A critique of the anthropomorphic conception of the state: The Romanian state as a relational, network and emergent actor. by Manea, Simona Florina
The London School of Economics and Political 
Science
A Critique of the anthropomorphic conception of the 
state: The Romanian state as a relational, network 
and emergent actor
Simona Fiorina Manea
A thesis submitted to the Department of 
International Relations of the London School of 
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
London, October 2008
UMI Number: U615274
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615274
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
THests
I 0 3 I
111 6452
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely 
my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work 
of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me 
and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may 
not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe 
the rights of any third party.
Abstract
The present thesis is premised on the claim that that there is an inescapable 
arrangement of the discipline around the concept of the state. IR theories, from 
rationalist to constructivist ones, dispute to different degrees the ontological 
and/or analytical utility of the concept. Yet none of them reject the assumptions 
of corporate agency (based on the assumption of personhood) when discussing 
the state as an agent internationally. This thesis advances the view that 
assumptions about the properties of biological kinds, such as unchangeable 
features, well-determined boundaries and unitary intentionality and agency, 
cannot be transferred to social kinds such as states. It constitutes a rejection of the 
essentialising and reifying moves characterising IR theories, while still arguing 
there are such things as structurally complex actors, and that the state is one of 
them.
The thesis proposes a conception of the state as a relational, network and 
emergent actor. It argues that a combination between the relational ontology of 
networks with the emergent and nonlinear assumptions of complexity science 
constitute the basis for such a conception of the state. Specifically, the framework 
can account for the relationship between individual and state agency without 
collapsing the two analytical and ontological objects. It proposes a view of state 
agency as differentiated depending on the type of relationships within networks 
engaged in the constitution of the state. In this light, state agency is regarded as 
non-unitary and relational.
Based on such a framework, the illustrative cases challenge the manner in which 
historical data has been put to work to explain the construction of the Romanian 
state in relation to specific historical events: i.e. the coup and change of regime 
after 1944; and within a specific period of modernity: i.e. from the 1960s to mid- 
1980s. The analysis demonstrates that the Romanian state is more than the sum of 
powerful individuals, yet not a static entity with a clear distinction between its 
inside and outside. It also shows that, even for the personalistic dictatorship years 
(1960s -  1980s), overlapping and contradictory social relations and practices 
simultaneously constitute the state and state agency. This demonstration aims to 
reinforce the broader claim about the applicability of the framework across a 
range of types of states (in this case, totalitarian modem states) whilst allowing 
specific historical analysis of their constitution and agentic potentialities.
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of Universities UK that made 
possible my enrolment in the PhD programme at the LSE. I would also like to thank 
the Open Society Institute New York, the Ratiu Family Foundation and the 
International Relations Department at the LSE.1 I could dedicate most of my time to 
research due to their generous financial assistance.
I am deeply thankful to my supervisor, Professor Kimberly Hutchings, whose office 
I have never left without valuable feedback on my work. My writing is also better 
because of her. I am also indebted to Kim for her constant support and words of 
encouragement for my project.
I have been fortunate enough to make a few dear friends in all the places where I 
have lived and studied. I thank all of them for their enriching presence in my life, 
and for tolerating my delayed birthday wishes and my two line emails, especially in 
the last months.
I would like to acknowledge my wonderful LSE colleagues and friends Cristina, 
Felix, Lisa, Matjo, and Simon. We have shared many intellectually stimulating and 
enjoyable conversations in the course of these four years. I am particularly indebted 
to Simon for taking the time to read and comment on my final draft.
I have benefited greatly from being part of the IR department research community. 
The International Political Theory workshop, the Research Design seminar, and the 
Staff and Research Students Seminar constituted valuable academic environments, 
which have informed my experience as a PhD student.
11 have received the following grants from these institutions: The Overseas Research Students Award 
(2004-2007), the OSI Global Supplementary Fund Scholarship (2005), the Ratiu Family Foundation 
Award (2006 and 2007), the LSE International Relations Research Studentship Award (2005 - 2008).
4
I owe a great deal to my former teachers, who have contributed in different ways to 
the academic path I have chosen. I would like to acknowledge here the incredible 
talent of my history teachers, Ms. Preluca and Mr Postolache, in making us curious 
about world history and politics. I also would like to thank my university teachers, 
Professor Ovidiu Pecican and Professor Marius Jucan and Dr. Peter Lawler for 
introducing me to the history of ideas, anthropology, and IR theory, respectively. I 
am particularly grateful to Professor David Farrell, Dr. Richard Jackson, Professor 
Inderjeet Parmar, and Dr. Veronique Pin-Fat for their support of my PhD 
application.
I would like to thank my mom, and my sister, Aura, and our dear family friends, 
Kati, Mircea, Susan, and Steve for their lifelong affection and unconditional support 
for my different projects.
Not least, I should thank my boyfriend, Marco. He has been, during these years, a 
wonderful life companion, and my closest friend.
5
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................................... 8
General aspects........................................................................................................ 8
Methodological considerations............................................................................. 10
Organisation of the thesis..................................................................................... 15
Chapter 2: One and the Multiple: Statist and pluralist views of the state.... 22
2.1. The state as an autonomous actor................................................................. 23
2.2. Enhancing the international/domestic divide by ‘deconstructing’ 
sovereignty............................................................................................................. 29
2.3. Pluralists views: the FPA literature.............................................................. 35
2.4. The state in the interdependence and world politics paradigms.................40
Conclusion............................................................................................................. 47
Chapter 3: Social construction and deconstruction in the conceptualisation 
of the state...........................................................................................................50
3.1. The socialised state: the state in the constructivist systemic paradigm 
(Wendt)...................................................................................................................50
3.2. The sociological state (Sorensen, Hobson)...................................................59
3.2.1. Typologies of state.................................................................................. 60
3.2.2. The ‘constitutive’ state............................................................................66
3.3. The state as (academic) discourse and power relations: the postmodern
critique of the state.................................................................................................70
Conclusion............................................................................................................. 75
Chapter 4: From essentialist to relational ontology: implications for 
conceptualising the state and state agency....................................................... 78
4.1. Essentialism/substantialism in IR: explanatory and ontological 
consequences......................................................................................................... 79
4.2. Social relations, selves and agency............................................................... 92
4.3. States as relational and non-unitary actors.................................................100
Conclusion............................................................................................................107
Chapter 5: The State as an emergent network actor.................................... 109
5.1...... Integrating the concept of the ‘network’ into the conceptualisation of the 
state....................................................................................................................... 109
6
5.2. The network as an emergent social entity: potentialities and limitations 119
5.2.1. The autopoiesis assumption and the issue of network boundary 119
5.2.2. The nonlinearity and emergence assumptions: implications for 
understanding state agency............................................................................. 124
5.3. Power, agency and networks.......................................................................130
Conclusion............................................................................................................135
Chapter 6: State constitution and state agency: Times of change (1944 -  
1948)................................................................................................................... 138
6.1. Tracing the paths of change......................................................................... 139
6.2. Times of change: 1944 - 1948.....................................................................149
6.2.1. The Coup of 23 August 1944: the catalyst for change........................150
6.2.2. Tendencies towards uniformity............................................................ 156
Conclusion............................................................................................................164
Chapter 7: The totalitarian state: a relational, network state: Romania (1965 
-1980s).............................................................................................................. 168
7.1. Social processes and totalitarian states: networks of social relations and 
networks of agents............................................................................................... 169
7.1.1. ‘The Party, Ceausescu, Romania’: Locating the discussion about 
Romanian state action......................................................................................170
7.1.2. Assessing the relationship between the state and the Party............... 177
7.1.3. The consequences of economic centralisation upon state agency .... 182
7.1.4. Ideational resources: not top down or nationally bounded................ 186
7.2. Re-framing the explanations of Romanian Foreign Policy...................... 191
7.2.1. Existing explanations: the Romanian state: unitary, maverick and/or 
dependent on USSR.........................................................................................191
7.2.2. The issue o f ‘independent’ foreign policy...........................................195
7.2.3. Industrialisation and debt payment as ‘independent’ foreign policy 
goals.................................................................................................................. 199
Economic development through industrialisation.................................200
The debt payment -  the policy goal of the 1980s..................................203
Conclusion........................................................................................................... 209
Chapter 8: Conclusion..................................................................................... 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................ 237
7
Chapter 1: Introduction
General aspects
The present thesis is premised on the claim that that there is an inescapable 
arrangement of the discipline around the concept of the state. IR theories, from 
rationalist to constructivist ones, dispute to different degrees the ontological and/or 
analytical utility of the concept. For instance, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)2 
theories emphasise the role of leaders, the elites, the bureaucracies, and interest 
groups in determining political outcomes. Yet, analyses of international politics 
come with an assumption that it is states that do the acting internationally.
When attributing ontological and analytical status to the state internationally, such 
theories treat states as corporate persons. Indeed, Alexander Wendt argued that 
discussion about international politics would not be possible without the 
personification of the state and the assumption that its agency is unitary. States as 
persons and state agency as unitary presupposes a conception of entities as coherent 
and possessing a well defined inside. The theoretical justification for treating states 
as persons or like persons has been debated in the last decade in IR, especially after 
the publication of Wendt’s Social Theory o f  International Politics? However, 
systematic analysis of how one can still keep the state as an actor without resorting 
to reifications and personification of the state are still lacking.
2 Although FPA is part of the discipline o f IR, I differentiate here between IR and FPA texts. This 
distinction, while debatable, is reflected in the curriculum of politics departments. The courses 
identify and separate between IR and FPA ‘core thinkers’, although many can be found on the reading 
lists o f both courses.
3 See for instance the Review o f International Studies, 2004, 30.
8
The thesis examines different theories that treat the state as a sum of individuals, 
leaders, elites, top bureaucracies and as if states are persons, in order to assess 
whether their analytical and/or ontological moves provide cogent and coherent 
understandings and explanations of the state as an actor. The thesis intends to show 
that these theories are premised on essentialist and reifying assumptions of social 
entities, spaces and agency. These assumptions create fundamental inconsistencies in 
these theories and undermine their explanatory potential.
The thesis proposes a conception of the state as a relational, network and emergent 
actor. It aims to show that a combination between the relational ontology of 
networks with the emergent and nonlinear assumptions of complexity science 
constitute the basis for such a conception of the state. Process philosophy and 
relational sociology, as well as Colin Wight’s work on agents and structures will be 
central to such a move. The thesis proposes a view of state agency as differentiated 
depending on the type of relationships within networks engaged in the constitution 
of the state. In this light, it regards state agency as non-unitary and relational. The 
project also aims to provide an account of the relationship between the individual 
and the state without collapsing the two analytical and ontological objects.
The thesis puts forward a conceptualisation of the state that allows for differentiation 
between states according to their historical and contextual specificity. Yet it insists 
on considering the state as a network as an ontological premise for any historical 
analysis. From this perspective, totalitarian, highly centralised states, for instance, 
can also be considered network-like and relational, yet constituted through social 
relations, practices and institutions that may differ from postmodern states. This
9
differentiates the argument of this thesis from evolutionist conceptualisations of the 
state. The latter suggest a relational and processual ontology only in relation to 
contemporary social entities when they associate, for instance, modem/industrial 
states with modernity and postmodern ones with informational societies.
The two illustrative cases that I propose in the thesis are intended to demonstrate the 
manner in which the framework is put to work to explain the construction of the 
Romanian state in relation to specific historical events: i.e. the coup and change of 
regime after 1944; and within a specific period of modernity: i.e. the period between 
the 1960s to mid 1980s. Their rationale and added contribution will be discussed at 
more length below.
Methodological considerations
The processual philosophy and relational sociology literature, network analysis and 
complexity science writings, and the literature on social and psychological views of 
the human self, constitute the main sources for the chapters informing the theoretical 
framework developed in the thesis. The case studies use primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources are newspaper articles, archive evidence published in 
historical journals documenting the policy measures of the Romanian state and the 
Romanian communist Party for the time in question, reports of meetings between 
Romanian leaders and other foreign officials and CIA country reports. The political 
histories written by foreign and Romanian authors, as well as anthropological and 
economics writings, are the secondary sources for these chapters.
Due to the nature of the topic, immanent critique as a method is essential in 
demonstrating the inconsistencies and shortcomings of a wide range of IR theories.
10
The analysis in the case study chapters is based on a reading of historical data 
through the framework developed in chapters 4 and 5. The appraisal of the 
explanatory potential of political histories of the time is achieved therefore with a 
theoretical preference for a concept of the state as relational, network and emergent. 
I use some of the methodological insights of the network analysis literature to guide 
my analysis in the empirical chapters. I rely on qualitative analysis to identify the 
role of different boundaries in the constitution of the state as an actor. The analysis is 
underpinned by an understanding that the boundary drawing of the social networks 
relevant to understanding social action is an empirical question rather than a 
theoretical assumption (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). It involves a negotiation 
between the observer’s view of where the boundary should be drawn and the 
participants’ awareness or acknowledgement of these boundaries.
From the variety of IR texts I have chosen those that are both reflective of the 
different trends in conceptualising the state but also those that make a claim about 
the potential of their theories to provide an integrated analysis and ontology of the 
domestic and the international social spaces. In the second chapter I will discuss the 
works of Krasner, Gourevitch, Putman, Katzenstein and Allison, and Keohane and 
his co-authors. The writings of Krasner and Keohane et al. combine an IR focus with 
an FPA one. FPA projects aim to bring the domestic within thinking about 
international relations and emphasise the role of domestic structures upon foreign 
policy. Stephen Krasner’s version of realism,4 and especially his work of 
deconstructing sovereignty as an ordering principle of the international realm, seem 
to propose a reconsideration of the international -  domestic division. The complex 
interdependence and world politics paradigms of Keohane and Nye are theoretically
4 Stephen D. Krasner has been frequently described by students o f International Relations as ‘a 
modified’, untypical or ‘sophisticated’ realist with acknowledged influences from both Neorealism 
and Neoliberal Institutionalism (Philpott, January 2001; Rothstein, Autumn, 1988).
interesting because they combine, for example, a systemic theory of international 
relations and a pluralist ontology of the international, which includes transnational 
and transgovemmental relations (Keohane, 1986; Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, 
Autumn 1987). While keeping states as the main units in the system, they make 
systemic processes the unifying concept between international and domestic politics. 
Gourevitch’s ‘second image reversed’, Putnam’s ‘two-level games’ and 
Katzenstein’s ‘domestic explanation’ are the most quoted FPA examples of 
analytical frameworks that theorise the domestic and international link. I discuss the 
bureaucratic politics model of Allison because it represents the example of state 
fragmentation on which Keohane draws and which Krasner argues against. My 
interest is in how the view of the state relates to the understanding of the 
international and the domestic social spaces.
I have chosen constructivists such as Wendt and historical sociologists such as Hobson 
and Sorensen, as well as the postmodern critique of the state, because they explore from 
different premises the constitution of the state and state agency. These writings integrate 
more consistently ideational factors such as values, norms, and identities, think more 
extensively about state agency (Wendt, Hobson), historicise the state (Hobson, 
Sorensen) and give weight to discursive practices (the postmodern critique). With the 
exception of Wendt, these IR theorists propose a reconsideration of the ontological and 
analytical understanding of international and domestic social spaces.
The case studies propose an analysis of regime change, which occurred in Romania 
following the end of the Second World War between 1944 and 1948, and of 
Romanian state policies during times of stability; the period of 1960s to mid 1980s. 
The process of regime change culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and the
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declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947. The purpose of having an analysis 
of regime change, as well as times of stability, is to re-enforce through empirical 
illustration the theoretical argument, while also having the theoretical argument 
drive the empirical analysis. In other words, the cases serve two simultaneous and 
inter-related tasks of ‘theory illustration’ and ‘theory development’ (George & 
Bennett, 2004, p. 74).
By looking at what was targeted in the process of regime change, I aim to 
demonstrate that states are neither a sum of individuals nor static entities. Changing 
the constitution and the agentic possibilities of the Romanian state was not only the 
result of a process of political exclusion of individuals but also of concomitant 
processes of re-designing social relations. I consider the stages of regime change as 
being indicative of the implicit manner in which states, as political entities, are 
thought to function by human agents. The historical accounts argue that the cause 
and the agent of change were the Soviet Union and/or Stalin. Stalin’s will, and the 
coercion by the Red Army, explain the changes in the state in terms of its formal 
relations and institutions. The first case study intends to reframe the linear 
explanations, which identify one or two causes directly responsible for regime 
change, with an account that acknowledges the role of multiple and layered social 
networks, as well as social relations, in the constitution of the Romanian state.
For the second time frame, the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the historical data and 
political histories describe a highly centralised state with a strong leader, whose 
personality cult took on Orwellian dimensions. The Romanian case can constitute 
empirical data for theories that take a pluralist view (wherein states are their leaders), 
or a statist view (whereby the state is a highly hierarchical and centralised actor with
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well-defined and separate interests and goals). The counter-factual historical data 
represents, in this case, a challenge to my ontological claims about the constitution 
of social entities, boundaries and agency in relational network-like and nonlinear 
ways.
The broader goal of this case study is to demonstrate that, in spite of the formal 
highly centralised organisational structure, the logic of the social relations 
underpinning the policies and institutions of the state enabled several types of 
networks to constitute the state. This illustrative chapter has been chosen to reinforce 
the broader claim about the applicability of the framework across types of states, 
such as totalitarian industrialising states, yet allowing for specific historical analysis 
of their constitution and agential potentialities in the international. This is, in other 
words, an argument against ideal types or typologies of states, especially when these 
typologies undermine the meta-theoretical commitments to a relational view of the 
social world.
When reading the political histories for these time periods, it became more evident 
that the demonstration was being made difficult by the silent assumptions that 
informed the historical narratives. Although the historical analyses do not make 
explicit references to a specific view of the state and state agency, they are 
underpinned by statist and pluralist ontological assumptions and work with a 
conception of the state as a person. Often the Romanian state and the leaders such as 
Ceausescu are considered synonymous, or the Communist Party is equated to the 
state. Authors speak about the ‘thoughts’ or the ‘state of mind’ of the state or the 
nation, and so forth. It is at this point that the anthropological and economics 
writings on communist societies and economies become important in offering more
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detailed insights into the social practices that constituted the Romanian state. My 
argument against a certain type of historical narrative becomes thus part of the 
endeavour to unveil the explanatory possibilities for understanding the agency of the 
Romanian state when the focus is on social relations, practices and institutions and 
the networks of human agents embedded in these social spaces.
Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is organised into eight chapters, including the present introduction and the 
conclusion. The second and third chapters critically engage with some of the 
propositions put forward by the IR and FPA texts mentioned above regarding the 
view of the state as an agent in international politics. These chapters provide the 
themes and the questions that are explored throughout the thesis.
The second chapter, entitled ‘One and the Multiple: The statist and pluralist views of 
the state’, looks at the differences between the statist approach of Krasner and the 
pluralist approaches in terms of conceptualising the state and state agency. Pluralist 
views consider the state as either fragmented or as a redundant concept. Katzenstein 
and Gourevitch define the state as a conglomerate of interests, which are not 
necessarily only the interests of specific classes or groups, but neither representative 
of the public good. Putnam regards the state as the sum of executive decision­
makers. Allison’s bureaucratic politics model argues that there is no analytical value 
in considering the state as a distinct institution from the bureaucratic institutions. 
The pluralist writers reject the assumption of the state as a unitary actor. The 
paradigms of complex interdependence and world politics of Keohane and Nye also 
challenge the view of the state as a unitary actor. They understand the state as a 
fragmented entity. On the other hand, Krasner’s account proposes a concept of the
state as an autonomous actor possessing a coherent inside and unitary intentionality 
and agency. The chapter questions the conceptualisation of the state as an 
autonomous actor or as the sum of individuals or interests, the conceptualisation of 
social spaces as self-contained and ontologically different in terms of their 
constitutive features, and the conceptions of agency suggested by these theories. The 
manner in which the relationship between the international and the domestic is 
conceived is an important signifier for a certain vision of entities and the sources of 
state agency. The chapter, for instance, engages at length with Krasner’s argument 
regarding the emergence of sovereignty and his view of the international -  domestic 
division. It discusses the logical implications of Krasner’s own argument upon 
understanding the state as an actor, and it questions Krasner’s argument regarding 
the hypocrisy of state behaviour.
In Chapter 3 ,1 discuss Wendt’s social theory of international politics, the work of 
historical sociologists such as Hobson and Sorensen, and the postmodern critique of 
the state. Their analyses incorporate relational and processual ontological 
assumptions by suggesting, for instance, a structurationist solution to the agency -  
structure problem. Such a position involves claiming that agents and structures are 
mutually constitutive, that neither is ontologically prior to the other, that elements 
are interdependent within the structure and interaction is time and space contingent. 
The chapter explores the internal tensions and inconsistencies that emerge from the 
different analytic or ontological moves, such as the bracketing of the domestic, or a 
strong focus on typologies of states. For instance, the analysis looks at the 
implications of Wendt’s anthropomorphic view of the state and the methodological 
bracketing of the domestic for the goals of his theory of international politics to 
explain change in the international realm. The chapter discusses the postmodern
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critique of the state, which is generally sceptical of the possibility for IR theories to 
avoid the reifications of social spaces and of the state. The section intends to relate 
the main arguments of the postmodern critique to the general aim of my research 
project, which is to deconstruct the traditional conceptions of the state in order to 
reframe its understanding using a relational and processual ontology.
Several questions have emerged from these two chapters as important to the 
conceptualisation of the state as an actor. They refer to the need to view the state as a 
unitary and a coherent entity in order to attribute it agency, to the relationship 
between ‘the’ international and ‘the’ domestic, to the relationship between human 
agents, such as leaders, bureaucrats, and politicians, and the state. They also refer to 
the conceptual possibilities of multi-causal explanations, as well as to the 
possibilities for a new language to discuss state agency as practice dependent and 
constituted by multiple social spaces.
The fourth chapter proposes a shift of the grounds on which conceptualisations of 
social entities and agency rest: from essentialist or substantialist to processual or 
relational ones. The aim of this chapter is to offer a more coherent framework that 
aligns a relational conception of entities with a relational understanding of agency 
and social spaces. The chapter uses the insights from processual philosophy, 
relational sociology, social psychology, and Colin Wight’s work on agency and 
structure to reframe the understanding of the state as an actor. The discussion first 
intends to show that the contradictions and inconsistencies of the IR theories 
examined earlier are in fact due to the essentialist conceptions underpinning their 
views of entities, properties and of boundaries. My analysis examines the mismatch 
between Sorensen’s essentialist view of state agency and the relational view of social
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spaces proposed by his framework. It also discusses the implications of developing 
predictable algorithms for each ideal type of state (for instance, associating a type of 
state with a type of agency internationally). The chapter discusses the concepts of 
social relations, selves and agency. It places these concepts at the centre of an 
understanding of the state as a relational and non-unitary actor. It develops the 
arguments that allow my framework to consider states as actors without the 
assumption of unitary intentionality. The argument proposes a conceptualisation of 
the state and state agency that maintains the ontological differentiation between 
individual and state agency.
Chapter 5 builds upon the conceptualisation of the state as a non-unitary and 
relational actor developed in chapter 4. It aims to show that the concept of the 
network is useful in thinking about the state as an entity and about social spaces. The 
chapter critically reflects on the issue of boundaries in order to consolidate the 
argument about the non-unitary nature of the state. It also argues for a 
conceptualisation of the state as a hierarchical network. The chapter uses the 
network analysis literature to contend that states should be conceptualised as 
networks regardless of the historical period. It also uses the complexity science 
concepts of emergence and non-linearity to further the distinction between the state 
and individuals and between their agential potential. Lastly, the chapter interrogates 
the conceptual links between agency and power existent in the IR literature and 
examines which understanding of power should inform the conception of agency 
developed in this project.
The theoretical propositions are illustrated in the chapters six and seven. Chapter 6 
looks at the political processes in Romania in the years before the coup of 1944, and
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at the changes occurring after, which culminating with the abolition of the monarchy 
and declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947. The chapter identifies the 
networks of social relations constituting the Romanian state formally, illicitly and 
informally. It illustrates the manner in which different networks of social relations 
and human agents inform a varied Romanian state agency during the pre-1944 years. 
The analysis in this chapter is underpinned by an understanding of change as 
dependent on previous social relations and practices, yet not determined in any clear 
way. The chapter considers the immediate context equally important for creating the 
opportunities for some social relations and networks of human agents to become 
more important than others. The analysis identifies the stages of regime change and 
discusses their implications for the constitution of the Romanian state. The analysis 
offers explanations that incorporate factors identified by historians, such as the 
presence of the Red Army on the Romanian territory, or the interest of the Soviet 
Allied Commission in the development of a communist regime in Romania, but it 
incorporates them into a more complex explanation. The chapter intends to offer a 
more nuanced account of the constitution of the Romanian state at the end of the war 
that moves away from the deterministic view: the Romanian state and state agency 
as the epiphenomenon of either the structural division of the world or of Stalin’s 
personal intentions.
The last core chapter is particularly important for making a fundamental point about 
the relational, network, and emergent character of the Romanian state. The chapter 
argues that explanations of state action should go beyond identifying the Romanian 
Communist Party or the leader as the cause for the position of the Romanian state in 
relation to specific policy goals or other actors. The chapter demonstrates that, in 
spite of the centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state
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institutions and practices, the Romanian state can be conceptualised as a network. 
This is achieved by looking at several issues: the conceptual and factual 
differentiation between the party and the state and the effects of the policies of 
bureaucratic, political, and economic centralisation. The chapter shows why and how 
the social spaces ordered around social practices in the economic and the political- 
administrative domains are equally important for understanding the emergent agency 
of the state. They constitute the Romanian state as a centralised yet network actor, 
highly coercive yet not able to control outcomes from top-down. The chapter also 
discusses two closely related foreign policy goals: economic development through 
industrialisation, and the payment of the national debt. The analysis of these policy 
goals illustrates the manner in which the boundaries between the inside and the 
outside are being negotiated in relation to different (or even the same) ‘foreign’ 
others. My analysis also raises questions about the tenability of claiming a stable self 
for the Romanian state. This is because for each goal or state action the state 
constitutes itself at the confluence of social relations, practices, and new contexts. 
By demonstrating the complexity of the social processes involved in the constitution 
of the Romanian state as a non-unitary actor, the analysis intends to disprove the IR 
accounts that identify one main relationship (state-society, for instance) as the cause 
for the agential potential of the state internationally.
The concluding chapter draws out the main theoretical contributions made by this 
project and links them to the analyses of the empirical chapters. It also reflects upon 
the type of social inquiry that the discipline can produce in terms of explanations of 
past events, and in terms of predicting future outcomes, if the intention is to develop 
policy relevant analysis. It discusses the implications of the project for understanding
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the domestic and the international social spaces, as well as for the boundaries of the 
discipline.
Chapter 2: One and the Multiple: Statist and pluralist 
views of the state
The argument is not about whether we are or are not ‘state centric 
but what we mean by the state (Halliday, 1987, p. 217).
This is the first of the two chapters that discuss rationalist and constructivist or 
statist5 and pluralist views of the state. The reason behind the choice of authors has 
been extensively presented under the Methodological consideration in the 
introduction. The goal of these chapters is two-fold. Firstly, the chapters aim to 
identify the limitations but also the insights in terms of understanding the 
constitution of the state and state agency. In order to achieve this, the chapters 
examine the implicit and explicit statements about the state as an actor. They also 
look at the manner in which the relationship between the international and the 
domestic has been framed in the writings. This relationship is an important signifier 
for a certain vision of entities and for understanding the sources of state agency. 
Secondly, the aim is to provide a platform for reconsidering the view of the state and 
state agency.
51 will use ‘state-centrism’ to denote the focus within international politics on the state as the main 
actor and ‘statist’ and ‘statism’ to refer to those theories that regard the state as an autonomous actor. 
Keohane, for instance, calls state-centric theories those which acknowledge the state as unified and 
the only actor in politics, while Krasner uses them interchangeably. See also Wagner (Summer, 1974) 
on the distinction.
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Statist and pluralist conceptions of the state refer to those frameworks that 
acknowledge the state as an independent analytical and/or ontological entity or deny 
its status by focusing on other objects of analysis. They start from different positions 
to explain international politics. When reading the opposing accounts it becomes 
immediately evident that even the pluralist frameworks refer to states as actors 
internationally. How different are then these approaches from each other in terms of 
their explanatory potential? What are the conceptions of state agency that are related 
to their respective views of the state? The present chapter answers these questions by 
looking at the work of Krasner, Gourevitch, Katzenstein, Putman, Allison6 and 
Keohane and Nye.
2.1. The state as an autonomous actor
In Krasner’s writings the state is portrayed as an independent analytic construct 
(Krasner, Spring, 1979, p. 96). 7 This translates into an image of the state as an 
autonomous, unified actor. It is more than a setting for domestic politics or an 
epiphenomenon of societal or group bargaining. Krasner’s project is different from 
that of other neo-realists8 (Krasner, 1999, p. 58, Feb., 1992, Spring, 1981) in that it 
rejects the state as a black box and aims to ‘unpack’ it, i.e. to break it down into 
identifiable components. It is an inside-outside perspective: the state is still the main 
actor in the international yet the focus is on its domestic components. The concept 
aims to fulfil a bridging role between the two dimensions of politics: the
61 take Allison as the main author of the bureaucratic politics model. He published an article in 1969, 
which became a book two years later (Allison, 1971). In 1972, Allison co-authored an article with 
Morton H. Halperin on the same subject (Allison & Halperin, 1972).
7 The discussion here refers to the concept of the state as it is theorised or as it can be inferred from 
his writings. However, his claims are also about the manner in which politics as a social realm is 
constituted.
8 Krasner engaged in his writings more with the Waltzian and the Gilpian versions than with the 
classical Realist ones (Robert O. Keohane & Krasner, Autumn, 1998).
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international and the domestic.9 According to Krasner, the statist approach is also 
designed to counter the pluralistic arguments, such as the bureaucratic politics 
model, which deny any standing to the state as an analytical concept.
A key feature of Krasner’s statist argument refers to the ability of the state to pursue 
the national interest without interference from pressure groups. This criterion allows 
Krasner to decide what institutions can be accurately labelled ‘state institutions.’ The 
state is identified with the ‘central governmental institutions’ and in some cases only 
with its ‘principal official agency’. Their respective responsibility is to ensure the 
‘well-being of the society’ or the general interest of society (Krasner, 1978, Feb., 
1992, p. 46, Jan., 1984, p. 228, Spring, 1979, pp. 79-80, 85). Specifically, in his 
analysis of the US foreign economic policy, the state institutions exclude local 
governments, at times the White House, elements of different Departments, various 
congressional committees depending on the degree of connectedness with their 
respective constituencies or social groups within these constituencies (Krasner, 
Autumn, 1973, p. 89). Although bargaining is present between the state’s agencies, 
dissident behaviour against the state’s policies can place an agency outside it.10
This statist view raises several issues. First, in terms of the definition of the state; 
secondly, in terms of the implications of the framework for empirical analysis; lastly, 
when the analysis acknowledges all the relations on the ground, the empirical 
findings do not sustain a statist approach, which relies on the state as an autonomous, 
unitary, and coherent entity.
9 Krasner writes that ‘[s]tatism is consistent with realism because it justifies the assertion that states 
can be treated as unified rational actors ( ...)’(Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 46).
10 He writes: ‘Executive departments like Agriculture and most congressional committees would not 
be part o f the state -  they are explicitly concerned with specific societal interests’ (Krasner, Feb., 
1992, pp. 46,47, 89).
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The unpacking of the state into identifiable components is not accompanied by any 
acknowledgement of the social processes and relations that bind it together. The 
state is autonomous and unitary in character by virtue of the rational and 
instrumental pursuit of the national interest and the ‘general societal 
objectives’(Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 48). The pursuit of the national interest is, in 
other words, the common ground for stateness for the component institutions. Yet, 
both interest-formation and the type of bonding relationship based on the national 
interest are primarily ‘bargaining’ relationships. This makes the “statist state” the 
same as the state in a pluralist argument: a sum of institutions or sum of interests 
(Wagner, Summer, 1974).
Secondly, according to the statist assumptions of exogenous interests and insulation 
of the state from other societal groups, the mere existence of interaction and 
influence between the society and state would dissolve the state (Wagner, Summer, 
1974). Not only is society exemplified narrowly by pressure groups but the existence 
of the state as an actor is premised on its ability to stay outside constitutive 
interaction with such groups. Contrary or different opinions arising from other 
groups are not only deemed less than a national interest but they alter the ‘stateness’ 
of the institutions that take them on board. Additionally, Krasner’s argument 
presupposes a taken-for-granted agreement upon what national security entails in 
terms of policies to follow. He writes, ‘[i]n defending territorial and political 
integrity [security], there is no obvious reason for intra-national clashes’(Krasner, 
Autumn, 1973, p. 496). Krasner’s position presupposes that the concerns and the
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understandings of national security are collective, i.e. supported by the entire 
society, because the impact of security polices is collective.11
Krasner’s theory cannot reconcile the assumption about a collectively representative 
interest with the statist assumption about the minimalist interaction between the state 
and society. The assumption of coherence and unity of the state makes this move 
even more difficult. The assumptions that inform the argument about the state as an 
autonomous actor have been criticised for their normative implications. Krasner 
defends his theory by arguing that there is an ethical dimension to it, which does not 
endorse autocratic rules. He writes: statist theory ‘would not endorse an autocratic 
regime that pursued interests that disproportionately favoured particular groups in a 
given society (...)’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 47). Yet, he also argues that ‘statism is 
sceptical of popular control in a fragmented polity because such control can frustrate 
the pursuit of the national interest rather than promote it’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 
47). The conundrum remains how to keep the state as an actor while also 
acknowledging the state-society relationship and the interactions between different 
state institutions.12
Krasner’s empirical findings weaken his statist theoretical contentions with respect 
to the ability of the state to act unhindered internationally and domestically (Krasner, 
Spring, 1982a, Spring, 1982b). The empirical findings suggest an important 
constraining role for private groups both internationally and domestically due to 
their economic power and domestic institutional arrangements. They can influence 
and change international economic regimes (Krasner, April, 1991, pp. 343, 356).
11 ‘[Security] is the collective good par excellence. It affects all groups in more or less the same way. 
Only with difficulty can one group within a state enjoy security without providing it to others’ 
(Krasner, Autumn, 1973, pp. 495-496).
12 Krasner himself acknowledges these limits in a co-authored article (Peter J. Katzenstein, Keohane, 
& Krasner, Autumn, 1998, p. 666).
Krasner also recognises empirically the role of broader social relations in influencing 
the institutional arrangement and consequently the American state in terms of the 
decision-making, policy choices, and ability to pursue those interests. However, his 
conceptual framework takes interests for granted and places them outside interaction 
with society. This makes Krasner’s conceptual tool kit restrictive and unfit for 
empirical examples that need to understand those interactions -  the manner in which 
the state is informed, shaped and influences, in its turn, the formation of interests.
In his recent writings on sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, p. 43) -  to which I will return 
in the next subsection -  the explanatory need for a revised conceptualisation of the 
state as a separate entity has been avoided through a new focus on ‘rulers’ and 
‘specific policy makers’. Interestingly, in spite of the emphasis on individuals as the
13main ontological givens and agents , this is not an inside-outside type of argument, 
like the statist one. Rather, the ruler-based approach is integrated within the 
discussion about the nature of the international realm and state action internationally. 
Krasner still speaks of states, referring for example to the Westphalian state, and 
then more specifically to the English and the French state. The argument about the 
prevalence of the logic of consequence internationally relies on a focus on rulers, i.e. 
individuals and their instrumental behaviour. It is the ruler’s drive to preserve 
power14 that informs his/her pursuit of the national interest and common good, with 
the caveat that domestically, normative constraints (societal norms) may influence 
the ruler’s actions (Krasner, 1999, pp. 7, 9).
13 ‘The starting point for this study, is that the the ontological givens are rulers, specific policy 
makers, usually but not always the executive head of state. Rulers not states -  and not the 
international system -  make choices about policies, rules, and institutions (Krasner, 1999, p. 7).
14 Methodologically, preferences should be taken as given: ‘Any actor-oriented approach must start 
with simple assumptions about the underlying preferences of actors. These preferences must be 
applicable to all actors across space and time. If the preferences, the underlying interests of actors, are 
problematic, then the preferences become something to be explained rather than something that can 
do the explaining.’ (Krasner, 1999, p. 7)
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One important issue arises from this new focus. This refers to the relationship 
between the ruler and the state. The fact that the concept of ‘state’ is still present in 
the analyses implies that rulers speak for states. At the same time, from the manner 
in which Krasner frames his analysis, it seems that the state is still considered an 
actor. In fact, one of the key elements of the sovereignty argument rests on the 
assumption of states as rational unitary actors. If Krasner’s intention is to explain 
state action by reference to the ruler’s instrumental and power-driven actions, then 
the concept of the state loses all of the previous meanings developed in the statist 
approach. This issue of the relationship between individual and the state is a 
recurrent one in the FPA pluralist theories discussed below.
To conclude, this first section has examined Krasner’s statist argument. It has 
evaluated the ability of his theoretical framework to offer a different 
conceptualisation of the state from that of the pluralists and the neo-realists. It 
concluded that paradoxically, Krasner’s framework ends up with a pluralist 
argument. It has also argued that the framework’s ability to question and explain the 
role of broader social processes in shaping the ‘national’ interest and state behaviour 
is limited. The discussion has also drawn attention to the under-examined 
relationship between leaders and states as actors in the international system.
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2.2. Enhancing the international/domestic divide by 
‘deconstructing9 sovereignty
Krasner’s deconstruction of the long-embedded conception of Westphalian 
sovereignty15 would suggest at a first glance a theoretical and empirical 
reconsideration of the international -  domestic division. The different understanding 
of spatialities would in turn allow for a more dynamic framing of the manner in 
which states are constituted as actors.
Krasner’s view of the relationship between the international and the domestic draws 
on the classical differentiation. The domestic political community is favourable to 
‘lock-in processes’ and the creation of stable institutional forms. The diversity of 
domestic normative structures does not favour agreement upon the guiding 
principles at the international level (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, pp. 117, 148 - 
149). ‘Generative grammars’, i.e. institutionalized normative structures that 
constitute actors, are non-existent internationally (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 
145).16 In Krasner’s language, the international is the realm of the logic of 
consequences while the domestic is the realm of the logic of appropriateness 
(Krasner, 1999, p. 6). This translates into a different type of behaviour 
internationally: instrumental and utility driven. The ruler-based approach discussed 
above suggests that utilitarian and instrumental reasoning is present in the 
international realm as well as domestically (Krasner, 1999, pp. 5 - 6). Krasner argues 
that sovereignty as an organising principle has emerged because of the utilitarian
15 Krasner’s four types of sovereignty exercised by states are: domestic sovereignty (i.e. control over 
domestic activities), interdependence sovereignty (authority over transborder movements), 
international legal sovereignty (authority stemming from ‘formal juridical independence’), and the 
Westphalian sovereignty (i.e. authority to be the sole ‘arbiter of legitimate behaviour’ within a 
territorial unit). For an extensive account on the four types of sovereignty, see (Krasner, 1999, pp. 1 - 
42, Winter, 1995-1996, pp. 118 -119).
16 ‘[T]he defining characteristic of international politics is anarchy, the absence of authority, not the 
nature of domestic regimes’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 48).
choice kings and bureaucracies consciously made in order to legitimate tax 
collection and consolidate their positions, respectively. Aside from the emphasis on 
the instrumental behaviour of rulers, this type of argument also emphasises the 
material causes of sovereignty. Ideas were a function of material interests within the 
political community of the time and had no generative role (Krasner, 1993, pp. 257, 
262). Krasner writes:
In the effort to construct sovereignty, ideas have been used to codify existing practices rather than to 
initiate new forms of order. Ideas have not made possible alternatives that did not previously exist; 
they legitimated political practices that were already facts on the ground. Ideas have been one among 
several instruments that actors have invoked to promote their own, usually mundane, interests 
(Krasner, 1993, pp. 238, 246).
A second related point Krasner makes refers to the existence of sovereign practices 
well before the Peace Treaties of Westphalia and, pace most scholars, an unclear, 
fuzzy transition from feudalism to modernity. The treaties institutionalised already 
existing material driven practices. For post-Westphalian Europe, he still maintains 
the role of material interests in determining political action and the role of 
instrumentally driven behaviour of leaders. He exemplifies his argument with the
17case of the fall of the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon’s political interests were, 
according to Krasner, the main drive for the demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 
1806, and not the works of Bodin, Hobbes, and Vattel (Krasner, 1993, pp. 251 - 
252).
While offering a more nuanced historical reading of the Westphalian moment, 
Krasner’s argument reinstates the realist view of well-defined boundaries between
17 The pre-Westphalian system was premised, according to historians, on universal institutions: 
religious (Papacy) and secular (the Roman Empire). The new system came with the rejection ofboth. 
Krasner is indecisive about the decline of the institutions o f the Holy Empire. He writes ‘the term “the 
Westphalian system” does accurately capture the fact that the efficacy o f universal institutions has 
been virtually eliminated (...).’ He also writes that ‘The Holy Roman Empire did not, however, 
disappear either in law or in practice in 1648. (...) While its most important institutions, especially 
the diet, atrophied during the eighteenth century, others remain robust’ (Krasner, 1993, pp. 236,247).
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the domestic and the international realms. Based on the conventional understanding 
of sovereignty Krasner implies that states are fixed and exclusively self-generated 
entities that cannot internalise, for example, normative prescriptions such as human 
rights law. I argue here that there are nevertheless trends in his analysis that allow a 
different conclusion: a re-conceptualisation of these social spaces.
Krasner builds his argument against what he calls the ‘conventional’ understanding 
of sovereignty as theorised over the years. He claims that there is a false perception 
of sovereignty and its practice. Both practice over the centuries and recent theories 
are invoked to buttress his argument. Furthermore, in order to substantiate his claim, 
Krasner points to the provisions in the treaties of Westphalia, which did not enforce 
an absolute right of decision of rulers with respect to religion (Krasner, 1993, pp. 
242-244).18 The problem lies thus, as can be inferred from Krasner’s argument, in 
the premises or in the starting definition, for sovereignty is not the exclusive right of 
control over a specific territory (Krasner, 1993, pp. 235,237,240). Paradoxically, 
this proof has a two-fold effect: it reduces the shocking element of his thesis and 
secondly, it undermines Krasner’s argument about the instrumental as opposed to 
generative role of the principle of sovereignty. Consequently, the broader argument 
about the hypocrisy of the system becomes less powerful.
The shocking element of his thesis referred to his exposing of the mismatch between 
the practice and the rule of sovereignty. This makes states hypocritical. However, if 
we accept his demonstration that the legal definition of 1648 reflected the blend of 
central control and intervention existing already, then subsequent state practice 
represents a reflection of this contradictory rule. State practices were instantiations
18 The treaty did not recognize ‘the right of rulers to change the religious practices within their 
territories arbitrarily’ (Krasner, 1993, pp. 242-244).
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of the tension captured in this institutionalising moment. In other words, the 
contradictory practices after the Peace Treaties were instantiations of the sovereignty 
principle. Yet, Krasner does not acknowledge the constitutive or generative role of 
the principle. Instead, he reads the different practices with respect to Human Rights 
or economic cooperation, for example, as signs of the hypocrisy of the system. Only 
by being inconsistent in the usage of the definition of sovereignty, can he claim this 
interpretation. That is, the system is hypocritical because it is judged now according 
to the ‘conventional’ definition and it is not generative because hypocrisy and 
inconsistency implies instrumental and utility-oriented action.
Secondly, the argument of a non-generative international structure is built on the 
exercise of state instrumentality. At the same time, Krasner argues that ‘[t]he 
assumption that states are independent rational actors can be misleading because it 
marginalizes many situations in which rulers have, in fact, not been autonomous’ 
(Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 115). This creates another paradoxical position 
because in theory, if sovereignty is to remain non-generative, rational and 
instrumental calculation should prevail. Nevertheless, ‘many’ times, this has not 
happened since ‘autonomous’ behaviour has been trumped due to interventions 
based on normative justifications (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 115).19 In other 
words, the lack of autonomous behaviour reinforces the argument about the 
hypocrisy of the system and at the same time undermines the assumption upon 
which a non-generative system relies.
The additional claim that ‘no convincing alternative cognitive construct has been 
presented’(Krasner, Spring, 1982a, p. 509), in spite of sovereignty being contested as
19 It should also be noted that Krasner attributes the deviations in the behaviour of states to 
‘erroneous’ action: ‘in the shorter run (...) states, may err.’ The example he gives is the US’s 
ideologically-driven foreign policy (Krasner, Feb., 1992).
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an organising principle of the international system, in fact supports the argument 
against the prevalence of the logic of consequence. According to Krasner, a new 
principle would need to be shown as viable and compensatory for the high ‘sunk 
costs’, i.e. the political, social, economic costs, of dissolving the present order. This 
is portrayed as a rational instrumental decision. In this context, one can argue that 
sovereignty as an enduring reference point creates the possibilities of its deeper 
institutionalisation and the subsequent possibility to become a ‘generative’ rule.
The idea that norms and principles can be institutionalised in the international 
system and constitute a feature of the structure comes out of Krasner’s writings on 
regimes. It is however an unintended consequence of his usage of concepts. Regimes 
denote cooperative and norm-driven behaviour and action and hierarchical 
structures. At the same time, he equates, for example, the international economic
onstructure/system with both the neo-liberal economic order and with the 
international trade structure (Krasner, March 1981, pp. 135, 138). The conceptual 
difference between specific regimes and the international economic structure is 
collapsed when he states that the international neo-liberal order is a regime that the 
Third World would like to change (Krasner, March 1981, p. 121). The weak 
conceptual link between economic regimes and international structures blurs the 
understanding of what the Third World is really changing: an ‘intervening 
variable’/actor within the system (as regimes are labelled) (Krasner, Spring, 1982b), 
or a structural feature. On the other hand, it means, as mentioned, that the features of 
international structures are not immutable.
20 Krasner uses the concepts of international structure, system and politics interchangeably. For 
example, the US has a ‘position of dominance in the international system’, which he labels in some 
other places a hegemonic international structure (My emphasis). (Krasner, April, 1976, p. 318, 
Spring, 1981, p. 321).
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Finally, Krasner works with a narrow understanding of rationality and politics. This
can be inferred from his understanding of the relationship between material and
ideational factors. As mentioned, he asserts the prevalence of material over
ideational factors in the emergence of sovereignty. However, in his book, Krasner
acknowledges in several places that there was a ‘fluid relationship between power
[understood as material interests] and ideas’. Krasner argues that ‘ [k]ings, popes, and
emperors all had intellectual rationales that legitimated their claims to make
authoritative decisions’ (Krasner, 1993, p. 256). This means that there was a
concomitant revision of the sources of authority, both spiritual and political around
the time of the treaty of Westphalia. He also mentions a ‘sense of national identity’
emerging by the end of the fifteenth century in England. In the light of these
historical specifications, Krasner’s material embedding and understanding of
rationality become questionable. Furthermore, several other authors have
demonstrated the role of Enlightenment writings in shaping the political practices of
the time (Reus-Smit, 1999; Ruggie, January 1983; Schwoerer, October - December
1990). For instance, ideas such as meritocracy and the rule of law put forward by the
0 1Enlightenment literature were important for the political practices of the time and 
informed Napoleon’s political beliefs (Martin, 2001). This means that Krasner’s 
argument in not only inconsistent on its own terms in providing an explanation of 
political behaviour but also fails to integrate historical material relevant to the 
historical period he discusses.
This section has discussed Krasner’s argument regarding the emergence of 
sovereignty and his view of the international -  domestic division. It has shown that 
his work contains arguments that point to a fundamentally different position that he
21 Such works are Montesquieu’s ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ of 1748 or Rousseau’s ‘The Social 
Contract or Principles of Political Right’ (1762)..
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has chosen to argue for in his work. The analysis has shown that state practice is not 
‘hypocritical’ but reflects the contradictions institutionalised in the Westphalian rule. 
It has also shown that the idea of the domestic and the international as fundamentally 
different social spaces is difficult to sustain if one looks at the logical implications of 
Krasner’s own argument.
2.3. Pluralists views: the FPA literature
Pluralists consider the state as either fragmented or as a redundant concept. 
Katzenstein and Gourevitch define the state as a conglomerate of interests, which are 
not necessarily only the interests of specific classes or groups, but neither are they 
representative of the public good (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977). Putnam 
regards the state as the sum of executive decision-makers (Putnam, 1998, p. 432) . 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model argues that there is no analytical value in 
considering the state as a distinct institution from the bureaucratic institutions. The 
pluralist writers reject the assumption of the state as a unitary actor (Gourevitch, 
2002, p. 303). Except for Allison, they also aim to incorporate the domestic 
dimension of the state into explanations of world politics.
This literature brings into discussion the need for an integrated analysis. 
Katzenstein’s domestic explanation , Gourevitch’s second image reversed and
22 Katzenstein’s framework focuses on the constraints domestic structures place on the international 
political process (Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976).
The second image reversed designates the conceptual endeavour that aims to assess the role of the 
international state system, which is exemplified by (the state of) war and the distribution of power 
among states, and of the international economic system in influencing domestic politics (Gourevitch, 
Autumn, 1978).
35
Putnam’s two-level games24 aim to theorise the ‘intertwinement’ or the ‘areas of 
entanglement’ between the domestic and international politics (Gourevitch, 
Autumn, 1978, p. 911; Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976, p. 2; Putnam, 1998, p. 
430). They acknowledge the importance of state - society relations, which they 
theorise differently. For instance, Putnam’s definition of state’s autonomy is linked 
to its ability to distance itself from societal ‘pressures’ (Putnam, 1998, pp. 445,449), 
which resembles Krasner’s view of the state. They all posit causal relationships 
between the nature of the state as an institution and that of society (i.e. societal 
groups).
There is a key theoretical and ontological implication from the empirical writings 
that none of the authors seem to acknowledge. The analytical move to consider the 
relationship between the state and society as part of the analysis of international 
politics informs the examples these writers give. Katzenstein claims for instance that 
France is a strong state with a weak society while the USA has a weak state and a 
strong society (Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976, pp. 15 -  42). This relationship 
influences the implementation of state policies (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977, 
p. 604). Putnam argues that during international bargaining a dominant state 
domestically will find itself in a weak bargaining position as it cannot attribute the 
lack of agreement on an issue or renounce negotiations on the grounds that 
domestically it cannot implement the decisions (Putnam, 1998, pp. 445,449). One 
can infer from the examples that within a specific historical context, a state can be
24 It designates a model that looks at the manner in which or whether the domestic politics of different 
states are connected through international negotiation (diplomacy). The international negotiations for 
a package of policies to counter the first oil shocks at the Berlin Convention in 1972 illustrate 
Putman’s framework (Putnam, 1998).
25 For instance, Gourevitch writes: ‘International relations and domestic politics are therefore so 
interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.’ (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 
911). These approaches are not systemic explanations like Krasner’s or Keohane’s. Their preference 
for a comparative politics approach also accounts for the lack of the systemic view. See for instance 
the Katzenstein et al. discussion on theory and comparative politics (Peter J. Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 
10-11). Also, (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 882).
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considered simultaneously weak and strong: strong domestically but weak 
internationally. Its agential potential becomes differentiated.
Yet, their analytical framework suggests, in spite of the contrary claim, that the state 
has unitary agency. It is agency based on an assumption of the internal coherence of 
the state. The state has an identifiable ‘inside’. The focus of the analyses is on the 
state and society as two distinct entities, whose features are internally determined. 
These features determine the type of relationship between the two. It is, for instance, 
because the state is dominant in France that the society is weak. This logic exposes 
the preference for explanations based on law-like regularities. The explanations 
identify specific features of the state and society that will lead to a weak or strong 
position of the state internationally. By this logic, the French and the USA states 
have pre-determined positions internationally. Such an understanding would create 
difficulties in explaining whether or why the French or the USA state are not always 
weak or better off in international negotiations.
Gourevitch’s understanding of the relationship between the state and society 
represents a more interesting option. He posits that state action is a function of the 
relationship between the society and the state. He then suggests that the properties of 
the relationship, such as the level of interaction with labour, agriculture and industry 
societal groups, influence the agential potential of the state. For instance, if there are 
many links, then the higher the autonomy of the state and its agential potential 
internationally. At the same time however, it means that Gourevitch’s framework 
starts with a concept of the state as a sum of interests and ends up with an 
‘autonomous’ actor (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 906). He is more explicit on this 
issue when arguing that the state can impose its preferences over international
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organisations (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 894). For example, Gourevitch writes 
that ‘whenever states assert their views they are able to prevail over international 
organizations’(Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 894). The state stops being a plural 
entity and becomes a unitary one.
All of these writers speak of the relationship between the domestic and the 
international in terms of cause and consequence. This signals that there is an 
assumption of two separate and autonomous structures. They argue that 
simultaneous analysis is required due to the interconnectedness of domestic and 
international politics (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978,p.911). Katzenstein, for instance, 
contends that, in the overall explanation, domestic politics exercises ‘the primary 
constraints’ (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977, p. 587, Winter 1976, p. 2). While 
Putnam argues in his example of international negotiations for a package of policies 
to counter the first oil shocks that his focus is on when and how they are ‘entangled’, 
suggesting the possibility of separation on other issues (Putnam, 1998, p. 427). 
Putman does not mention when that can be the case theoretically or empirically. It is 
nevertheless a limiting assumption about the possibilities of interactions between the
two realms. Their view of social spaces is constituted by the classic domestic vs.
•  •  •  • •  •international division. Political interactions take place within the domestic or the
international but not across this divide. Transnational and transgovemmental 
relations do not feature as part of these explanatory frameworks, although both 
Gourevitch and Putnam explicitly deem them important in order to understand 
foreign policies and institutional development of states (Gourevitch, 2002, p. 304; 
Putnam, 1998, p. 459).
26 Overall, the issue o f norms and ideas is under-theorised in the FPA literature.
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Allison’s bureaucratic politics model emphasises the placement of individuals within 
specific bureaucratic organisations (Allison, 1969). The interactions of individuals in 
these organisations are the ‘determinants of the actions of a government in 
international politics’ (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43). Organisations have 
conflicting values, interests, and act according to specific organisational patterns 
(e.g. procedures and routines). Policy goals are the result of bargaining amongst 
individuals, who have different organisational and personal interests. The 
bureaucratic process with its focus on the bargaining and compromises between 
domestic institutions is the direct cause of a state’s action internationally (Allison & 
Halperin, 1972, pp. 48, 53). The international is considered a platform for already 
formed internal interests (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 57).
An important issue arises from Allison’s weak specification of the relationship 
between this model and the unitary state model, which works with a conception of 
the state similar to Krasner’s view. Allison suggests that they are equally valid types 
of models (Wagner, Summer, 1974, p. 448). Allison does not specify whether the 
models can explain the same thing or different issues, or if there are instances when 
the state can be considered an instrumental and unitary actor (Bendor & Hammond, 
Jun., 1992, p. 305). The conceptualisation of the national interest as ‘generally 
accepted’ and pre-determined (Freedman, Jul., 1976, p. 441), despite the existence 
of different organisational interests, makes the bureaucratic politics model similar to 
the statist one. Critics have also noted that the bureaucratic politics model works 
with a very narrow definition of politics and context, which is limited to the 
bureaucratic organisations (Freedman, Jul., 1976, p. 437). This becomes evident 
when the model is compared to the other pluralist accounts presented above, which
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demonstrate the value of the state-society relation for understanding the formation of 
state interests as well as the role of the international.27
To conclude, this section has examined some of the pluralist conceptualisations of 
the state. It has assessed the implications of their conceptualisation of the state- 
society relationship for understanding the state as an actor. The section has argued 
that although the initial conceptualisations of the state focus on the state as the sum 
of interests, decision-makers and so forth, these writers work with a conception of 
the state as an actor. Their conceptualisation of social spaces, such as the 
international and the domestic, enforces an understanding of the state as a coherent, 
unitary actor. The discussion of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model has suggested 
that Allison proposes a limiting understanding of the political process, which is 
similar to Krasner’s in some key respects. It has also suggested that Allison’s 
argument does not spell out the relationship between his two different models and 
their specific roles for explaining state action.
2.4. The state in the interdependence and world politics
paradigms
The work of Keohane et al. explicitly draws on the bureaucratic politics model 
(Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 7; Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 732) but it
27 The limitations o f the model to explain political action during the Cuban Missile crisis are 
eloquently exposed in Jutta Weldes book (Weldes, 1999). See also (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).
281 include in this analysis also Keohane’s co-authored work. Keohane et al. are interested in the 
‘changing nature of the international system’ (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. viii), in 
institutional theory (After Hegemony), in the relationship between the international structure and 
international regimes (Robert O. Keohane, 1989, p. 80) and in the conditions of international 
cooperation, or international law and politics (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, & Slaughter, Summer 
2000, pp. 397, 399).
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also maintains a systemic dimension (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 
1987, p. 730; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 7). The paradigms of complex 
interdependence and world politics challenge the view of the state as a unitary actor. 
They understand the state as a fragmented entity. Their emphasis on transnational 
and transgovemmental relations, pace the pluralist accounts above, supports such 
an understanding of the state.29 It also suggests an enlargement of the ontology of 
the international.
The state is regarded as an organisation whose main purpose is problem solving. Its 
underlying goal is efficiency. State agency seems at this point enabled by efficiency 
rather than by any moral, social, or political goals. On the ground, different 
departments of the government than the main decision-making body can represent 
the state (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 50).
Human agents are given an important role (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, pp. 4 - 5,8 - 
9). Elites, leaders or statesmen are instrumental in agenda setting and control and 
‘state choices’ are more likely to reflect their understanding of what the interests are 
(Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 748 - 749). They 
distinguish between foreign policy makers and politicians, the latter having narrower 
interests than ‘foreign policy leaders’ (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 29, 
206). Bargaining takes place amongst a variety of groups with more or less influence 
upon the official agenda setting: ‘national interests will be defined differently on
29 The world politics paradigm ‘brings together traditional international politics, the bureaucratic 
politics approach to foreign policy analysis, and transnational actors ( ...)’ (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 
1971a, p. 732). Initially, transnational relations denoted ‘a generic category’ for both transnational 
and transgovemmental interactions. Transnational interactions involved interactions between both 
governmental and other non-governmental actors. They came to reconsider their terminology in the 
light o f Harrison Wagner’s critique (Wagner, Summer, 1974). This section will use the revised 
terminology. Thus, transnational is restricted only to interactions between non-governmental actors 
while transgovemmental refers to interactions between governmental sub-units (Robert O. Keohane 
& Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 41).
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different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units’(Robert O. 
Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 30). According to Keohane and Nye, the national interest 
is a shifting category, which reflects the interactions between domestic and 
international politics (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 7).
Governments30 are both internationally and domestically ‘open’ rather than hermetic 
‘decision-making units’(Robert O. Keohane & Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 45). The state is 
‘multifaceted, even schizophrenic’ in its negotiations with foreign governments 
(Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 30). Keohane and Nye write that ‘[pjolicy 
conceived as if the world consisted of billiard-ball states guided by philosopher- 
kings is not very useful’ (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 197). This is due to the 
existence of different preferences within the establishment. State action also includes 
the actions of governmental sub-units engaged in interactions with other states. Such 
an interpretation involves a broad working definition of politics and state action 
(Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 730). The argument that transnational and 
transgovemmental coalitions are possible supports, as mentioned, the non-unitary 
view of the state. This consequence is important in that it blurs the boundary 
between the domestic and the international. For Keohane and Nye, international 
politics extends within the domestic and vice-versa (Robert O. Keohane & Nye,
2001, p. 21).
States act internationally in a utilitarian rational way. The state is also the most 
important rational actor in the international system. In exercising agency, the state is 
treated at times as a person, it ‘reacts’ and ‘adapts’ to transnational and
30 Keohane does not explicitly differentiate between the concepts o f ‘state’ and ‘government’. They 
are used interchangeably: as in governmental action or state behaviour or (sovereign) governments 
as actors in world politics (Robert O. Keohane, 1984, pp. 93, 110). Also, in (Robert O Keohane, 
Spring 1998, p. 93; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 5).
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transgovemmental relations and is capable of emotions such as ‘ambition’(Nye & 
Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 343). The mles of international regimes are ‘frequently 
changed, bent, or broken to meet the exigencies of the moment’ (Robert O. Keohane,
Spring, 1982, p. 331).31 Despite the existence of transnational relations, the state is 
still ‘in charge’ and all the other actors are subordinated to it (Robert O. Keohane,
1986, p. 193,1989, p. 8). The international institutions lack the power and autonomy 
to enforce mles and procedures (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 17). Even the 
domestic structure, such as group interests, and the international distribution of 
capabilities, have more impact on the state than the international institutions (Robert 
O. Keohane, 1989, p. 6). In this light, states have permanent agency despite being at 
times constrained, while non-state units have only ‘occasional’ influence upon 
‘international events.’ It is only then that they become ‘actors’ in international 
politics (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 330).32
Keohane et. a l ‘s arguments are important because they develop on the manner in 
which one can keep the state as an actor while considering it fragmented. Keohane et 
al., however, do not address some key questions. The complex interdependence state 
is multi-faceted because of the diversity of issues and interests that coagulate in 
transnational and transgovemmental coalitions. It is, in other words, a multiple-issue 
and multi-interest state and that is what makes it non-unitary. This is an argument 
linked to a particular type of modem state inserted in a global economy and social 
interactions. One question that can be raised is whether their non-unitary view of the 
state could for instance apply to highly centralised bureaucracies such as those of
31 They nevertheless make cooperation possible in specific issue areas by organizing the interactions, 
facilitating institutionalisation of agreements, and constraining the realm of possible actions (Axelrod 
& Keohane, Oct., 1985, p. 238; Robert O. Keohane, 1984, p. 67; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p.
17).
32 ‘An actor is only that entity that can influence the course of international events’ (Nye & Keohane,
Summer, 1971b, p. 330).
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totalitarian states. Keohane and Nye concede that states can be considered unitary as 
well, and this can be decided empirically (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 733). 
In doing so, they imply a change in the ontological premises of the state from a 
plural entity to a unitary one. It is not clear from the writings on transnational and 
transgovemmental relations if the world is ontologically different now or whether IR 
theory has been ignoring an important part of reality (Wagner, Summer, 1974, p. 
441). The implications are significant as the argument assumes that there was once a 
‘traditional’ or ‘classical’ organisation of the world, wherein the state was a unitary 
actor.
Critics have showed that Keohane et al.’s state is in fact the nation-state (Shaw, 
2000). Keohane et al. put forward a similar view to Krasner’s on the issue of 
sovereignty and of the international and the domestic division (Nye & Keohane, 
Summer, 1971b, p. 332). This means that Keohane et al. reinforce a conventional 
understanding of social spaces. The personifying language used to describe state 
action reflects a view of state agency as person-like. Thus, while the state is non- 
unitary due to the variety of issues and preferences, state agency is person-like. 
Keohane and Nye fail to provide an understanding of state agency that would 
correspond to a non-unitary view of the state.
While Krasner links the foreign policy and the systemic argument through the idea 
of the state as a rational and unified actor, in Keohane it is the idea of ‘systemic 
process’ that aims to bring together the domestic and the international dimensions. 
Keohane and Nye’s process-oriented systemic theory defines the system in terms of 
power structures and political processes. Process ‘refers to the relationship among 
the formal mles, informal customs and conventions, and the patterns o f  interactions
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among the players’ (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, p. 18). The 
definition Keohane and Nye give for political process is very similar to the one on 
which the international organisation model is built. International regimes are defined 
as ‘multilevel linkages, norms, and institutions’ between different actors (Robert O. 
Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 47,51). The overlap between the definitions of regimes 
and ‘political processes’ creates difficulty in grasping the specificity of each concept 
and the manner in which they are put to work. By way of response, Keohane and 
Nye believe the criticism of poor specification about the difference between regimes 
and non-regime conditions, for example, can be countered through the focus on 
formal interstate agreements (Robert O. Keohane, 1989, p. 77). This marks a 
narrowing of the initial definition of political processes, which involved more than 
formal rules.
Further inconsistencies in their conceptualisation of the political process are created 
due to their understanding of the role of ideas and broader social relations in 
constituting political action. Keohane and Goldstein acknowledge that ideas have 
‘causal’ impact on the policies if the context allows it, that is, if there is a change in 
the ‘underlying conditions’ or in the distribution of capabilities among units 
(Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 25).34 This implies that ideas cannot acquire a 
concomitant structural and legitimising dimension within the international system. 
This is a claim that goes against Keohane’s initial position on the process-oriented 
system that includes both capabilities and institutions in its definition.
33 Haggard and Simmons point out that Keohane is not consistent in acknowledging the 
institutionalisation of regimes, more specifically of the international oil regime (Haggard & Simmons, 
Summer, 1987, p. 494).
34 Also, writing about the aim of the book, ‘(- • •) I [do not] investigate the effects of ideas and ideals 
on state behaviour.’ (Robert O. Keohane, 1984, p. 6)
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The complex interdependence paradigm leaves under-examined the process of 
emergence of new or conflicting state preferences and new hierarchies of state
o r
goals. The framework falls short of acknowledging the constitutive role of broader 
ideational resources or the constitutive role of multiple social relations and practices. 
I consider their usage of the bureaucratic politics model to understand domestic 
politics to be the cause of the limiting explanatory potential of the paradigm. The 
model works, as discussed above with a narrow understanding of politics as 
bargaining relations. The over-emphasis on the state as a problem-solving entity and 
on communication as mere exchange of information to maximize goal-achievement 
contributes to such an interpretation.
This section has discussed the conceptualisation of the state and state agency that 
comes out mainly from Keohane and Nye’s writings on complex interdependence 
but also from Keohane’s other co-authored articles. The understanding of the state as 
fragmented due to the existence of multiple issues and preferences is important but 
does not go far enough to allow for a re-framing of social spaces. Their state is still 
the national state and the divisions between the international and the domestic are 
similar to Krasner’s conventional understanding. Ideational and broader social 
relations and practices are not included as enabling sources of state action in 
Keohane et al.’s view. This is despite their definition of the political process as 
informed by formal and informal rules and practices.
35 This is Keohane and Nye’s self-confessed shortcoming in the article that revisits the explanatory 
power of the interdependence paradigm (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 739 
- 740).
Conclusion
This chapter has critically engaged with statist and pluralist views of the state. The 
analysis has identified the internal tensions and limitations of these theories as well 
as the implications for the conceptualisation of the state as an actor. The discussion 
of this chapter has revealed that in spite of the different starting points, statist and 
pluralists accounts of the state end up with similar conceptualisations of the state as 
an actor.
The first section has shown that Krasner’s definition of state agency is premised on 
the assumption of unity and coherence and on the ability of the state to implement its 
interests in isolation from pressures of non-state actors. The analysis has exposed the 
discrepancies between the theoretical claims and theoretical implications of his 
empirical analysis. Krasner’s theoretical framework offers limiting tools to approach 
the empirical examples. The framework cannot reconcile, for instance, a claim about 
the state as a legitimate actor with the statist assumption about the minimalist 
interaction between the state and the society. My discussion has suggested that 
Krasner’s empirical examples indicate a need to re-frame the agency of that state in 
order to acknowledge the social relations that embed it. The discussion has also 
shown that Krasner starts with the state as an autonomous agent but ends up with a 
pluralist argument: the state as a sum of institutions and/or interests.
The second section discusses Krasner’s argument of Westphalian sovereignty and its 
implications for understanding the state as an actor. Krasner offers a more nuanced 
historical reading of the Westphalian moment. My argument in this section discloses 
the inconsistent use of the sovereignty concept in Krasner’s analysis. Understanding
47
sovereignty as a contradictory practice has important implications for the overall 
claims Krasner makes about the nature of interaction within the international and 
about the relationship between the two realms of action. The interchangeable use of 
the concepts of international structure, system, and politics in the writings on 
regimes points also to the necessity to reconsider the understanding of these social 
spaces. In the light of this demonstration, Krasner’s view of the state as a unitary and 
a coherent actor becomes difficult to sustain.
The third part has engaged with the pluralist views of the state, which emphasise the 
fragmentation of the state: the state as a sum of interests (Katzenstein or Gourevitch, 
Putman) and the state as bureaucratic institutions (Allison). The pluralist views 
seems to offer an alternative view of the manner in which the state is constituted and
i
exercises agency. However, the conclusion of this section has been that the rejection 
of the unitary assumption is not a sufficient ontological move to produce coherent 
conceptualisations of the state. The discussion has shown the potential of these 
frameworks. For instance, the empirical analyses of Katzenstein and Putman could 
support a theoretical argument about the state as a non-unitary entity and an 
associated view of agency as varied -  i.e. simultaneously weak and strong. At the 
same time, the conceptualisation of the state -  society relation suggests a view of the 
state with a clear and coherent inside that enters interaction with society.
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model makes the case for the importance of the 
institutional positioning of individuals within the bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, 
Allison works with a narrow definition of politics and context, which focuses on 
bargaining relations between individuals. This becomes even more evident when 
comparing this model to the other FPA frameworks. Secondly, the lack of
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specification of the relationship between this model and the unitary state model, 
which Allison also outlines, raises questions of whether they are seen as equally 
valid or whether there is an implicit ontological preference for the former.
There is a systematic leap from the state as a sum of interests, or the negotiator, 
leader etc, to the state/government as a corporate actor, which is not addressed in 
either of these writings. Statist and pluralist approaches alike maintain a blurred 
relationship between two different ontological objects, individuals and the state. 
This blurred relationship favours the translation of human attributes to states, as 
Chapter 4 will discuss.
The authors discussed in the last section aim to combine the contributions of FPA 
with a systemic focus in explaining international politics. Keohane and Nye’s 
process-oriented systemic theory also challenges the view of the state as a unitary 
actor by focusing on transnational and transgovemmental relations. The section has 
argued that the potential of a conceptualisation of the state as non-unitary in its 
agential potential is inconsistently pursued. The section has argued that the 
framework narrows the sources of state constitution and state action due Keohane 
and Nye’s understanding of the political process. The focus on bargaining 
interactions and formal interstate agreements not only involves limiting conceptions 
of the political process, but it also contradicts their initial understandings of these 
processes. The analysis has also raised questions of whether the view of the state put 
forward in the interdependence and world politics paradigm can only be applied to 
recent modernity, or whether Keohane and Nye aim to make a broader ontological 
claim about states as actors.
36 On the existence of different ontological objects in IR, see Tony Skillen in (Wight, 2006, p. 177). 
Also, (Buzan, 1995, pp. 198 -199,201).
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Chapter 3: Social construction and deconstruction in the 
conceptualisation of the state
The views of the state discussed in this chapter are underpinned by the broader aim 
to reconsider the ontological and analytical boundaries of social spaces or the 
relationship between the international and the domestic realm. In doing so, ideational 
factors are more consistently integrated within these theoretical and empirical works. 
History becomes an important coordinate to frame understandings of the state and its 
agency, and discursive practices acquire more weight in thinking about the 
constitution of the state. This chapter looks at the accounts of Wendt, Hobson, 
Sorensen, and the postmodernist critique of the state. The aim is to assess these 
theories in relation to the ones presented in the previous chapter, as well as in terms 
of their declared explanatory aims, in order to reveal the potential and the limitations 
of these writings for conceptualising the state.
3.1. The socialised state: the state in the constructivist systemic 
paradigm (Wendt)
[W]e are [not] likely to have ...theories o f change 
without better incorporation o f domestic politics into our models (Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Autumn 1987, p. 742).
50
This section discusses Wendt’s account of the state within the context of his social 
theory. It questions the legitimacy of essentialising the corporate identity of the state 
and the methodological move of bracketing the domestic in his systemic theory of 
international politics. It also assesses the implications of these moves for 
understanding and explaining change and state action internationally.
In developing a social theory of international politics, Wendt’s goal is to ‘predict and 
make sense of what [is] going on’(Wendt, 1999, p. 216). The theory is explicitly 
founded on a number of ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions. It puts forward a preference for a structural/holistic idealist position, 
which emphasises the role of ideas besides material forces, in the constitution of 
structures. Ideas gain ontological status alongside material forces (Wendt, 1999, pp. 
1, 81).37 Ideational structures are generative, constitutive of actors’ identities and 
interests through practice, and are also causative of action (Wendt, 1999, p. 365). 
Material forces are both capable of determining action - they have ‘intrinsic powers 
and dispositions’ - and are a ‘function of ideas’. In other words, both material and 
ideational factors can be both independent and dependent variables (Wendt, 1999, 
pp. 94, 96, 98).
Wendtian theory argues for a structurationist position regarding the relationship 
between agents and structures. A structurationist position involves claiming that 
agents and structures are mutually constitutive, that neither is ontologically prior to 
the other, that elements are interdependent within the structure and interaction is 
time and space contingent (Wendt, Summer, 1987, pp. 338, 356). The theoretical 
aim is to avoid both reification of the structure and voluntaristic views of agency,
37 The structural idealist position is based on Wendt’s reading of scientific realism, which 
acknowledges the effects of both ideational and material structural on actors.
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which underpin conceptions of international politics such as the neorealist and 
foreign policy ones respectively (Wendt, 1999, p. 146). The instantiations of the 
social structures are norms, rules and institutions, identities, interests and action 
(Wendt, Summer, 1987, pp. 351 - 354, 357). The structure is reiterated and 
reproduced in the agential practices.
Symbolic interactionism informs Wendt’s understanding of identity formation. 
Wendt suggests that identities are both ‘auto-genetic’ and relational -  created 
through ‘self-reflection’ and in interaction with others. These types correspond to 
what Mead calls the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in symbolic interactionism -  ‘an agent’s sense 
of self and social identities respectively (Wendt, 1999, p. 183). Social identities are 
relational. They emerge out of the process of interaction and intersubjective 
meanings within the international structure (Wendt, 1999, p. 313).
The starting point of Wendt’s social theory of international politics is the 
commitment to an ontology that focuses on process, intersubjectivity, and co­
constitution as just discussed. This represents Wendt’s guarantee against a possible 
reification of structures, identities and interests a la Waltz. Based on such 
propositions, Wendt contends that his theory of international politics can account for 
change within the international system (Wendt, Spring 1992, p. 422). The Wendtian 
systemic theory rests on two other moves: one is the assumption of corporate agency 
for states and the other is the methodological bracketing of the domestic realm on the 
basis of the long-embedded ontological assumption about the different nature of the 
international and the domestic (Wendt, 1999, pp. 13,193).
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The view of the international, which is underpinned by structurationist assumptions, 
is a relational one. Anarchy is only one of the possible effects of the continuous 
interaction between states within this structure. Actors have the ability to constitute 
and transform the international structure through practices. Wendt writes ‘social 
structures exist, not in actors’ heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices. 
Social structures exist only in process’ (Wendt, Spring 1992, pp. 394 - 395, Summer, 
1995, p. 74). This is the meaning of Wendt’s claim that ‘anarchy is what states 
make of it’ (Wendt, Spring 1992). He argues that social practice and process rather 
than the anarchical structure create competitive or cooperative international orders 
(Wendt, Summer, 1995, p. 74).
The state is a structure but it becomes an actor when it is endowed with corporate 
identity and personhood. States are considered ‘actors with more or less human 
qualities’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 10). States can exercise agency because they have a 
‘ sense of Self , which is termed corporate identity, and are unitary in their external 
expression due to their legal personality. The state is unitary in the sense that it is the 
only legitimate centre of decision-making in the international system, and, at a 
specific moment in time, action is attributed to only one entity (e.g. ‘Germany’, 
‘UK’ and so forth). According to Wendt, agency cannot be attributed to a non- 
unitary entity.
International politics becomes a comprehensible and possible realm of action if 
states are anthropomorphised and attributed corporate agency. Corporate actorhood 
properties are essential for making possible ‘institutionalized collective action’ 
(Wendt, 1999, pp. 194 - 199, 215). Wendt argues that:
38 States are persons because they possess intentionality, i.e. they are ‘purposive actors’; secondly, 
because they behave like organisms or super-organisms; and thirdly, because they possess collective 
consciousness (Wendt, 2004, p. 291).
International politics as we know it today would be impossible without attributions of corporate 
agency, a fact recognized by international law, which explicitly grants legal “personality” to states. 
The assumption of real corporate agency enables states actively to participate in structural 
transformations (Wendt, 1999, p. 10).
There are five essential properties that constitute ‘the self of the state or its 
corporate identity (Wendt, 1999, pp. 202 - 204). These are an institutional-legal 
order, a monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence, sovereignty, a 
society, and a territory. These features are not ‘historically variable’ and are not 
negotiable in interaction and process (Wendt, 1999, pp. 64, 70, 198). They are 
‘essential’ to the state because they define and delimit the state from other entities. 
The corporate identity ensures the awareness of the state as a distinct group with 
specific traits. Wendt writes ‘[corporate identities] are constituted by the self- 
organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities’ (Wendt, 1999, 
pp. 224 - 225). The group awareness is the result of internal processes of self­
organisation and reflexivity (Wendt, 1999, p. 76). The corporate identity is generated 
within the domestic and is exogenous to the international structure. Since the 
corporate identity is already formed before interaction within the international, 
Wendt argues that the state is a ‘pre-social’ entity, ‘ontologically prior to the states 
system’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 198). Change is limited to the interaction within the 
international and to the ‘the boundaries of the Self, which the social identities 
represent.
Corporate identity creates the conditions of existence for the other types of identities. 
These are types, roles and collective identities.40 Role identities and collective
39 According to Wendt, ‘exogenously given’ denotes ‘identities and interests [that] are not seen as 
being continuously in process in or sustained by interaction itself and that ‘in the analysis of 
interaction ...are constants, not processes or outcomes, even if they change outside interaction’ 
(Wendt, 1999, p. 316).
40 Corporate, type and role identities draw on a microsociological perspective on identity while 
collective identities is a concept from the psychological theory of social identity. Identity theory is a 
microsociological theory that explains ‘individuals’ role-related behaviours and social identity theory
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identities are entirely endogenous to the international structure and formed within 
interaction. Role identities require a ‘constitutive other’. They are ‘not based on 
intrinsic properties and as such exist only in relation to Others’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 
227). Role identities are created and enacted through a process of ‘mirroring’ or 
‘reflected appraisals’. This means that a state’s perception of how others see it 
informs its actions (Wendt, 1999, pp. 228,327). In short, collective identities allow 
for identification through similarities not only oppositions (Wendt, 1999, p. 229). 
This latter identity makes possible different types of international structures, such as 
Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian. They are the result of interaction between the 
collective identities of states (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246 - 312). Type identity is both 
‘internally constituted’ and constituted in interaction with ‘others’ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 
246 - 312). Political legitimacy is dependent on the internal relations between the 
state and society but also on the state system (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224 - 227). 
However, Wendt insists that ‘the characteristics that underlie type identities are at 
base intrinsic to actors’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 226).41
The international and the domestic have separate constitutive effects on the state. 
Each realm is characterised by its own internal dynamics (Wendt, 1999, pp. 13,193), 
which influence differently the constitution of the state. Furthermore, the political is 
a separate and autonomous international system from the economic one and it is 
within this realm mainly that the identities and the interests of states are constituted. 
Wendt argues, however, that in order to understand how change occurs in the 
international realm, one would need to look at the state’s practices within the
is social psychological theory that explains ‘group processes and intergroup relations’ (Hogg, Terry,
& White, December 1995).
41 Wendt’s emphasis.
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international as well as at the changes in the domestic constitution of the state or in 
its different identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 146).42
In the rest of the section, I will discuss the manner in which Wendt’s meta- 
theoretical position has been incorporated into the theory of international politics. I 
will address several inter-related issues focusing especially on the implications of 
Wendt’s anthropomorphic view of the state and the methodological bracketing of the 
domestic for the goals of his theory of international politics.
The methodological bracketing of the domestic comes with ontological and 
epistemological consequences. Discussing co-constitutive processes within the 
international and then co-constitutive processes within the domestic is one of the 
possibilities of taking a general structurationist position at the meta-theoretical level. 
Structurationism applied separately to the domestic and the international is what 
Wendt’s theory proposes as opposed to structurationism applied across social 
realms. However, Wendt’s discussion of type identities, which link the two realms, 
suggests that the latter approach has its merits. His claim that change in the 
international realm can also occur as a result of variation in the properties of states, 
which constitute the corporate identity, points also to the importance of the domestic 
social space. Wendt’s methodological move undermines a structurationist position 
applied across the classical spatial divide, which could reveal how the properties of 
states change in practice in different historical contexts.
The methodological move of bracketing the domestic is corroborated with the 
ontological claim that states are like persons, possessing a sense of self or a
42 ‘[International politics is ...also about the reproduction and transformation -  by intersubjective 
dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels -  of the identities and interests through which 
those incentives and worlds are created’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 394).
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corporate identity. The fact that the meanings of, and the relationship between, the 
elements constituting the corporate identity are placed outside practice is at odds 
with the broad structurationist position taken by Wendt. Contextualisation and 
process as intrinsic to identity formation are sidelined in relation to this specific form 
of identity. Furthermore, if Wendt’s metatheoretical position links agency, i.e. the 
ability to do, with constitutive processes, then it becomes difficult to accept his 
methodological and ontological moves, which leave aside important sources of state 
agency.
An important implication of such an ontological position is the reification of what is 
deemed the self (Neumann, 1996, p. 139). The reification of the self further 
forecloses the possibility of problematising the relationship between the essential 
elements. Change coming from the change in the relationship between the legal 
framework, sovereignty, society, and territory is obscured. In other words, some of 
the important features and functions of the state are less likely to be subject to 
questioning, dispute or re-consideration.
Explanatory problems arise as a result of the exclusive focus on international 
practices for explaining the emergence and the reproduction of international security 
communities and more broadly, of specific types of international structures (Wendt, 
1999, pp. 246 - 312).43 The explanation of the Kantian international structure 
incorporates only the behaviour or practice in the international that is the 
commitment to certain international rules. The focus on international practices is 
also justified by Wendt’s treatment of states as like-units, which fulfil the same 
functions due to their corporate identity. However, if we accept that the domestic
43 He writes: ‘many state interests are constructions of the international system’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 
243).
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incorporation of rules and norms is important, but that it also differentiates states, 
then the Wendtian bracketing of the domestic becomes problematic. Explaining the 
efficacy of security communities and their resilience needs to go beyond the focus 
on international state practices, such as signing treaties, and formal participation in 
international or regional organisations. Such research questions require the inclusion 
of type identities, the relationship between the ‘essential’ elements of the corporate 
identity and the inclusion of the domestic social space more broadly into the 
theoretical framework.44 In this context, the assumption that states are like-units 
because of their corporate identity and legal personality becomes a constraining 
assumption rather than an enabling one for explanations of international state action.
Wendt also acknowledges that methodology can affect one’s ontology, which is at 
the core of any substantive theory (Wendt, 1999, pp. 34 - 35) He contends that 
given interests and identities (a methodological option) can lead to the over­
emphasis of the importance of material over ideational factors. According to Wendt, 
a poor methodology, that is, a methodology that does not have the tools to approach 
specific concepts such as identity and interests formation, can limit a theory’s 
research potential. Methodology transforms in that case into a ‘tacit’ ontology: 
‘exogeneity [of interests and identities] in theory is tacitly transformed into an 
assumption of exogeneity in reality’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 35). He further writes that 
‘ [t]he difference matters for the perceived nature of international politics and for the 
possibilities of structural change’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 36).
44 Wendt’s propositions are also difficult to defend if one subscribes also to arguments that 
demonstrate the importance of the state-society relationship for state agency internationally, although 
he acknowledges the importance of the ‘state-society complex’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 210). See the 
discussion in the previous chapter, as well as the discussion of the historical sociologists’ accounts in 
the second section o f the present chapter.
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One could conclude that Wendt’s overall goal of explaining and understanding the 
changes occurring in the international system is limited by the methodological and 
ontological moves explained above. These moves create inconsistencies in his usage 
of the structurationist assumptions. For instance, the structurationist position would 
involve making practice central to determining even the relationship between the 
‘essential’ properties of the state. It would also involve a theoretical framework that 
considers this relationship constituted in different social spaces across the domestic -  
international divide.45 This separation between social spaces, international vs. 
domestic, is the key criterion by which he classifies identities: identities are 
exogenous or endogenous to the international structure. If the spatial disjunction 
would be reconsidered, then Wendt’s classification of identities would also require 
re-framing without losing Wendt’s insights into the different social processes by 
which states acquire social identities.46
3.2. The sociological state (Sorensen, Hobson)
The second-wave historical sociologists47 such as Sorensen and Hobson combine the 
propositions of a constructivist ontology with an integrationist understanding of 
social spaces. Their aim is to develop a historically informed theory of the state that
45 This observation touches upon another line of criticism against the Wendtian theory of politics that 
refers to his limited view of what constitutes the international. For a critique of the limitations of 
Wendt’s understanding o f the international realm, see (Campbell, June, 2001, p. 441).
46 For example, role identities formed by opposition to others will be central also to the process of 
acquiring a collective identity, which identifies similar others. These two can also constitute type 
identities, such as political legitimacy.
47 The English School had an important role in introducing historical research to the study of 
international relations (Buzan & Little, 2002; Halliday, 2002; Hurrell, 2001; Neumann, 2001). Theda 
Skocpol and Charles Tilly are known as first-wave Weberian historical sociologists. They argued for 
the inclusion of a historical dimension to the study of the state, although their understanding of the 
state is closer to the neorealist rather than to the constructivist one (Hobson, 2000, pp. 174 - 193; 
Shaw, 2002, p. 87). Second wave historical sociologists could also be considered more generally 
constructivists who develop a historically informed understanding of international politics (Barnett, 
2002; Reus-Smit, 1999).
481 am referring to their structurationist and ideationalist metatheoretical positions.
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brings domestic and international politics together (Hobson, 2000, p. 204,2002b, p. 
77; Sorensen, 2001, p. 19). Historical analysis is regarded as a method as well as an 
ontological commitment against the reification and naturalisation of the present 
(Hobson, 2002c). This section assesses the key contributions of these two writers to 
the conceptualisation of the state as an actor.
3.2.1. Typologies of state
Sorensen’s definition of the state is comparable to the Wendtian one when he 
identifies the concepts of territory, government, and population as ‘essential 
characteristics’ or elements of the state, on which the constitutional independence of 
the state is predicated. It is a definition that focuses on the state as a ‘historical 
structure’ that comprises of institutions, material capabilities and ideas (Sorensen,, 
2004, p. 13).49 Constitutional independence is the constitutive or foundational rule 
of sovereignty. This rule allows Sorensen to consider states as unitary based on their 
legal status. It is this foundational rule that has remained unaltered since its 
consolidation in the seventeenth century (Sorensen, 2001, pp. 148 - 149).
Changes have occurred, according to Sorensen, in the practices or regulative rules 
existing between sovereign states. These rules developed after the emergence of the 
foundational rules of sovereignty. The regulative rules of sovereignty are, for 
example, the rules of admission and recognition within the international society of 
states, as well as the ones that regulate behaviour, such as non-intervention, 
reciprocity, diplomacy, and international law. Sorensen emphasises the ‘dynamic 
and changing content of the sovereignty institution’s regulative rules’ (Sorensen,
49 He draws on the Coxian view (Cox, 1981).
2001, pp. 150 - 151). States equally possess constitutional independence and act 
according to the regulative sovereignty rules. Additionally, states differentiate 
themselves through substantial, constitutive statehood or empirical sovereignty. 
Empirical sovereignty constitutes the second source of change. Empirical 
sovereignty refers to ‘the concrete features of statehood’, that is to the structure and 
content of the government, economy and nation (Sorensen, 2001, p. 151).
By combining regulative and empirical sovereignty, Sorensen identifies three ideal 
types of states: modem, postcolonial and postmodern (Sorensen, 2001, p. 73). These 
types point to a specific view of the relationship between the domestic and the 
international (Sorensen, 2001, p. 152). Sorensen explains the changes in the internal 
constitution of the state in terms of empirical sovereignty, and the change in the type 
of relations states develop with other actors as a result of different regulative rules of 
sovereignty (Sorensen, 2004, pp. 6 - 7).
The modem state, for example, is built upon the division between the domestic and 
the international at all three levels of statehood. The modem state enjoys 
constitutional independence. It acts according to the regulative rules of non­
intervention and reciprocity, and has a well-demarcated economy, territory and 
national community, which constitute its substantive statehood (Sorensen, 2001, p. 
154).
The second ideal type, the postcolonial state, moves towards a more integrated view 
of the relationship between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’. The ‘deficiencies 
in substantial statehood’ of postcolonial states account for the ‘integrated’ 
relationship between the two social spaces. Postcolonial states abide by and are
61
informed only partially by the regulative norms of non-intervention and reciprocity. 
50 Dependency on international financing, weak institutions and the lack of national 
community (substantial statehood) also make them more vulnerable to intervention. 
This intervention is termed ‘negotiated intervention’ in order to capture the whole 
array of political, economic, and social conditionalities imposed on these states. A 
‘tension’ exists, according to Sorensen, between constitutive sovereignty and the 
regulative rules and substantial sovereignty (Sorensen, 2001, pp. 155 - 158). The 
former keeps the domestic and the international segregated, while the latter two 
propose an ‘associated view’ of the two realms.
Sorensen proposes an ‘integrated’ view of the international -  domestic relationship 
only in relation to the postmodern state. This is because the substantial features of 
postmodern statehood are ‘integrated’: multilevel governance ‘based on 
supranational, national, and subnational institutions’ and an economy based on 
‘cross-border networks’, where citizens take on layers of supra or sub- national 
identities (Sorensen, 2001, p. 162). ‘Government and society’ are increasingly ‘de­
nationalised’ and regulative rules, such as ‘regulated intervention’ and ‘cooperative 
reciprocity’, reflect and enforce this tendency. As in the case of the postcolonial 
state, there is a tension between constitutive sovereignty, which enforces the 
international vs. domestic disjunction, and the other two types of sovereignty 
(Sorensen, 2001, p. 160).
50 S0rensen’s analysis is not correct in suggesting that the economic underdevelopment of 
postcolonial states is the only reason these states cannot play by the rules of reciprocity in 
international trade. He writes that ‘the emergence of development assistance regimes, where 
economic aid flows from rich, developed countries to poor, underdeveloped countries...is a sharp 
deviation from the liberal, equal opportunity principle in relations between states ( ...)’ (Sorensen, 
2001, p. 155). For analyses on development and international trade, which point to the need to rethink 
the trade rules because they put in a disadvantage position developing states, see articles and reports 
compiled at http://www.globalpolicy.Org/socecon/trade/subsidies/index.htm#2008.
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Sorensen and Hobson, to which I return below, apply structurationism to both the 
domestic and the international, that is, to the relationship between the state and the 
domestic structures (e.g. society), as well as to the relationship between the state and 
the economic, military, and normative international structures. They consider agents 
and structures mutually constitutive (Hobson, 2001, p. 411). Their writings propose 
an integrated image of the international and the domestic as constituting ‘one social 
system’ (Hobden, 2002, p. 57). The ‘spatial realm’ is ‘co-constitutive’ rather than 
‘separate or self-constituting’ (Hobson, 2002a, p. 437), despite the fact that the 
concept of sovereignty and the consequent idea of jurisdiction inevitably creates 
these two different spaces (Sorensen, 2001, p. 12).
Sorensen aims to show that under anarchy not all states are or become like-units. 
Aside from the logic of homogeneity, the logic of heterogeneity is also present in the 
international realm (Sorensen, 2001, pp. 27 - 30). Economic, politico-military and 
normative international structures could create sameness within the international 
(Sorensen, 2001, pp. 1, 11, 13). However, the domestic structure of the state, for 
instance the manner in which norms are implemented, is as important, and can be an 
obstacle in the homogenisation of the international.
The existence of two types of logics internationally, and of un-like units, is linked to 
the existence of different security dilemmas. These security dilemmas are peculiar to 
each of the type of states: modem, postmodern and postcolonial. Sorensen’s main 
point is that security dilemmas should be understood as having both domestic and 
international sources (Sorensen, 2001, p. 95). Different types of states generate 
particular types of behaviour and commitments internationally, such as cooperation 
and conflict. Postcolonial states face internal security dilemmas given by intra-state
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wars and competition. On the other hand, the concern of postmodern states is 
effective and legitimate governance in a globalised world (Sorensen, 2001). 
Postmodern states focus on creating ‘coordinated security communities’ with similar 
postmodern states. These communities are intended to undermine the self-help 
mentality that characterises the other two types of states (Sorensen, 2001).
Sorensen’s view of the state has a different twist to Wendt’s. The difference lies in 
Sorensen’s two-level reference to the state -  an initial discussion of defining 
ahistorical features or elements, moving on to historically specific combinations 
between constitutive elements. The elements of empirical or substantial sovereignty 
are practice dependent. Thus, Sorensen acknowledges the fact that the contingent 
relationship between so-called ‘essential’ features is salient for explaining and 
understanding state constitution and state action.
Sorensen does not explicitly deal with state agency. The aim of Sorensen’s analysis 
is to examine the mutual constitution of domestic and international structures rather 
than focus on ‘actors or their decision-making’(Sorensen, 2001, p. II) .51 The 
different types of states developed in his analyses endorse the view of the state as a 
structure. One could infer that the structure acquires agential properties through the 
government. In terms of its exercise, Sorensen’s ideal types seem to point to varying 
degrees of agency domestically, which is linked to the ability to control the means of 
legitimate violence. On the issue of international agency, Sorensen’s typologies 
illuminate more about the types of priorities or commitments states choose, based on 
their domestic structural features and on their relations within the international 
military and political, economic and normative structures. Postcolonial states, for
51 Aim of the book: ‘to find out exactly how states are being transformed and what the consequences 
are’ (Sorensen, 2004, p. 21).
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example, are regarded as ‘weak players in the international system’ as well as 
‘peripheral players in the global economy’ (Sorensen, 2001, pp. 57,63). Sorensen’s 
analysis does not discuss whether the integrated social processes associated with the 
postmodern state, such as the existence of supra and subnational sources of 
citizenship, challenge the unitary aspect of state agency.
Sorensen’s analysis is valuable in discussing sources of state transformation through 
the notions of substantial and regulative rules of sovereignty. The above typologies 
and explanations lead to questions about the relationship between analytical moves, 
i.e. integrated analyses, and ontological claims (the type of units and structures one 
posits to exist and their constitutive features). It becomes evident that the point of 
‘integrated’ analysis is to demonstrate that the domestic and the international are not 
necessarily ontologically separate and different realms. For instance, Sorensen 
shows postcolonial states are confronted with internal Hobbesian security dilemmas 
while postmodern ones can create hierarchical relations within coordinated security 
communities internationally (Sorensen, 2001, p. 177). However, Sorensen seems to 
argue that, depending on historical context or geography, one could justify 
conceptually the idea of the state as a fixed entity with a well-delimited inside, and, 
therefore, with a fragmented rather than integrated constitution -  domestically and 
internationally. For example, modem states are conceptualised as entities with well- 
defined boundaries. The national identity creates a coherent community. Interests are 
internally produced. This suggests that social processes across the international -  
domestic divide do not contribute to the creation of state interests. The logical 
conclusion is that the modem state as an ideal type suggests an a priori preference 
for considering these social spaces as separate. In this respect, Sorensen’s historical
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typology is at odds with the meta-theoretical claim about the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the inside and the outside.
3.2.2. The ‘constitutive’ state
Hobson aims to relate the international agency of the state to the domestic agential 
power of the state (Hobson, 2000, p. 204). Hobson puts forward the concept of 
‘constitutive’ state. Hobson argues that the state is ‘territorially promiscuous’ -  it is 
an agent situated between the domestic and the international structures, while being 
embedded in both realms (Hobson, 2000). He draws on Mann’s concept of multi- 
spatiality to define the state as being constituted by ‘multiple overlapping and 
intersecting socio-spatial networks of power’. This is an important move because it 
suggests a dynamic understanding of social spaces. Such a definition of the state is 
different from those presented thus far. The definition does not link the state as an 
actor to a well-defined territory. This means that it allows us to conceptually 
problematise the relationship between an essential element, such as territory, and the 
state as an entity.
The nature of the relationship with society and the nature of interactions within 
different international structures inform the international and domestic agential 
power of state (Hobson, 2001, p. 411). The state is ‘Janus-faced’ such that it is not 
only constrained by both realms, but also shapes or constitutes them by playing one 
o ff from the other’ (Hobson, 2001, pp. 412-413).53 While the constitution of the state 
as an actor is framed in structurationist terms, its exercise is defined in terms of
52 Mann quoted in (Hobson, 2002c, p. 16).
53 Hobson writes that ‘the state can transform its domestic realm both to enhance its interests 
externally or overcome international/global structures ..., and to conform to the requirements of such 
structures ( ...)’ (Hobson, 2001, p. 413). Hobson’s emphasis.
‘freedom from.’ Since the state is viewed as an embedded set of institutions within 
both ‘domestic and international society’(Hobson, 2001, p. 413), it is only partially 
autonomous. The conceptualisation of the state as socially embedded and partially 
autonomous (Hobson, 2000, pp. 194 - 195) does not take away the conceptual 
possibilities for the exercise of agency.
Hobson makes the domestic part of the explanatory framework of international 
politics (Hobson, 2000, pp. 213, 226). He defines the domestic agential power or 
‘governing capacity’ of the state as the ‘ability of the state to make domestic or 
foreign policy’, as well as shape the domestic realm, ‘free of domestic social 
structural or nonstate actor constraints’ (Hobson, 2000, p. 218, 2001, p. 398). The 
domestic agential power also refers to the ability of the state to implement decisions 
(Hobson, 2000, pp. 198 - 199,207)54, although these decisions are informed by the 
interaction of the state with society (Halliday, 1987, p. 223; Hobson, 2000, p. 182).
International agential power is defined as the power to overcome the predicaments of 
the anarchic logic and ‘construct foreign policy free of international structural 
constraints’ (Hobson, 2000, pp. 198 -199,207). The state is an agent because of its 
ability to cause behaviour or action (Hobson, 2001, pp. 398 - 399). Hobson locates 
the explanation for international agential power within the domestic state-society 
relation (Hobson, 2000, p. 225). Hobson argues that the stronger the links with 
society, the higher the agential power of the state domestically and internationally 
(Hobson, 2000, p. 199). In his words, ‘strong states go hand in hand with strong 
societies' (Hobson, 2000, p. 227). Due to the placement of the state in different 
international economic and political power structures, its international agential 
power is varying in degree (Hobson, 2001, pp. 412 - 413). The constitutive state is an
54 Mann terms it ‘infrastructural power’ (Mann, 1993, p. 53).
actor that is both constrained and enabled by political and/or economic international 
structures -  therefore not merely responding to the requirements of those 
international structures. The state can be simultaneously constrained within one 
structure for instance, in the political but shaping the economic. He writes:
In sum, the significant point is that this structurationist synthesis entails recognizing that states are 
socially embedded within domestic and international society, while simultaneously having varying 
degrees of international agential power to reform international structures as well as to mitigate their 
constraining logic (Hobson, 2001, p. 413).
Hobson’s conceptualisation of the state rests on the existence of multiple social 
spaces. This view is accompanied by a conceptualisation of the state as an actor with 
varying agential potential. More broadly, I take the idea of linking the existence of 
multiple social spaces with explanations of the varying agential potential of the state 
as a significant one. Hobson’s argument regarding state agency overemphasises the 
links between state and society as the main causal factors for a certain type of 
international agential power (high or low). This preference raises questions in 
relation to Hobson’s actual commitment to keep more than one relationship or social 
space as constitutive of state agency.
On the other hand, Hobson’s definition of the state as a ‘territorially promiscuous’ 
actor offers the conceptual possibility to move the conceptualisation of the state 
away from traditional definitions that emphasise the territory as a condition for the 
existence of the state. The territory is one of the ‘essential’ elements that have been 
considered central to defining the state and its sovereignty. Territory has been central 
to the definition of the state as a legal person, which possesses unitary agency. If the 
view of social spaces were reconsidered, as can be inferred from Hobson’s account, 
then the concept of unitary, person-like state agency, which is premised on the legal 
definition, would also need to be reconsidered.
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Problems arise nevertheless from Hobson’s empirical analyses. The state is defined 
in material terms. The focus is on the financial and tax functions (Reus-Smit, 2002, 
p. 124), which, according to Hobson, sustain the ability of the state to survive. Thus, 
the multiple ideational and material social spaces that were at the heart of Hobson’s 
conceptualisation of the state are sidelined for a definition that is similar to the 
rationalist conceptions. The focus on material factors, such as the domestic financial 
or tax system, makes the outside vs. inside distinction more visible (Reus-Smit 
2002). According to Martin Shaw, the possibility of multi-spaces is reduced by 
positing a dualism between ‘a’ domestic and ‘a’ international realm (Shaw, 2000). 
The dualism also facilitates the focus on one space at a time. For example, Hobson’s 
empirical study of tariff protectionism and trade regime change contains two 
methodological moves: first bracketing state-society relations and focusing on 
international and domestic structures and second, reversing the bracketing by 
analysing the state-society complex (Hobson, 2002c, pp. 21 - 22).
In spite of Hobson’s specification that ‘social and political change can only be 
understood through the interaction of multiple forces’, the focus of the just 
mentioned examples is on causal explanations that privilege material military and 
economic factors (Hobson, 2002b, p. 80). This is achieved to the detriment of the 
constitutive analysis that incorporates the ‘social dimension’ of the international 
structures, resulting from the intersubjective understandings of norms, culture or 
ideas (Reus-Smit, 2002, pp. 126, 128 - 129). It also suggests that Hobson’s 
theoretical preference for multi-causal explanation is limited by the focus on 
material factors, as well as by the reduction of the social spaces that inform state 
agency.
69
To conclude, the arguments of the historical sociologists discussed in this section 
make more evident the limitations of Wendt’s bracketing of the domestic, his 
reliance on practice in the international realm to explain the emergence of different 
international structures, and his taken for granted corporate self. The section has 
argued that both Sorensen and Hobson offer interesting insights for integrating the 
domestic and the international within an account of state constitution and state 
agency. Hobson’s account of the state and its varied agential potential represents a 
departure from the traditional conceptualisations of the state. This is because the 
account focuses on the state’s ability to act and create effects as a condition of 
agency rather than on the existence of ‘essential’ elements such as territory. The 
discussion also pointed to some of the tensions present in these theories and the 
empirical analyses they develop.
3.3. The state as (academic) discourse and power relations: the 
postmodern critique of the state
This section engages with the IR postmodern critique of the state. The main 
difference between these writings and the ones discussed in the previous sections lies 
within their starting point. Postmodern writers think of reality in discursive terms. 
Reality is internal to language and it is constituted by it. The analyses of the state are 
thus carried out by exploring the body of knowledge (i.e. sum of interrelated texts) 
that create the present possibilities and the parameters for thinking about reality and 
about the state.
Postmodern writers use the methods of deconstruction and genealogy in their 
critique of the state. The deconstruction approach is informed by the writings of
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Derrida and focuses on the state as a grammar that needs to be deciphered. To 
deconstruct a concept is, according to Bartelson, ‘to demonstrate, that it is contingent 
upon the text in which it figures’ (Bartelson, 1995, p. 239). The second approach, the 
genealogical method, is linked to the writings of Foucault. This method is employed 
to reveal the contradictory and plural practices constituting concepts such as the 
state. By using this method, postmodern writers aim to destabilise the taken for 
granted and common sense assumptions put forward in IR. Genealogy reflects the 
view that as concepts have not developed in linear ways, nor should their 
understanding be thought of as coherent and unitary.
In what follows, I suggest four main and closely related claims that the postmodern 
critique of the state makes. First, these writings intend to expose the binary 
oppositions contained by the discourse on the state, oppositions that are inscribed in 
modem political theory and international political theory. In this understanding the 
concept of the state is viewed as an encrypted and reified chain of notions -  a 
narrative that needs to be ‘decoded’ through deconstmction and exposed as being 
built upon binary oppositions. The strong claim here is that the state is not a self- 
referential entity outside language (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 153,164; Walker, 1993, p. 
5).
For example, the works of Walker, Bartelson, Ashley show that the concept of the 
state is built on a series of dichotomies between the inside and outside, order and 
disorder, hierarchy and anarchy, good life and survival, ‘us’ and ‘them’ etc (Walker, 
1993, pp. 32 - 33). These oppositions are simultaneously the outcomes of and the 
legitimising reiterations for modem political thought, i.e. of disciples such as IR, 
sociology and political science. This is due to the fact that each of these sciences
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takes ‘one aspect of [the] duality [inside/outside] as the foundation of its inquiry’ 
(Bartelson, 1995, pp. 238,239). The ‘de-naturalisation’ or ‘de-essentialising’ moves 
are not discussed by placing the state within a historical context as historical 
sociologists propose. Rather, the postmodern writers expose the inbuilt biases and 
the processes by which the state has been transformed in discourse from a stage in 
human history to the telos of world history itself (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 42 - 43).55
This links in with a second key argument concerning the impossibility of 
transcending the state-centric discourse about reality. The scepticism is explained by 
the fact that the state has been both the starting point of any theorising, that is, the 
representation of political order, as well as its object of analysis (Bartelson, 2001, 
pp. 5, 27, 34). According to Bartelson, there is an inevitable circularity when 
attempting to escape the representational space constituted by the state or a state- 
centric discourse present even in the deconstructivist writings of Ashley and Walker. 
The state is the result of discursive practice, and it is simultaneously dependent on 
and originating in, the political community through which the statist discourse is 
disseminated (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 167 -168). Walker’s identification of the state as 
the result of the opposition between the particular and the universal ignores, 
according to Bartelson, that this opposition between the international and the 
domestic came only with the discourse on the state (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 167 -168).
Thirdly, if one accepts that the international -  domestic division has been 
discursively constructed, postmodernists propose its revision by affirming the 
‘contingency’ of the state (Bartelson, 2001, p. 152). That is, the postmodern 
critique intends to contest the spatial view of modernity, which makes space a
55 ‘It has been frozen and naturalised as a socially inevitable and eternal condition, being presented as 
a product of evolution as well as a transhistorical entity’ (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 38, 52).
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function of time or of history. They aim to contest and contextualise the discourse 
on the state as one of multiple interpretations of the political order rather than 
consider it an independent and essentialist one (Walker, 1993, pp. 15, 66 - 67; 
Weber, 1995). Beside the discursive reframing of the state, Walker argues for an 
ontological ‘reconsideration’ of the spatial order or of political space (Walker, 1993, 
p. 13). The academic discourse has reified ‘an historically specific spatial ontology’ 
and it perpetuates ‘a geopolitics of static fragmentation’ (Walker, 1993, pp. ix, 8). 
The state in this view, is a ‘historically specific solution’ or form of organisation to a 
contradictory trend between universality and particularity (Walker, 1993, pp. 1,10). 
In Der Derian’s view, the nation-state was ‘founded on the stasis of a fixed identity 
and impermeable territory’. The associated discourse of boundaries needs to be 
deconstructed in the context of a new reality, which increasingly relies on 
technologies of speed, surveillance and simulation (Der Derian, 1995, p. 369, 
September 1990).
Lastly, the rethinking of the spatial order, for example, disassociating territory from 
governance, should be accompanied by a conceptual reconsideration of the social 
practices associated with the existence of the state. The analyses of postmodern 
writers disclose the present order as intrinsically violent, based upon the ‘us’ vs. 
‘them’ representation. They claim that changing the organising principle would also 
change politics by decreasing the potential of war. In this understanding, the state is 
not only a sum of discursive practices but also a social phenomenon instituted and 
reproduced through non-discursive social practices. The discursive and social 
practices are mutually constituted. For example, foreign policy as a social practice 
and the discursive practices related to the construction of an ‘us vs. them’ identity 
(Campbell, 1998) are mutually reinforcing and constituting of the state (Weber,
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1995). The state as a social project is, in other words, an ongoing process of 
discursive identification and social practices rather than an ontological given.
Since the state is regarded as a discursive practice, states per se then do not ‘cause’ 
action or cooperative behaviour. What a specific discourse on the state can do is 
enable certain actions and disable others, in other words, it can create the conditions 
of possibility (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 1999) for both scientific discourse and political 
action. Individuals are not the locus for power, nor are they mere reproductive 
agents. In Butler’s words, ‘the subject [individual] is precisely the site o f ... [power] 
reiteration, a reiteration that is never merely mechanical’. 56
The contestation of the inbuilt oppositions within the concept of the state is 
accompanied, as mentioned, by scepticism that these oppositions could ever be 
transcended by theories of IR. From this perspective, the present project of 
rethinking the conceptualisation of the state in terms of constitution and agency 
would be a non-starter. The view of the postmodern writers is that theory building of 
any kind about the state is inevitably reinforcing of state-centric discourses and state- 
centric social reality. The next chapter will develop on how the postmodern idea of 
the state being constituted and reiterated through discursive and social practices is, 
for instance, an important element of the state as an actor argument.
I subscribe to the endeavours undertaken by these writers to de-essentialise the 
concept of the state and problematise the relationship between social spaces as well 
as the traditional disjunctions. I also subscribe to those postmodern understandings 
that acknowledge the existence of a material reality, which is not an epiphenomenon 
of textual relations -  the acknowledgement of social practices that do not necessarily
56Judith Butler quoted in (Smith, 2002, p. 240).
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have an explicit discursive aspect to them. However, I do not agree with the 
conclusions reached by some of the postmodern writers that states, as forms of 
political community, are intrinsically violent. The next two chapters offer more 
arguments for my claim that it is impossible to predict or a priori suggest that other 
forms are or can be fundamentally more appropriate or less violent in their 
constitution.
Conclusion
This chapter has brought under scrutiny conceptualisations of the state, from 
Wendt’s systemic theory to the historical sociological ones of Sorensen and Hobson 
and the postmodern critique of the state. Wendt, Sorensen and Hobson put forward 
in an explicit manner a view of the social world built on both ideational and material 
factors, in which entities such as the state are socialised rather than given; where 
agents (i.e. the state) are in constitutive relationship with structures (ideational, 
material, international and domestic) and identities and interests undergo continuous 
interaction and constitution.
The first part of the chapter discussed the explanatory and ontological implications 
of Wendt’s bracketing of the domestic and assumed corporate self. The discussion 
has noted that these two moves make Wendt’s argument inconsistent with his 
metatheoretical structurationist position and more generally undermine the 
explanatory goals of his theory. For instance, the section has argued that the focus on 
international state practice becomes a constraining assumption rather than an 
enabling one for explanations of international state action. The methodological and
57This later aspect will become evident in relation to the illustrative cases.
ontological preferences that justify this focus on the international social space 
become problematic if one accepts Wendt’s metatheoretical argument that links 
agency to the constitutive processes taking place in more than one social structure.
The second section has examined Sorensen’s and Hobson’s historically informed 
accounts of state constitution and state action. Sorensen links the features of the state 
to specific historical or regional contexts. The main point made in relation to 
Sorensen’s typology of states refers to the unsolved tension between the analytical 
moves and ontological claims underpinning his ideal types. In this second part, I 
have also argued that Hobson’s understanding of social spaces has important 
consequences for rethinking the concept of the state and state agency. However, the 
discussion has claimed that his empirical analysis reverts to an understanding of the 
state that is similar to the rationalist ones. Furthermore, the theoretical preference for 
multi-causal explanations is reflected in the empirical illustrations, which focus on 
the domestic material sources of state constitution.
The last section of this chapter discussed the main ideas coming out of the 
postmodern critique of the state. The state is, in one understanding, a narrative that 
needs to be deconstructed and its binary constitutive oppositions such as inside vs. 
outside and order vs. anarchy exposed. In a complementary understanding, the state 
is not only discourse but also social practices. This invites, according to postmodern 
writers, reconsideration of political space and of the practices associated with the 
state. The section acknowledges the need to develop an understanding of the state 
that problematises the traditional assumptions on which conceptions of the state as 
an actor have been built.
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Several questions have emerged from these two chapters as important to the 
conceptualisation of the state as an actor. They refer to the need to view the state as a 
unitary and a coherent entity in order to attribute it agency, to the relationship 
between ‘the’ international and ‘the’ domestic, to the relationship between human 
agents, such as leaders, bureaucrats, and politicians and the state. They also refer to 
the conceptual possibilities of multi-causal explanations as well as to the possibilities 
of a new language to discuss state agency as practice dependent and constituted by 
multiple social spaces. These issues will be addressed in the next two chapters.
77
Chapter 4: From essentialist to relational ontology: 
implications for conceptualising the state and state
agency
The analysis has demonstrated thus far that FPA and IR theories contain important 
internal inconsistencies that compromise their explanatory and ontological goals.58 
This chapter aims to show that the contradictions and inconsistencies of these 
theories are in fact due to the essentialist conceptions underpinning their views of 
entities, of their properties and of boundaries.59 The chapter proposes a shift in the 
ground on which conceptualisations of social entities and agency rest: from 
essentialist or substantialist to processual or relational ones.60 The aim is to offer a 
more coherent framework that aligns a relational conception of entities with a 
relational understanding of agency and social spaces. The chapter uses the insights 
from processual philosophy, relational sociology, social psychology, and Colin 
Wight’s work on agency and structure to reframe the understanding of the state as an 
actor.
581 am referring here to the aims of explaining change, reconsidering the international-domestic 
relationship and conceptualising the state as a non-unitary actor respectively.
59 It should be noted that the constructivist propositions such as inter-subjectivity, the co-constitution 
between agents and structures, time and space contingency introduce important non-essentialist 
relational elements. Yet the conceptualisation of the state and state agency are fundamentally 
essentialist in character and relational elements are not consistently applied.
60 I use the terms ‘processual’ and ‘relational’ ontology as synonymous. They designate the ideas 
coming from two closely related fields: processual philosophy and relational sociology. Patrick 
Jackson and Daniel Nexon, on the other hand, differentiate between the two terms (Jackson & Nexon, 
1999) to emphasise the focus on both relations and social processes. I take the focus on both social 
relations and practices to be implicit in the relational or processual ontological positions on which I 
draw. See for instance (Abbott, 1995; Emirbayer, September 1997; Fuchs, 2001; Rescher, 2002; 
2008; White, 1992).
4.1. Essentialism/substantialism in IR: explanatory and 
ontological consequences
In what follows I will give a brief overview of the main ideas linked to essentialist 
positions in order to identify the essentialist logic at work in FPA and IR theories 
discussed in the previous chapters.
Substantialism is a long-standing tradition stemming from philosophical, Christian 
as well as scientific writings. Essentialist propositions regarding social life have 
become mainstream although processual philosophy61, which puts forward a
Cry
different view of social entities, has a similarly long tradition. This is because the 
essentialist conceptualisation of social entities has been supported and reinforced by
•  • •  f* !\ •  « •mainstream scientific assumptions about biological entities. Social entities, such as 
individuals or other social kinds, have been defined in the same way biological 
entities are defined. Social entities have intrinsic and immutable essences or 
substances (Fuchs, 2001) across time and spatial coordinates.64 These are termed 
primary properties (Rescher, 1996, p. 47). Primary properties define the entity as a 
member of a category. The entity is dependent on its intrinsic qualities in order to 
exist (Van Brakel, 1992). It exists independent of the environment65 by virtue of
61 Process philosophy is a metaphysical endeavour that aims to provide a broad and general account 
of the nature of reality. The key idea is that ‘natural existence consists in and is best understood in 
terms of processes rather than things — of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities’ (Rescher, 
2001).
62 Some of the authors are Aristotle, John Locke, Thomas D’Aquinas and Isaac Newton.
63 Findings in psychology also suggest that individuals have a cognitive inclination to assume that 
entities possess innate features. Psychologists have termed this ‘intuitive essentialism’ (Medin & 
Ortony, 1989) or ‘psychological essentialism’ (Susan A. Gelman, 2004; S.A. Gelman & Markman, 
1986; S.A. Gelman & Wellman, 1991).
64 Locke refers also to properties as constituting the essence. See The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy. 2nd edition, p. 887. In analytical philosophy, essences are termed ‘natural kinds’. Van 
Brackel writes for instance ‘Natural kinds are those to which terms and classifications refer when they 
are true and constant in all possible worlds’ (Van Brakel, 1992, p. 225). See also (Fuchs, 2001, p. 12).
651 must mention that a minimum essentialism is unavoidable as a pre-requisite for the development 
of any discipline. Essentialism in this form is achieved when identifying properties of individuals or
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these intrinsic properties. In Rescher’s words, the assumption is that ‘things remain 
self identical through time on the basis of their possession of certain essential 
features or properties that remain changelessly intact across temporal 
changes’(Rescher, 1996, p. 34).
The accompanying proposition of agency is that agency is located in a coherent 
entity or within a stable and unchangeable core. Agents are seen as homogenous, 
unitary and autonomous (Fuchs, 2001, p. 112). Actions or events are regarded as the 
consequence of the interaction between entities or between their properties. Events 
are also considered epiphenomena of the self, that is, secondary or variable 
properties emanating from these substances. In this sense, entities predate everything 
else existing in the world. Interaction does not change the entities but only 
potentially their secondary properties. The underlying principle of such an 
interpretation of the social world is that ‘functioning follows upon being’ (operari 
sequitur esse) (Rescher, 2002; 2008). Such assumptions have informed the 
understanding of human agency. In its turn, human or individual agency has been 
used as a template to think about the agency of other forms of organisations such as 
states.
In the rationalist accounts of the second chapter, agents are thought to possess 
instrumental, goal-oriented rationality. In Krasner’s writings for instance, 
instrumental logic determines the individuals’ behaviour (Krasner, 1993).66 Their 
motivating goals are preservation of power as well as security and prosperity for 
internal constituencies. While their tastes and preferences may vary, rational
other social kinds. However, it does not involve any claims about their intrinsic nature or about the 
immutable character of the relationship between these features.
66 It must be noted that in liberal theories, the intrinsic qualities are different: individuals are inclined 
towards cooperation.
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reasoning, the methods, and rules to achieve best results, make them like-entities. 
While the focus on individuals suggests high subjectivity and therefore difference, 
common essence is what explains action. According to Elster, the assumption that 
they all rationally assimilate and use information makes possible explanations and 
predictions of choices for action, strategies and rewards (Elster, 1989, p. 28). 
Krasner’s view of human agents indicates a substantialist interpretation. Individuals’ 
behaviour is explained by reference to their intrinsic qualities as rational and 
instrumental agents. Secondary properties, such as social status or identities, do not 
play a role in the explanations provided. Krasner’s explanations are based on initial 
assumptions about the internal properties of actors, which are not dependent on the 
environment. Pluralist accounts, for instance, work with a concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’(Keohane, 1984). Bounded rationality acknowledges the occasional 
constraints of the environment upon decision-making and the exercise of agency. 
Yet, I have argued that Keohane and Nye’s fundamental understanding of entities is 
similar to the statist conception. Constructivist writers propose, on the other hand, an 
understanding of rationality as socially constructed, embedded in symbolic and 
material structures, when discussing state behaviour internationally. This resembles 
the relational position, which will be discussed in the second part of the chapter.
/ o
States have also acquired immutable or substantial features. In IR, this translated 
into a claim that sovereignty, territoriality, the nation and the government are 
primary features of the modem state. The Westphalian moment could be considered 
what Rescher terms ‘the moment of conception’ of entities alongside their intrinsic 
features (Rescher, 1996, p. 66). These features would only disappear with the demise 
of the state. These properties do not alter the ‘core’ or the essence of what defines
671 leave aside for the time being the assumptions of personhood on which such a conception of state 
agency rests.
68 In other fields, substantialism has underpinned conceptions of national identity.
the state as an entity throughout history or in different geographical locations. The 
theories discussed in the previous two chapters, with the exception of the post­
modern ones, work with such assumptions. Wendt’s concept of role identities, that is 
the state’s social identities69, are in substantialist language instantiations of 
secondary properties. Social identities can be altered according to Wendt but not the 
sense of self.70 The latter is not ‘historically variable’ nor negotiable in interaction 
and process (Wendt, 1999, pp. 64, 70, 198). The assumption regarding states as 
stable across temporal and spatial dimensions favours treatment of states as like- 
units. It makes generalisation possible about state behaviour internationally.
Taking goals and interests such as the national interest and the general interest of 
society as internally produced constitutes another expression of essentialism in IR 
theory. Statist approaches premise the state as an actor assumption upon the 
existence of internally defined interests. The national interest is regarded as a 
commonly agreed interest. The interaction with other actors does not change these 
interests. Interests deemed contradictory to the generally agreed national interest 
could place an institution outside ‘the state’, as Krasner argues. This is also the case 
in the pluralist accounts. My discussion of Katzenstein’s and Putman’s distinction 
between state and society showed that this differentiation is based on an assumption 
about the pre-constituted nature of state and societal interests. Goals originate from 
internal processes associated with the state and/or society respectively. In this sense, 
they are viewed as existing prior to the interaction. In Keohane and Nye’s work, on 
the other hand, the view of state interests is more dynamic. The hierarchies between 
issues related to the state are unstable and negotiable. The national interest for 
example is not ‘self-evident’ and a fixed goal of the state. It is fluctuating due to the
69 Secondary properties of the state can be the size of the territory, the type of the government, its 
multi-ethnic components etc.
70 See discussion in Chapter 3.
interaction between elites, governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
institutions within time and context (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971, pp. 332, 
335).71 Yet, the interdependence paradigm still suggests, as shown in the second 
chapter, that interests are internally created within the different bureaucratic 
organisations. Bargaining occurs based on pre-established and internally produced 
interests. The argument in Chapter 3 has shown that the constructivist accounts of 
Wendt and Hobson take either domestic or international goals as already 
constituted72 because of the methodological bracketing of these spaces. Sorensen’s 
focus on types of states is also illustrative of essentialist moves. The analysis 
assumes for instance, that postmodern states take for granted democratic institutions 
and practices (Sorensen, 2001), which are placed outside political negotiation. This 
implies that postmodern states are intrinsically democratic.
Essentialist reasoning underpins the conceptualisations of spaces in the theories of 
the previous two chapters. Viewing the ‘outside’ or the ‘international’ as 
fundamentally and irrevocably different is suggestive of an essentialist 
understanding. The properties associated with these spaces are considered intrinsic 
to them and unchangeable through time and space. Secondly, conceptualising the 
international and the domestic as self-contained and autonomous spaces (Emirbayer, 
September 1997: 285) in spite of the ‘inter-action’ between the two is also an 
expression of essentialism.
Krasner’s writings on sovereignty and international regimes and the work of 
Keohane and Nye, Putman, Gourevitch and Katzenstein make essentialist arguments
71 See also (Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 29,206).
72 Wendt takes the process of domestic goal formation for granted while Hobson takes international 
state interests as fixed in the discussion about 20th century international institutional change (Hobson, 
2002, p. 80). Sorensen sees the state as a structure and goal-framing is not a central issue of his 
endeavour.
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about the two realms. The international is characterised in their writings by anarchy 
and lack of normative underpinnings. These are primary properties. In Gourevitch’s 
writings for instance, the international is characterised by the potential for war and 
the distribution of power among states. Regimes are secondary features of the 
international. They constitute a state’s secondary interests and preferences. The 
essential interests are the drive for power and survival. In the interdependence and 
world politics paradigm of Keohane and Nye, the definition of systemic processes as 
patterns of relations between actors, norms and conventions, suggests a focus on the 
normative and ideational dimensions as characteristics of the international. The 
discussion in the second chapter has demonstrated that Keohane and Nye preserve 
nonetheless a similar understanding of the international to the other rationalist 
theories. Even when the behaviour of the state leads to the creation of normative 
structures, such as regimes, they are not constitutive of the state or of the 
international structure. They do not change the structure of the international.
Conversely, constructivist accounts make ideational structures constitutive of the 
international by subscribing to the meta-theoretical structural idealist position. As 
we have seen, it underpins the understanding of Sorensen’s postcolonial and 
postmodern types of states. These types of states propose a less strict distinction 
between the features of the international and domestic. Sorensen demonstrates that 
states can face internal Hobbesian security dilemmas, which are specific features of 
the international in the rationalist accounts. The international can be hierarchical 
through the constitution of coordinated security communities. In this sense, 
Sorensen’s conceptualisation of the postcolonial and postmodern state does not 
sustain the dichotomy between the inside and the outside as an ahistorical and
73 See also section on Wendt, Chapter 3.
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permanent feature of the international.74 This constitutes the relational aspect of 
Sorensen’s theory.
However, all of the rationalist and constructivist theories discussed sustain and 
endorse the international-domestic division. This division is either the consequence 
of an ontological preference of conceptualising spaces as self-contained or the 
indirect consequence of methodological bracketing of either of the realms. The post­
modern IR literature, on the other hand, has challenged the inbuilt dichotomies on 
which conceptualisations of the state rest (such as the inside-outside).
As mentioned at the beginning of the section, there are two issues involved in the 
conception of agency on essentialist premises. Firstly, action and behaviour are 
explained by reference to the primary or secondary properties of entities. They are 
regarded as the direct cause of specific actions (Emirbayer, September 1997, pp. 285 
- 286). Entities possess immutable and measurable features that can interact and 
produce effects while the entity remains unchanged. The underlying principle is that 
entities pre-date action.
Statist and pluralist theories of IR make these substantialist propositions evident 
when claiming that the interaction between states’ capabilities determines the state’s
7 f \position within the international. These properties explain outcomes. The 
instrumental and rationally driven behaviour of leaders also explains state actions.
74 An additional consequence of essentialising the domestic and the international as separate spaces is 
the reification of material factors. Material capabilities are for instance considered the main or 
primary cause of state behaviour in the international (Maynard & Wilson, 1980).
5 See also (Emirbayer & Mische, January 1998; Jackson & Nexon, 1999).
76 This reflects the view of structure as ‘relations of difference’ established between the properties of 
the entities, that is between the material capabilities of states within an anarchical system. See (Wight, 
2006). It is also representative o f the understanding of structure as law like regularities in the sense 
that these laws (anarchy) underpins the interaction of the units as laws underpin in physics the 
interaction of biological units.
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This idea of action as reliant on internal properties of entities is also evident in 
constructivist theories. According to Wendt, states are ‘pre-social’ entities, 
‘ontologically prior to the state system’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 198). Sorensen’s 
framework also offers examples of explanations of state action that rely on the 
essential properties of states. The actions of postmodern states are concerned with 
effective and legitimate governance in a globalised world. Their internal constitution 
as democratic entities allows for such a focus. On the other hand, the competitive 
and war-prone institutional features of postcolonial states inform their actions. 
Nevertheless, the work of Hobson and Sorensen introduces relational elements by 
arguing that outcomes are reliant on the relationship between the state and society. 
Yet, by keeping the domestic and the international as distinct, the relationship 
between the state and society is kept separate from social processes that take place 
across the inside -  outside divide.
Secondly, assumptions about coherent and unitary selves inform the view of agency. 
Agency denotes unified action and agentic authority and capabilities. Human agency 
is conceptualised this way in the essentialist accounts. In IR, this view has been used 
as a template to also think about the agency of other social kinds such as states. The 
conception of state agency draws on an analogy with individuals: it is internally 
coherent, unitary, and intentional. The examples above use the rationality or 
instrumentality of states to explain state action internationally. Rationalist theories 
use a concept of unitary actor to refer to the state as an agent internationally. This 
occurs, as I have shown, in spite of the pluralist specification that the state is a non- 
unitary entity. Wendt draws on the assumptions of personhood more explicitly 
while Hobson does not question the corporate agency assumption when discussing 
state agency internationally. Sorensen speaks of states as structures rather than
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agents and therefore he does not have an explicit view of state agency. Yet, he refers 
to states interacting in the international in the same way pluralist frameworks speak 
of states doing the acting internationally. The silent assumption is that of agency 
premised on the legal definition of the state. In this sense, the state has corporate 
agency. The concept of corporate agency Sorensen uses is similar to Wendt’s.
The goals of the theories discussed in the previous two chapters are to explain state 
action, to explain change, to propose a view of the state as non-unitary and to 
reconsider the domestic -  international divide. My immanent critique of the previous 
chapters exposed the internal inconsistencies of these theories. The internal 
contradictions account for the limited potential of essentialist accounts to achieve 
these goals. In what follows, the aim is to show that the essentialist propositions 
underpinning the conceptualisation of entities, agency and spaces are also 
responsible for undermining the coherence and aims of these theories. In doing so, 
the chapter makes more evident the need to offer a consistent account of the state as 
an actor premised on relational terms.
The statist approach posits that states are coherent and unitary entities. The 
conceptions of state agency and social spaces are also designed to corroborate such a 
view of social entities. However, the empirical analysis undertaken by Krasner 
contradicts these initial theoretical assumptions. I have already shown that Krasner’s 
work on sovereignty, for instance, can also be used to demonstrate that the 
international-domestic distinction does not have intrinsically immutable 
characteristics. Furthermore, Krasner himself eloquently demonstrated that the 
institutionalising moment of sovereignty did not define sovereignty as the exclusive 
or absolute control over a specific territory (Krasner, 1993, pp. 235, 237, 240).
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Using this as a starting point, Krasner shows the subsequent variation in the 
understanding and practice of sovereignty in different contexts. However, he fails to 
reflect upon the consequences of such historical insights for thinking about the state 
and state agency. The findings of the historical analysis he undertakes undermine the 
initial assumptions regarding the international-domestic divide and the claim that 
states are self-contained entities. I have hinted in Chapter 2 that the insights of 
Krasner’s empirical argument open up the conceptual space to keep the state as an 
agent, yet conceptualise it as a less coherent, self-constituted entity.
The pluralist accounts offer a conception of the state as a non-unitary actor. The 
international and the domestic are seen as autonomous, self-contained and having 
idiosyncratic properties. A silent conception of state agency as unitary and coherent 
also underwrites, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the explanations of international
77politics provided by pluralist accounts. While state agency is varied, depending on 
the type of state-society relation, it is not varied with respect to the same state. These 
theories do not match the conception of entities with a conception of social spaces 
and state agency. The essentialist conceptions of social spaces and agency have 
undermined the aim to conceptualise the state as a non-unitary actor. They reinforce 
the opposite claim about the state as a unitary and an autonomous actor.
The previous chapter has discussed at length the reasons that make Wendt’s theory 
internally inconsistent. This chapter has shown that these moves reflect an 
essentialist understanding of the social world. Such expressions of essentialism are, 
for instance, Wendt’s conceptualisation of the state as a coherent, unitary, and self-
77 This latter conception was possible due to the lack of specification of the relationship between 
individual and state agency. It allowed for transferring assumptions about human agency to states 
internationally.
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contained entity. The methodological move to bracket the domestic has led to an 
essentialist view of social spaces: the reification of the inside-outside distinction. 
These essentialist moves are at odds with Wendt’s meta-theoretical position that 
emphasises the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures, the relational aspect 
of meaning production through social practice. When translated to a social theory of 
international politics, such meta-theoretical assumptions would have allowed 
explanations of variation and change in the agent’s behaviour. According to Jackson 
and Nexon, such theories can only explain change as ‘external shocks’ (Jackson & 
Nexon, 1999). The move to consider social spaces as distinct and autonomous 
undermines the relational elements. Since Wendt’s theory of international politics 
has opted for, or led to, the reification of social spaces, and limited interaction to the 
international, it has also limited the explanations of the sources of change.
Hobson’s view of state agency does not consistently reflect his interpretation of
social spaces. Social spaces constitute the state. They are regarded as multiple and
over-lapping. Hobson also argues for an understanding of state agency as varied, i.e.
the state has different agency in different international structures, political and
economic. However, Hobson claims that state agency is high or low depending on
the relationship with society. If multiple spaces are informing and enabling state
agency as Hobson argues, then the logical consequence would be to claim that state
agency is simultaneously informed by its embeddedness in these spaces. Reifying
one particular relationship as the main cause for the state agency is a reifying move,
which comes at odds with Hobson’s preference for multi-causal explanations.
78 Moreover, there are not only inconsistencies between the two levels of Wendt’s theorising but also 
between his definitions of the state. Aside from the definition of the state as an entity given by the 
relationship between the elements of the legal framework, sovereignty, society and territory, Wendt 
also defines the state as a superorganism ‘with conceptual rather than physical boundaries’ (Wendt, 
2004, p. 315). In my view, this is a better working definition because it places at its centre the role of 
meanings resulting from social practices. These meanings are the ones that potentially constitute and 
enable die potential for action of states. Yet, the essentialist conception of entities is the one that 
informs the conception of state agency.
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Additionally, the analysis in the previous chapter has suggested that the empirical 
analysis of tariff protectionism and trade regime change (Hobson, 2002b, p. 80) 
privileges the focus on material factors, military and economic, as the main 
determinants of state action in international politics. Such a take is indicative of the 
essentialist assumptions underpinning the understanding of the domestic and the 
international as intrinsically different. This understanding counters or is inconsistent 
with Hobson’s meta-theoretical claim that both the ideational and the material are 
constitutive of both realms; and that multiple spaces inform state agency.
As argued earlier, Sorensen’s view of social spaces and the international-domestic 
contains important non-essentialist elements. The relational elements are evident in 
the conceptualisation of the international and the domestic in the case of postmodern 
and postcolonial types of states. At the same time, essentialist assumptions
■ 7 Q
underscore the focus on types or typologies of states. The tendency is to make 
strong claims about the intrinsic properties of each type and the type of action 
pursued by these states due to these properties. Sorensen also works with a view of 
state agency similar to Wendt’s. The evident mismatch is between the essentialist 
view of state agency and the relational view of social spaces proposed by his
OA
framework. This is because the assumption of corporate agency rests on 
assumptions of the coherence and unity of the entity and of the domestic realm. It is 
a diametrically opposed view of the international-domestic relation from Sorensen’s 
integrationist understanding.
79 ‘Such types cannot be found empirically and they are by no means the expression of empirical 
averages. Ideal types are analytical constructs which seek to express ‘pure’ forms by accentuating 
selected aspects of historical reality.’ (Sorensen, 2001, p. 73)
80 See also the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the tensions existing between the 
relational framework and the assumptions about the modem type of state.
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The purpose of ideal types is to create predictable algorithms: to associate a type of 
state with a type of agency internationally and type of action. Sorensen 
acknowledges that historically embedded analysis would reveal that no state is 
exclusively a particular type. In my view, this makes these distinctions valuable only 
if relegated to the status of possible features of the state and possible scenarios of 
action. Sorensen’s theory would need to go beyond identifying ideal types of states if 
the goal to offer a historically embedded analysis of ‘how states are being 
transformed and what the consequences are’ (Sorensen, 2004, p. 21) is to be 
achieved. As it stands, there are limits to what the theory can say about the 
intersections between the features of so-called ideal types of states. For instance, 
post-modern states are portrayed as stronger than post-colonial states due to their 
constitutive features. Their security dilemmas or concerns also distinguish them. 
Their aims are to create ‘coordinated security communities’ between themselves and 
achieve effective governance. However, if dilemmas regularly associated with 
postcolonial states, such as immigration, drugs, trafficking, and terrorism, become 
also constitutive of postmodern states, then the algorithm above cannot say anything
o 1
about the type of agency such states would have internationally.
To conclude, this section has pointed to the essentialist premises of the 
conceptualisation of spaces, agency, and entities on which statist, pluralist, and
o9
constructivist theories rely. It has argued that these assumptions account for the 
discrepancies between the conceptual frameworks and empirical analysis; secondly, 
that they are responsible for making the theories internally inconsistent since
81 For problems emerging from such intersections see ‘World failing on human rights’, 2008/05/28, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/world/7422528.stm. Also, (The State o f  the World's Human 
Rights. Annual Report 2008)
82 Postmodern positions have not been discussed here as their aim is to critique rather than construct 
theories of the state and state agency. They argue, however, against the dichotomies specific to the 
essentialist positions: inside vs. outside and the normative vs. the material.
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conceptualisation of entities, agency and social spaces are shifting between 
essentialist and relational understandings.
4.2. Social relations, selves and agency
This part proposes a relational conceptualisation of entities, spaces, and agency. It 
aims to put forward a more coherent understanding of social entities and action. To 
this end, the analysis uses the insights of process philosophy and relational 
sociology, social psychology and the work of Wight on agents and structures.
The relational sociological and philosophical view of social life emphasises, as 
constructivists do, temporal and spatial contextualisation of entities. It makes entities 
contingent on social practices rather than taking them as ahistorical and invariable. 
However, postmodernists note that moving the foundations of social entities from 
essentialist to non-essentialist and historicised ones is confronted by a significant 
paradox (Bartelson, 2001; Walker, 1993; Weber, 1995). Bartelson contends that 
making entities dependent on the contingency of practice means acknowledging the 
potential of the entity to cease existing. Drawing on Nietzsche, he further argues
that ‘the premises of intelligibility rest (...) upon tracing some ‘essence’ through 
time’ (Bartelson, 2001, p. 36). Historicising the state makes ‘explanation with 
reference to a core impossible’ and transforms the state into ‘a sum of its history’ 
(Bartelson, 2001, p. 36)84.
83 ‘For a being to be contingent is to have the potential not to be’. Agamben paraphrased in 
(Bartelson, 2001, p. 152).
84 This explains Bartelson’s scepticism regarding the ability of theories to transcend reifications when 
developing theories of the state.
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I use Abbott’s (Abbott, 1995) and Rescher’s work to argue that by defining social 
entities as ‘processes and relations’ (Rescher, 1996, p. 52) or as ‘the stability- 
pattems of variable processes’ (Rescher, 2002; 2008), we can maintain both the idea 
of repetition and that of contingency, when discussing the constitution of social 
entities. Such a definition places social relations at the centre of the reproduction and 
transformation of entities. Reproduction and transformation occurs through social 
processes or social practices. Making entities reliant on social practices means 
accepting the idea of stable meanings as well as transformation of the properties of
QC
entities depending on their temporal and spatial context. The focus on social 
practice as time and context bound makes it untenable to apriori decides upon the 
features of entities or social spaces, such as the domestic or the international. The 
focus is not so much on the resilience of the property as it is on the meaning it 
acquires within social contexts. Entities can have a history or multiple histories. 
These histories are premised on both recurrence and transformation of meanings 
through practice. Processual philosophy argues that there is no ‘core’ that is 
insensitive to historical context or to specific relationships with others. A relational 
ontology also rejects a priori dichotomies (Fuchs, 2001, p. 13) such as normative vs. 
instrumental or material vs. ideational.
Entities are constituted by and constitute the social relations that underpin social 
action. By social relations, I understand the negotiation within social practices of
85 The emphasis on social practice in establishing the meanings of properties comes into effect with 
making even the ‘primary’ features culturally and socially bound. The feminist critique for instance 
documented the fact that rationality, as a feature of women is not the result of some biological process 
of cognitive evolution but rather the consequence of changing societal norms. See also sociological 
writings (Alexander, January 1992; Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and frequently in the IR literature 
Onuf, Wendt, Kratochwil, and many others.
86 Such a position is also justified and supported by an epistemological preference for explanations 
that acknowledge the complex manner in which social action emerges. See the discussion in the next 
chapter on nonlinearity.
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87material-symbolic structures. Social relations constitute the material-symbolic
structures of social engagement (Wight, 2006)88 in different historical and spatial
contexts. They are constitutive and constraining for a certain area of social life
80and/or for a group or groups of people. As such, entities can acquire different 
meanings depending on the type of relations (Emirbayer, September 1997, p. 300) 
underpinning or enabling their practices.90 Agency is social91 because the ability of 
doing is defined in relation to other actors and involves rules, meanings, events, and 
so forth (Emirbayer & Mische, January 1998, p. 973). This makes relations 
constitutive of actors rather than something in which pre-constituted agents engage
07(Somers, November 1998, p. 766). Rescher’s definition of entities as ‘processes 
and relations’ is meant to emphasise this specific aspect regarding entities being 
constituted by and meaningful in social relations.
The social and psychological views of the individual self corroborate this view of 
entities. There are two main conclusions concerning the constitution of human actors 
that come out of these writings. First, individuals are social as much as they are 
independent. They are social due to their embedding within material-ideational 
relations. Subjectivity and reflexivity make the ‘self particular, i.e. distinguishable 
from other selves that are engaged in similar relations. While subjectivity and 
reflexivity play an important part in interpreting experience and engagement within
87 See Bhaskar on the view of structure as ‘internally linked’ ideational and material elements. Quoted 
in (Wendt, Summer, 1987, p. 357). What Giddens’ terms ‘virtual’ is ‘unobservable’ in the Bhaskarian 
terminology, at least according to King, Emirbayer and Mische.
88 Wight uses an account of structures as relations.
89 I will take here the view that social relations are structural as far as they are repetitive through 
routinised practices. Yet, my definition of the state in the last part of this chapter discusses also 
agential aspects o f social relations.
90 Wight makes a similar point by arguing that individuals engage in multiple layers of social 
practices (Wight, 2006).
In IR, agency as a ‘social condition’ denotes its embeddedness in social contexts. Constructivist 
theories such as the ones discussed in the third chapter work with such a conception o f agency. 
Vendulka discusses this assumption in relation to a variety of IR theories. See (Vendulka, 2001, pp. 
56, 66). Wight also develops a concept of social agency. See (Wight, 2006)
92 See both (Emirbayer, September 1997; Jackson & Nexon, 1999).
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social relations, they are themselves socially embedded. Subjectivity and 
reflexivity are, in this sense, social. Individuals are specific due to their subjective 
interpretation of social relations and positioning within social contexts. Contingency 
of action is premised on this latter attribute of human agents as subjective and 
reflective agents (Harre, 1983).94 This position is different from the one that 
differentiates between a self or ‘I’ and social identities95 or roles because it places 
both within social contexts. This is why I use social selves and social roles as 
synonymous. Such language emphasises the fact that all the dimensions of the 
person are social and constituted in social transactions.96 The self is not ‘an 
autonomous psychological entity’ but rather a ‘multifaceted social construct’, whose 
instantiations are time and context bound (Hogg, Terry, & White, December 1995, p. 
256; Howard, 1991, p. 215; Swanson, October 1985, pp. 338 - 342). The second 
contribution of this literature rejects the idea of the individual as a coherent and 
unified entity (Goffman, 1959; Howard, 1991; Nurius, 1991; Wiley, 1994). This 
literature demonstrates that individuals do strive for internal unity. However, they 
are actually constituted by overlapping selves with contradictory needs, diverse 
beliefs and cognitive dissonances (Colapietro, November 1990).97 Unity or 
coherence are not natural features of individuals. The consequences for 
understanding human agency are important, as we shall see further below.
93 Wight also argues that entities are social, that is they are constituted by relations but also by 
‘properties outside these relations’ (Wight, 2006, p. 163). The genetic code informing different 
physical and mental capabilities of human agents independent o f social environment would be such 
an example. However, scientific articles that identify genes as causes for specific diseases or 
disabilities and so forth often specify that they also need specific social habits, environments and 
experiences to trigger them. Many of these conditions or diseases often exist as potentialities. This is 
the assumption underpinning the design of pre-emptive advice and preventive medicine. Therefore, I 
subscribe to an argument that even such properties of individuals can be and are partially socially 
conditioned.
94 See also North Whitehead in (Mesle, 2008).
95 This position underpins Wendt’s understanding of the person. In that view, the internal constitution 
of the individual has to do with ‘structures and processes within the body’, while the external one is 
the result of social recognition. (Wendt, 2004, p. 293)
96 Some have focused on the self as a result o f communication or language exchanges (White, 1992) 
but I take it to be also the result of ‘doing’ or behavioural acts that are not expressed verbally.
97 Colapietro speaks for instance about the ‘de-centering’ of the self (Colapietro, November 1990).
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The following example illustrates the relational and reflexive aspect of human 
action, which makes individuals social as well as specific. Let us take agent X, who 
has been socialised in community 1, in which bribing and cheating are common 
social practices. These practices are common to a variety of social relations related 
to different domains of activity such as work and study. If agent X ends up in 
community 2, where cheating and bribing are not general social practices, she/he can 
continue to bribe. In this instance, one can argue that his/her previous constitution 
and social relations are still creating effects upon his/her actions. It is likely that the 
new social relations will also be causally efficacious in imposing penalties. A second 
scenario can be that she/he stops bribing and cheating. In this case, structure 1 stops 
creating effects. Alternatively, she/he can occasionally bribe and cheat. The example 
illustrates that the possibilities for acting are open, even if socially embedded. It also 
demonstrates the manner in which more than one set of social relations can be 
constitutive of human action.
The example also raises the question of whether one needs to argue that relations are 
constitutive (which is the relational view), or just instrumental. In this latter case, the 
assumption would be of an independent self, which places oneself outside the social 
context in order to calculate the benefits of each option. The social psychological 
view would reject such an assumption because reflexivity is social. Aside from this 
social psychological argument, which claims the social character of the self, I also 
take the view that social relations are constitutive of instrumental behaviour as they 
create or set the criteria for future action. The politics of Eastern Europe after the fall 
of communism illustrates this point. Political actors invoked democratic social 
practices to be constitutive of local politics. One can argue that the previous
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autocratic social practices were still in place and actors were only discursively 
invoking the democratic ones. They were instrumentally using these democratic 
practices and the social relations for political gains. However, by acknowledging 
these sets of relations and practices, political actors set the criteria that the IMF, the 
World Bank, the EU, and civil society organisations have used to evaluate their 
political and economic performance. The ‘instrumental’ use of social relations by 
social actors created the conditions for such social relations and practices to inform 
future actions.
My position here aims to acknowledge that outcomes are the result of both social 
relations -  regarded as both causative and constitutive of social action -  and human 
agency98. The examples illustrate the ways in which social relations are 
transformative as well as constitutive of social action. The second example also 
makes the theoretical point that social relations can have effects that are not 
acknowledged, nor recognised or intended by human actors (Wight, 2006).99 To use 
Wight’s language, they can also be termed autonomous and causative of social 
action (Wight, 2006, p. 143). At the same time, social relations are neither 
mechanical nor deterministic since action involves the reflexivity and subjectivity of
98 The relational position of Jackson and Nexon for instance leaves under-specified the role of 
individuals. In fact, they claim that ‘doers’ are present only in the substantialist understanding 
(Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 302). I have been arguing thus far that individual agents can be a source 
of change in spite of minds being social.
99 Following Bhaskar, Wight’s argument about the independent, autonomous, and thus causative role 
of social relations or structures relies on two main theoretical assumptions. First, Wight makes the 
point that structures can exist autonomously because they can create effects that are different from the 
reasons and motives agents give for action. They do not depend on the agent’s recognition to create 
effects (Wight, 2006, p. 143). Secondly, structures have independent causal efficacy as they pre-date 
the subject. The example given is that of the institution of marriage, which pre-dates individuals. 
Bhaskar also writes ‘ [t]he relations into which people enter pre-exist the individuals who enter them, 
and whose activity reproduces or transforms them (...).’Quoted in (Wight, 2000, p. 427). I read 
Wight’s position to mean that social relations pre-date specific agents or individuals (agent X, Y) but 
not individuals as an ontological category.
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human agents. This is an argument I will use in the last part of the chapter to frame 
the agency of structurally complex actors.100
The discussion of social selves and relations has important consequences for 
understanding and conceptualising agency. Human agency rests on the possession of 
intentionality, reflexivity, rationality as well as on the ability or potential to produce 
effects. The argument made here does not reject these premises for human agency. It 
rather suggests that agency is social, relational, and non-unitary. Human agency as 
social and relational means regarding agency and the ability to act not only as a 
premise but also as an outcome of social relations and specific transactions.101 The 
type of properties the individual acquires or activates are informed by the 
relationships that embed his/her practices (Fuchs, 2001, p. 9). The type of 
capabilities agents have are dependent on the social relations in which they are 
embedded (Wight, 2006, p. 152).
Unity is not a natural fact about individuals, as we have seen above. The assumption 
of coherence and unity as conditions for agency are reconsidered here for individuals 
and other social kinds alike. For individuals, it means acknowledging the different 
types of agential potential that they can have in different social roles. The variation 
in the exercise of agency depends not only on the social relations underpinning 
social action but also on the reflexivity and subjectivity of these agents. Social selves 
or roles enable a variety of agentic possibilities for the same individual. Some 
specific relations would be important for the constitution of individuals as citizens or 
as parents respectively -  with the relations constituting an individual as a citizen 
being irrelevant to its constitution as a parent.
100 This is a term used by Wight. See (Wight, 2004).
101 They argue that individuals are the outcome of ‘interactional performance not the cause of it’ 
(Goffman, 1959). See also (Collins, March 2003; Fuchs, 2001).
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Coherence or unitary intentionality because of collective belief102 and a top-down 
decision-making apparatus are the foundations for corporate agency in Wendt’s 
theory. Without the existence of unitary intentionality, states would not be efficient 
in implementing decisions. Ultimately, states are not agents if they are not ‘capable 
of imposing binding decisions on their members’ (Wendt, 2004, pp. 297, 298). 
Lacking the ability to produce effects is correlated with decentralised organisation 
and plural intentionality or intentions, of which groups are an example (Wendt, 
2004, p. 298).
The literature on types of states shows that postmodern states are decentralised states 
yet still efficient actors in pursuing foreign policy goals. This literature provides at 
first glance an excellent counter example to Wendt’s argument. This means that the 
IR literature already offers cases that challenge the argument according to which 
states must be coherent and centralised in order to be actors. The literature on social 
selves endorses this alternative view. Since it is questionable to treat even 
individuals as coherent and unified in their agential potential, then it is even more so 
when conceptualising the state and state agency. However, the literature does not 
provide a concept of agency that would mirror the decentralised nature of the state. 
As we have seen, Sorensen’s framework reverts to corporate agency premised on 
unitary assumptions. This means that new ways of discussing agency are needed that 
acknowledge the relational and non-unitary features of entities.
To conclude, this section has argued for a conception of social entities as relational 
and non-unitary in character. In has built upon the insights of relational sociology,
102 See also Wight’s critique of Wendt’s claim according to which collective belief is a sufficient 
condition for the constitution of agents such as the state (Wight, 2006).
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processual philosophy, and Wight’s work on agents and structures. The analysis 
offers the foundations that will ground a different conception of the state and state 
agency.
4.3. States as relational and non-unitary actors
This part discusses the manner in which I use the relational view of social entities 
and agency to conceptualise structurally complex actors, such as the state. It intends 
to show that states can be conceptualised as actors. It proposes a concept of state 
agency which does not rely on the unitary or the personhood assumptions. The 
conceptualisation of state agency proposed here aims to maintains the ontological 
differentiation between individual and state agency.
In what follows, I will briefly outline the consequences of a relational view of social 
entities for understanding the constitution of the state. Drawing on processual 
philosophy I have argued, in the previous part, that social relations and practices are 
important concepts with which to frame the understanding of social entities in 
general. The term ‘social relations’ denotes the variety of relations characterising 
human life -  socio-cultural, political, and economic, the structures of social 
engagement in different spatial and historical contexts.
In this sub-section, I will use the term ‘social relations’ to designate the specific
101historical and spatial ties constituting socially complex actors that inform and
103 Wight makes the differentiation between internal and external relations. Internal and external 
relations constitute entities as ‘a form of relation’, with ‘different powers, properties and liabilities’ 
(Wight, 2006, p. 168). I think my definition of the state reflects such a distinction. However, my 
discussion in Chapter 5, using the language of networks, will point to the fact that the internal- 
external relations are a matter of degree than outright distinction.
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characterise their practices. I understand these relations or ties to be also 
simultaneously shaped by those transactions. I define structurally complex actors as 
social kinds other than individuals, which are described by multiple and overlaying 
functions; they create and reinstate patterns of interactions to support these 
functions; and lastly, involve collectivities of agents, who, intentionally or not, 
reproduce, change or reshape through their practices the boundaries of the entity.
The conceptualisation of the state as social relations dependent on social practices 
acknowledges the differentiation and specificity of different state forms in time and 
space. The networks of social practices are constitutive of the roles states take and 
the type of actions they pursue. It makes both the features and the agential potential 
of the state negotiable and varied not only through time but also in relation to other 
actors within a specific historical context. These theoretical moves sustain the 
proposition that states are social, relational and non-unitary entities.
States are actors for two main reasons. States are commonly attributed agency when 
discussing politics. They are the ‘appropriate subjects for statements referring to 
certain [political] actions’(Wilmot, 2001, p. 164). This is what Wilmot calls the 
‘ semantic view of corporate agency’ (Wilmot, 2001, p. 161). Patrick Jackson makes 
a similar argument. He contends that states take on agency as a consequence of 
human agents speaking on behalf of the state and acting on behalf of the state on the 
basis of their institutional agency (Jackson, 2004, pp. 286 - 287).104 I subscribe to 
this type of logic, to argue that state agency is socially constructed not only through 
discursive social practices, as Wilmot suggests, but also behaviourally. My argument 
does not limit the process of construction only to individuals placed in formal
104 Jackson draws on Hobbes for his argument.
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institutional arrangements, as the discussion on facets of human agency below 
indicates.105
Using the same logic exposed above to attribute agency to states, Wendt argues that 
the state is also a person by social convention (Wendt, 2004, p. 293). The question is 
whether one can consider the state an agent due to the attribution of agency in 
politics as above, yet reject the assumption of personhood. The first part of this 
chapter has already shown that the conception of the person used by Wendt is an 
essentialist one. The analogy of states with persons serves explanatory purposes for 
Wendt. However, the conclusion reached in that section was that the explanatory 
potential of Wendtian theory was in fact undermined by this ontological 
assumption.106 The second section of the chapter has offered additional reasons for 
rejecting the concept of the person that Wendt proposes. The definition of the state 
makes states, as social entities, exclusively reliant on practice for their existence. 
The social, relational and non-unitary assumptions are also important for framing 
state agency.
The potential similarities between persons and the state have been enabled by the 
legal definition of the state. The existence of an institutional ‘memory’ through 
procedures and reports has also prompted analogies with persons (French, 1984; 
Wilmot, 2001). However, I argue that it is necessary to maintain the ontological 
difference between the two. Properties such as intentionality and reflexivity 
associated with persons are dependent on practice, but their existence is not practice 
dependent. This makes individuals as biological entities fundamentally different
105 Chapter 5 will further contextualise this claim. The language of networks makes it even more 
evident why refering only to the institutional agency of human agents would be a limiting condition 
for understading the agential potential of states.
106 The bracketing of the domestic was the methodological move that accompanied it.
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from states, whose existence is exclusively reliant on practice. Wight provides an 
additional reason by arguing that intentions are individual. It is human agents that 
express intentions in action (Wight, 2004). States and individuals should differ in the 
processes, resources, and properties associated with them (Buzan, 1995, p. 201).
The conceptualisation of social relations as constitutive and causal offers the second 
reason for which states are considered actors. In the previous section, the discussion 
of the examples of bribing and Eastern European politics illustrated the theoretical 
point that social relations can be both causative and constitutive of social action. 
Social relations have transformative and reproductive potential, which relies on 
human agency. Explanations of outcomes include, on the basis of this understanding, 
social relations and human agency.107 A view of social relations as causal as well as 
constitutive is supported by Kurki’s understanding of causation (Kurki, 2006). Kurki 
defines causality as ‘all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to 
states of affairs or changes in the world’ (Kurki, 2006, p. 202). This definition of 
causality incorporates the ‘efficient cause/pushing and pulling’ conception, whereby 
human agents act and bring about certain changes. Secondly, it links causation to a 
‘constraining and enabling’ moment, which relies upon the incorporation of social 
structures (Kurki, 2006, p. 204).
Having defined states as specific social relations re-produced and transformed 
through social practices, one can consider states as having the ability to constitute as 
well as to cause social action. States as causative entities means that states have the 
‘capacity to do’.108 The state can be an actor if agency is understood as the ability to
107 It can involve reflexivity and subjectivity of human agents but not always awareness. See Wight’s 
argument on which I draw in section 2.
108 Following Buzan, Wight defines agency as ‘capacity to do’ and ‘an agent of something’ (Wight, 
2004, pp. 275 - 276). Wendt and Hobson also link agency to the ability to create effects. Wight sees
create effects. The above discussion allows us to reframe state agency that can 
incorporate a constitutive function.
I view state agency as involving a constitutive and behavioural moment. The first 
one involves the constitution or re-enactment of the entity or its capacity of being. 
This means the capacity of the state to reconstitute itself as authoritative and 
legitimate. Taxation relations are one example of relations that maintain this capacity 
of being and so are discursive-symbolic practices through educational programmes, 
for instance. States as agents due to their legal status is, in this case, only one of the 
constitutive processes that enable state agency. Legal personality is a necessary 
practice-dependent process but not a sufficient one for explaining state action. The 
second moment, which is inherently linked to the former, refers to the ability or 
potential to create effects -  i.e. pursuing policies or actions such as going to war and 
so forth. The ability to create effects is dependent on the material-symbolic relations 
engaged within the construction of the state. It also makes the state as an actor reliant 
on social practices of human agents rather than an essence outside these practices.
The constitutive practices and the agential potential of the state are linked here by a 
definition of state agency that incorporates a constitutive and a behavioural moment. 
Since the networks of constitutive practices may be varied, it also means that the 
agential potential of the state is differentiated. It supports the argument made in the 
previous section about the non-unitary nature of agency in general and furthers the
the state as a structure and humans the agents although he does agree that ‘anything can have agency’ 
and, therefore, even the state (Wight, 2004, pp. 270, 273). He writes: ‘[t]he important question 
however, is who, or what, possesses these capabilities? Clearly, it is not individuals as individuals that 
possess these capabilities, but rather individuals as socially positioned agents/actors, or incumbents of 
social positions. In other words, the capability that is derived by authority or allocation is attached to 
social positions that are relationally defined and governed by rules. They [the capabilities] are, in 
effect, the causal properties o f  those relationally defined positions and not the causal properties o f 
the individuals who occupy those positions’ (Wight, 2006, p. 152). My emphasis. I read this 
paragraph as supportive of the state as an actor position.
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argument that state agency does not need to be reliant on the assumption of unitary 
intentionality and top-down decision making apparatus.109
The essentialist proposition regarding agency suggests that acting is a consequence 
of being, while the processual argument claims the reverse: that entities are 
outcomes of social action. My conceptualisation of state agency put forward here 
does not prioritise one sequence over the other. For social entities such as states, 
acting and being are congruous. This avoids the reification of the agent that 
undertakes action by always considering the constitution of the entity.110
Thus far, I have looked at the justifications for treating states as agents yet not as 
persons. I have also discussed what state agency entails. The discussion below looks 
at the relationship between state agency and human agency and its consequences for 
understanding state actions and goals.
State agency as practice dependent makes state agency reliant on human agency. The 
possibilities of existence of structurally complex actors rest on the individuals’ 
engagement in social action. The agency of structurally complex actors is built upon 
the ability of individuals to sustain, re-enact and transform the networks of meanings 
informing particular state functions, goals or actions. It is their practices and the 
expressions of their reflexivity and intentionality that have implications for 
understanding the goals associated with states. Subjectivities play a role in the 
interpretation of social relations. They keep the potential for transformation and for 
different scenarios of action open.
109 Chapters 6 and 7 will illustrate the manner in which contradictory practices inform differentiated 
state agency as well as differentiated state positions/roles internationally.
110 This addresses Jackson’s concern about the reification of the structure (Jackson, 2004, pp. 283, 
285). I do not agree with Jackson that emergence necessarily means reification. See my discussion in 
the next chapter.
Human agency can be constitutive, representational, and transformative of social 
practices and of structurally complex actors. The facets of human agency suggested 
here can also be taken to reflect the more general claim that the human self is 
constituted by contradictory and multiple roles, as argued in the previous section.111 
Individuals can participate in the constitution and re-enactment of relations that 
constitute the social entity as an actor.112 In this sense, human agents have 
constitutive agency. One can say that individuals exercise constitutive agency by 
paying taxes, or fines, which in turn keep taxation as a significant relation 
constituting the state. Yet, very few of these agents are actually representational 
agents for the social entity. This is because they do not occupy positions in state 
institutions that would allow such agential potential. However, individuals also 
maintain a potential to have transformative agency even if they do not occupy 
institutional positions. State agency relies not only on the role agents take in formal 
institutions.113 State actions such as strategies or policy goals could reflect or not the 
intentions of some of the human actors involved in the political process. According 
to Wilmot, state actions could be representative for some individuals, or for none, 
yet for others they are the ‘lowest common denominator’, or ‘simply chance’ 
(Wilmot, 2001, p. 163).114
111 Phil Cemy speaks for instance o f ‘structure-bound’ and ‘transformational’ actors. See (Cemy, 
2000). On the role of individuals in the production and exercise of state agency see also Velasquez in 
(Wilmot, 2001, p. 162).
112 It should be noted that individuals per se do not reproduce structurally complex actors such as the 
state: it is rather the relations in which they are implicated that constitute structurally complex actors. 
Bhaskar, Wight and Joseph make this argument referring to the different properties of structures and 
individuals (Wight, 2000, p. 428) . Also, (Wight, 2006, pp. 144 - 145). For instance, Joseph writes 
that ‘structures are maintained because human activities are collectively organized into social 
practices and it is these social practices that contribute to the reproduction of social structures’ 
(Joseph, November 2003, p. 128).
113 Chapter 5 will show how this can be the case by using the concept of the network to conceptualise 
social entities.
114 However, in all instances, state actions involve social processes that cannot be traceable to one or 
all individuals, although leaders could suggest or sanction policies. See the discussion on non- 
linearity and emergence in the next chapter.
The definition of the state and state agency thus far has kept the distinction between 
states and human agents as different ontological kinds. The consequences for 
explaining state action and state goals are important. It means that state action, goals 
and positions in the international cannot be explained by reference to a particular 
individual or individuals. The focus on relations implicated in the constitution of the 
state means that the state is not merely the sum of human agencies (Wight, 2006), 
although the different facets of human agency above acknowledge the role of human 
agents. This is an argument that will be furthered by the discussion in the next 
chapter on the concepts of non-linear social action and emergence.
To conclude, this section has explored the conceptual implications of defining states 
as relational and non-unitary entities. It argued that states can be considered actors 
yet not persons. It built on the argument of the second section to question, on the one 
hand, the conceptions of personhood on which ideas about state agency have relied. 
On the other, it argued that state agency is social, relational, and non-unitary in 
character. The section has argued for a conceptualisation of the state and state 
agency that maintains the ontological differentiation between individual and state 
agency.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the inconsistencies identified in the analysis of IR and 
FPA theories are due to an essentialist understanding of social entities, social action, 
and agency. Relational elements are present, especially in the constructivist and 
historical sociological theories, but they do not inform these theories consistently. It 
has been suggested that a shift in the ontological foundations informing the
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conceptualisation of social entities and agency is needed in order to overcome the 
shortcomings identified thus far. Process philosophy and relational sociology, as 
well as Wight’s work on agents and structures, have been central to such a move. 
The second part discussed the concepts of social relations, social selves, and agency. 
It maintained that if anti-essentialist propositions apply to individuals then they 
should also underpin conceptualisations of structurally complex actors. The last 
section of the chapter has proposed a view of the state as de-centred or non-unitary 
and without a stable self. It defined the state in terms of historically specific social 
relations, practices, and meanings. It has argued that it is possible to maintain a 
concept of agency while rejecting the essentialist personifying assumptions about the 
state. The chapter also elaborated on the types of human agency on which state 
agency, in its constitutive and behavioural moments, relies.
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Chapter 5: The State as an emergent network actor
This chapter uses the findings and the language of the network literature to construct 
an argument about the organisational configuration of the state. It intends to show 
that states can be conceptualised as hierarchical networks. In doing so, it maintains 
the view developed in the previous chapter of the state as non-unitary and state 
agency as differentiated and relational. The chapter also argues that states should be 
conceptualised as networks regardless of the historical period. The definition of the 
state in the previous chapter, as networks of relations that rely on human agency, has 
kept the distinction between the two ontological objects. I use the complexity 
science concepts of emergence and non-linearity to develop further this distinction 
between the state and individuals and between their agential potential. The 
discussion in the second part of the chapter critically reflects on the issue of 
boundaries in order to consolidate the argument about the non-unitary nature of the 
state. Lastly, the chapter interrogates the conceptual links between agency and power 
existent in the IR literature. It argues for a notion of structural power, which should 
inform the understanding of agency developed in this project.
5.1. Integrating the concept of the ‘ network’ into the 
conceptualisation of the state
Using the literature on networks the section intends to argue pace Castells, that 
hierarchies are a type of network or a feature of networks. It then qualifies states as
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hierarchical networks. It also advances the view, against evolutionist accounts of the 
state, that states should be conceptualised as networks across different historical 
periods. Finally, the section aims to argue that the concept of the network is suitable 
to conceptualise states because it enhances the relational understanding of social 
entities put forward in the previous chapter.
The term ‘network’ is used both formally and metaphorically to designate and 
analyse social forms (Degenne & Forse, 1999, p. 11). In the former sense, the 
concept of the ‘network’ is associated with the set of methods devised by the 
network analysis literature to study the processes of formalisation of social networks 
such as social movements, local or regional communities or organisations, and 
political parties (Degenne & Forse, 1999, p. 1; Wellman, 1999, p. 16). The models 
are also used to explain ‘patterns of regularities in relationships among actors’ from 
marriage patterns, disease spreading patterns to decision-making and societal 
mobilisation on different issues (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 3).115
The idea of the state as a network is, however, under-explored within the network 
analysis literature. Usually, the state is conceptualised as a unitary actor with whom 
social networks such as social movements interact or it is a milieu in which social 
mobilisation occurs. A more extensive reference to the network state is found in 
Manuel Castells’ writings on the network society, whose interpretation would 
qualify as an ontological rather than a methodological view. His writings also
115 The methods are devised to study the structural elements of networks by looking at different 
features. Some of these features are: the ‘density and clustering of a network’; its cohesion; its size; 
and the nature of the ties and their numbers (Wellman, 1999, p. 16). One example: density of relations 
is calculated by dividing the number of effective relations of each individual by the number of 
potential relations. See for example (Passy, 2003, pp. 41 - 42). Much of network analysis is positive 
and cumulative and in search of ‘definite conclusions’. Yet, according to their own acknowledgement, 
conclusions are difficult to reach due to the reliance on quantitative measures (Degenne & Fors6, 
1999, p. 12) built around the individual as the main study subject.
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introduce the concept of the ‘network state’ to discuss the historical and material 
transformations occurring in the contemporary world.116
Castells conceptualises networks as fundamentally different from other forms of 
social organisation such as hierarchies and markets.117 Networks differ from 
hierarchies in that they do not have a top-down approach to dealing with events or 
tasks. Hierarchies on the other hand, have an organisational structure specified by 
charts, which enhances clearly defined hierarchical roles and functions (Castells,
2000). Individual elements within the network have enough freedom to decide upon 
the manner in which tasks are carried out, although the decisions are informed by the 
‘network logic’ or ‘protocol’. The concept of network logic establishes the idea that 
while there is individual agency, no node can exist by itself or ‘impose a diktat’.
This is because ‘nodes create and define one another through the connections’ and 
therefore what constitutes a node ‘is bound up with the particulars of the network’, 
to which it belongs and which it constitutes (Castells, 2000, p. 208). Trust of each 
actor within the network towards the others is what binds the network together and 
what makes it qualitatively different from hierarchies. In contrast to networks, 
hierarchies rely on authority stemming from the formal rules of hierarchical 
organisation rather than on trust. Placing trust at the foundation of networks 
introduces a personal dimension to the functioning of networks. Castells considers 
authority and the ability to act the outcome of the personal position of the individual 
within the network. The position is dependent on the individual’s ties to the others. It 
is worth noting that this understanding is similar to the Weberian traditional and 
charismatic types of authority. The impersonal authority of hierarchies, which arises 
from the role or the institutional position a node occupies, is suggestive of the
116 Sociological writings use the concept o f‘network’ to conceptualise cities as well as societies more 
broadly. See (Craven & Wellman, 1973; Van Dijk, 1999,2nd edition 2005).
117 In this thesis, only the relation between hierarchies and networks is discussed.
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liftWeberian legal-rational understanding. Castells argues that networks also 
represent evolutionary superior forms of organisation, more efficient than the 
traditional hierarchies (Castells, 2000). In this respect, both Castells and Sorensen, in 
the previous chapter, propose an alternative to the Wendtian position that 
emphasises the virtues of the unitary hierarchical entity (Wendt, 2004, p. 297) in 
exerting agency.
There is an underlying evolutionary perspective in the literature on networks. The 
network is considered a more appropriate concept to be used when discussing the 
social reality of the past three decades. Networks are the organisations of the present 
whereas unitary and homogenous entities are those of modernity. According to 
Castells, it is the change within the material structure of society that makes the 
network paradigm relevant (Castells, 2000, pp. 53 - 6 1).119 As we have seen, 
Keohane and Nye and Sorensen propose similar evolutionary approaches in the 
conceptualisation of the state. Keohane and Nye talk about the multi-issue state 
emerging as a consequence of increased economic interdependence. Sorensen’s 
postmodern state shares the same features as Castells’ network state.
Castells’ hierarchical state model designates a territorially fixed, bounded entity 
whose power relies on control over territory and resources and whose authority is 
enforced by the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention (Castells, 2000). Castells 
names this hierarchical organisation of the nation-state a Russian-doll model, with 
the central government ruling over the regional and the local. On the other hand, the
118 ‘Obedience is owed to the impersonal order itself, that is, legitimacy rests on a belief of both the 
legality and technical competence of claims of authority.’ Max Weber quoted in (DeLanda, 2006, p. 
258).
119 Castells identifies three major factors that contributed to the change in the material structure of the 
state: the cultural revolutions of the 1960s, which placed individual freedom at their centre; the 
economic restructuring of the economy after the 1970s economic crises and the development of 
technology and the genetic revolution.
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network state defines a state that loses control over its resources and authority over
the other levels -  regional and local. Castells’ Weberian influences in terms of ideal
types make the ‘network state’ an ideal type (Stalder, 2006). However, he also uses
it as a description of reality. Castells’ assumption is that the state has been changing
1
from the sovereign and unitary political actor to a network.
In what follows, I will use the network analysis literature to argue that the concept of
network can incorporate hierarchies. It can involve both personal and impersonal
forms of authority. Efficiency, which is generally linked to the ability to create
101effects, is not an exclusive property of either networks or hierarchies.
Considering hierarchies and networks as different forms of organisation due to their 
operating logics is misleading. There is evidence in the literature to support the claim 
that networks can have hierarchical formal organisation. That is to say, networks can 
involve impersonal authority and top-down decision making. The reliance on social 
relations as constitutive of networks means that uneven relations are a possibility. 
Felix Stadler argues that one of Castells’ definitions of networks as ‘the set of 
interconnected nodes’ (Stalder, 2006, p. 169) is broad enough to include hierarchical 
relations as a possibility for the organisation of networks. The network analysis 
literature has also shown that nodes can have peripheral or central positions 
depending on the patterns of relations underpinning their interaction and the 
resources they have access to. The type of ties or relationships underpinning the 
interactions between nodes can be a source of inequality, conflict and competition
120 For Castells, the network is always an ‘informational network.’ Castells maintains the idea that 
large scale networks are possible due to information technology that makes coordination possible 
(Stalder, 2006, pp. 181,201). However, the network analysis literature discusses networks well before 
information technology made a real impact. See for instance the role of networks in Poland during the 
Cold War in (Osa, 2003).
121 The epistemological position, which does not identify a unique causal relationship between 
different variables, informs my argument here. See the discussion on non-linearity further below in 
the chapter.
(Passy, 2003, p. 23). More generally, the literature considers hierarchical networks 
those networks that displays a centralised form of organisation (Osa, 2003, p. 83), in 
which the central node or nodes have ‘the capacity to issue commands to those 
located in less centrally located nodes’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 258). A network that has 
a star-like shape, in which one node in the middle coordinates and links to all the 
other nodes, is an example of hierarchical network. The literature on formal 
networks also reaches the conclusion that formal networks function as a result of 
institutionalised forms of conduct and social norms in order to preserve or sustain 
network ties (Ibarra, 1997, January 1993; Wellman, 1983).
Furthermore, we can still maintain Castells’ argument about networks as efficient 
even when they involve organisation according to formal social rules and 
hierarchical organisational structures. Several studies link efficiency to the existence 
of institutionalised mechanisms by which decision-making and resource allocation 
occur. These studies have shown that organisations in which authority is role-related, 
i.e. impersonal, are also characterised by high levels of trust between their members 
(Ankersmit & Te Velde, 2004; Huntington, 1975; Warren, 1999).
Conceptualising social organisations as networks is an ontological commitment that 
allows us, as we have seen, to consider different patterns of relations and 
acknowledge the flexibility of forms of organisation. I have already argued above 
that it is possible to consider more broadly networks as hierarchical and impersonal 
as well as reliant on trust. The literature on networks provides further examples of 
types of networks such as illicit and informal. Informal networks are those that 
remain clandestine or stay outside the officially recognised channels of social 
interaction. Their interactions can be work-related, personal, or social (Ibarra,
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January 1993). Illegitimate networks are those networks, whose activities are defined
1 ^as illegal by society or the formal network. The form the network can take is also
dependant on the issue at hand, such as health, security, human rights and so forth. 
The literature also speaks of network spaces -  spaces within which social action is 
organised, creating a sense of boundaries and fulfilling a socialising function. The 
multiple social spaces constitute individuals as nodes in different networks -  formal, 
illicit and informal, symbolic-discursive or virtual.123 At the same time, individuals 
constitute through practice the boundaries of these spaces and the networks 
themselves. The focus for instance on network spaces created around issues discards 
the separation between ‘the international’ and ‘the domestic’ (Ferguson & 
Mansbach, 1996, p. 50) or the distinction between state and society.
The discussion above opens up the conceptual space to consider the network as a 
fundamental form of organisation of social kinds. I take the network as the 
ontological premise for understanding and framing the organisation of the state. On 
this basis, states as networks do not denote a particular type of state specific to the 
informational age, as Castells and the others argue. Conceptualising the states as 
network-like does not make networks desirable or evolutionary superior forms of 
organisation. The network analysis literature illustrates the claim that networks can 
take different forms and network spaces can be exclusive or restrictive.
States are conceptualised in this project as hierarchical networks. The existence of 
organisational charts that differentiate between local and central authorities 
constitute entities as hierarchies, as Castells has pointed out. The structure of
122 The question of which networks are illegal or illegitimate is related to the issue of who has the 
power -  institutional and in terms of resources -  to name them this way. For example, the ANC 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa was for many years illegal and illegitimate.
123 On virtual spaces, see (Castells, 2000).
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electoral systems, the existence of national budgets, armies and so forth also enable 
hierarchical relations. I consider the institutional arrangement to constitute the 
formal side of the network. Additionally, hierarchy can be said to be, more broadly, 
a feature of states because access to resources by different parts of the network, as 
well as the input into the decision-making process, are uneven.124 The literature on 
elites, interest groups, lobbies, and bureaucracies illustrates this point in relation to a 
variety of states, Western or non-Westem, weak or strong states (Allison & 
Halperin, 1972; Huntington, 1975; Kochanek, 1983; Steiner, Jun., 1977; Walle,
2001). In short, the state has been defined here as a hierarchical entity due to the 
formal institutional arrangement and to the uneven access to resources and decision­
making.
Conceptualising the state as a network enhances the relational view on social entities 
argued for in the previous chapter. This is due to the explanatory interest of the 
network literature in the manner in which social relations are shaped, reshaped and 
transformed in social transactions. The language of networks proposes an ontology 
that does not rely on the unitary assumption, even when networks do include 
hierarchical relations. In this sense, hierarchical networks are different from Wendt’s 
hierarchical entities, which are conceptualised as possessing unitary intentionality 
and a coherent inside.
The concepts of network forms and network spaces, as used above, do not reduce the 
state to a formal network, which is enabled by the institutional arrangement. 
Empirically, states can be to different degrees a combination of formal and informal, 
hierarchical, decentralised and, at times, illegitimate networks. When nodes, such as
124 The discussion in the last part of the chapter on power will further qualify this claim.
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individuals and organisations125, fulfil military functions as part of both private 
militias and the army, then one has a network state that is shaped by formal, informal 
and illegitimate relations through the practices of human agents. Hamas, as part of 
the institutional arrangements constituting the Palestinian authority, could count as 
such an example. A node as an institution constituting the state can be at the same 
time legitimate or illegitimate, ‘democratic’ or ‘repressive’ depending on the type of 
relations in which it is involved with other nodes. For example, the Iraqi government 
can be considered legitimate as an institution within the Shi’a community and 
illegitimate when viewd by the Sunni community (Nasr, Summer 2004).126
The possibility of multiple spaces, insides/outsides, fits with and enhances the 
relational and processual understanding of the constitution of the individual as 
multifaceted self. Even if the relationships are the ones defining the network, human 
agency remains important in shaping the form of the network through practices. The 
emphasis on the ability of nodes to define the network space (Degenne & Forse, 
1999, p. 7) coheres with the social psychological insight that subjectivities and 
reflexivity introduce indeterminacy and choice.
The facets of human agency discussed in the previous chapter, such as constitutive, 
representative and transformative, are reflected in the concepts the network literature 
uses to discuss types of nodes. The potential of individuals as agents is related in the 
network literature to the roles they fulfil in the network (Degenne & Forse, 1999, p. 
4). Nodes can be, for instance, followers, brokers or hubs. Nodes are termed hubs if 
they draw on significant material and symbolic resources and they establish a high 
number of connections (Diani, 2003a, p. 7). A broker is an agent that connects
125 In the network analysis literature nodes denote individuals, organisations, neighbourhoods, or even 
elements of speech. See (Diani, 2003a, p. 7).
126 For more on the relationship between different networks of power see (Nasr, Summer 2004).
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nodes that are not ‘directly related to each other’ or actors that are ‘reluctant to 
connect’ (Diani, 2003b, p. 107). The distinctions between types of nodes should be 
regarded as useful tools for referring to human agents. Since individuals could be 
nodes in different networks, they can be simultaneously followers and brokers who 
initiate transformation. The example given above regarding a member of the Hamas 
as part of the government and the militias also illustrates this point.
This first part has argued that it is possible to think of networks as hierarchical and 
reliant on impersonal authority. The discussion in this section has questioned the use 
of the concept of the network to refer only to a historically specific type of state such 
as the postmodern state or the informational state. It has made the case for the 
network as an ontological premise for framing the organisation of socially complex 
actors, of which states are an example.
The section has also pointed to the ways in which the concept of the network allows 
for the conceptual acknowledgement of the relational view on social entities, as 
developed in the previous chapter. In terms of the conceptualisation of the state, the 
concept of the network opens up the space to acknowledge the contingencies of state 
forms127 such as modem, post-modem, weak, or strong, and the shifting ‘outsides’ 
and ‘insides’. The language of networks offers a more flexible sense of boundaries -  
multiple spaces, i.e. insides/outsides and roles for nodes. In the light of the 
discussion in this first part, states as networks denote not only overlapping social 
relations and practices but also the networks of actors embedded simultaneously in 
several of these social spaces.
127 On the contingency of states see (Tilly, 1998, May, 1995, Summer, 1994).
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5.2. The network as an emergent social entity: potentialities and
limitations
Within the network literature, authors like Castells have drawn on the contributions
•  1 0 0of complexity theory to conceptualise networks as complex systems. Conversely,
the complexity literature envisions complex systems as being network-like. This
190section critically uses the insights of complexity to discuss the constitution of 
networks in general and the state in particular. The section puts into conversation the 
network analysis and the complexity science literature on the issue of network 
boundaries. In doing so, it aims to strengthen the argument about the state as a social 
entity with multiple boundaries. Secondly, the section uses the concepts of 
emergence and non-linearity to develop further the argument regarding the different 
ontological status of states and individuals. It also aims to illustrate the importance 
of keeping the distinction between state and individual agency
5.2.1. The autopoiesis assumption and the issue of network boundary
The issue of network boundaries comes up in both the network analysis and the 
complexity literature. The issue of boundaries is linked in complexity to the 
discussion of networks as autopoietic systems. Complexity uses the term of 
autopoiesis to define living-systems (Mingers, 1995, p. 10). They are autopoietic
128 Complexity theory refers to systems rather than entities, but in many texts they are used 
interchangeably. Castells uses the work of Capra, who in his turn draws on the work of Varela and 
Maturana (Capra, 1996).
129 Complexity theory is considered different from systems theory. The claim is that complexity 
theory goes into further exploration of the concepts proposed by systems theory. Complexity theory 
and systems theory overlap in many of their assumptions about systems, such as emergence, openness 
of the system, the phases or states in which these systems may find themselves. For more see 
(Marion, 1999, p. 72).
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because they are envisioned as self-organising and self-producing entities. Networks
i i nas autopoietic systems are in this view, ‘organisationally closed’ and structurally 
determined in that ‘the product of their organization is that very organization 
itself (Mingers, 1995, pp. 33, 205). Change is internally determined rather than 
specified by the environment. There is no ‘outside intervention’ (Marion, 1999, p. 7) 
nor a ‘central controller’ (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 276) when complex entities 
change and reorganise.
An autopoietic entity has clear and identifiable boundaries. The boundary is
preserved through the ‘preferential interactions of its components’ and constitutes ‘a
single organized and dynamic entity’ (Staubmann, 1997, p. 84). The boundaries are
identifiable yet they are permeable. According to the complexity literature, the entity
is not secluded from the environment but it adapts according to the feedback
information it receives from the environment. This is what makes networks ‘open’ 
111systems. The openness of the system does not refer to change in the type of 
relations defining the structure of the system (Mingers, 1995, p. 33).
In IR, the Wendtian social theory of politics comes closest to this type of 
understanding. Wendt distinguishes between the self -  what in complexity terms 
would denote the ‘organisationally closed’ structure of the entity -  and role 
identities, which are open to change (Wendt, 2004, pp. 308 - 309). The statist claims 
in IR are also suggestive of the view of the state as an autopoietic entity. As I have 
shown, Krasner’s concept of the national interest is conceptualised as the product of 
an exclusive or stable relation between specific nodes as well as the exclusive 
outcome of a well-bounded symbolic-discursive and material space.
130 This is a version of autopoiesis developed by Varela to be applied to social systems, although 
Varela did not develop a social theory.
131 For the second meaning o f ‘open’ system, see the discussion below on non-linearity.
In complexity science, the autopoiesis assumption is considered a feature of living 
systems. When used in IR to conceptualise states, the national interest and so forth, it 
involves a claim regarding the similarities of boundaries between biological and 
non-biological entities. The argument in the previous chapter, has already pointed to 
the inadequacies of translating the properties of biological entities to social kinds, 
which are practice dependent. I build here on that logic as well as on the discussion 
of boundaries provided by the network analysis literature in order to make the 
argument that: in the case of social networks as complex systems, the emphasis 
should remain on overlapping and multiple spaces. This involves a less strong 
differentiation between the inside and the environment than made by the notion of 
autopoiesis.
I subscribe to the complexity idea that boundaries fulfil a socialising function in that 
the constitution of individual identities are the product of the system and constitute 
the system in their turn (Price, 1997, p. 10). This interpretation rests on an 
understanding that the elements and the internal processes are part of the boundary 
as much as they are the ‘inside’. The boundary is in effect a representation of the 
social processes that constitute the ‘inside’ (Cilliers, 1998). The network analysis 
literature makes a similar argument. Degenne and Forse write that ‘internal 
processes can also be part of the ‘external relations’ of the nodes with others when 
pursing various network goals (Degenne & Forse, 1999). The same processes of 
constitution of the network inform the actions of the network in the relations with the 
others. Such a view is congruent with my understanding of state agency as involving 
a constitutive and a behavioural moment.
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The problem with considering entities as autopoietic and boundaries as clear-cut is 
that the elements or the individuals are regarded as belonging exclusively to one 
network. In the previous part, I argued that individuals could be nodes in different 
networks or network spaces. This makes boundaries dynamic, unstable and 
contested. Such an understanding acknowledges the diversity of boundaries and the 
fact that they are not reducible to physical boundaries. Some complexity scientists 
have also conceded that if space is viewed as a ‘dimension of social interaction’, 
then it becomes difficult to draw up the boundaries of networks (Mingers, 1995, p. 
125). Thus, while legally the state is unified in time and space, it exists in multiple 
spaces and times.
The question of what makes an element a node is both ontological and 
methodological. Terming an element ‘a node’ is already an act of inclusion within a 
network. It represents a claim for the existence of a boundary and specific social 
relations that define the node. The network analysis literature has already noted that 
the methodological delimitation of the ‘boundary’ of the network is a challenging 
and disputed process in itself (Degenne & Forse, 1999, p. 190; Diani, 2003a, p. 7; 
Marsden, 2005, p. 10; Osa, 2003, p. 79). They use quantitative methods in order to 
establish the form of the network and the position of individuals in those
139networks.
I agree with Bourdieu’s observation that boundary drawing is an empirical question 
rather than a theoretical assumption (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100). It 
involves a negotiation between the observer’s view on where the boundary should 
be drawn and the participants’ awareness or acknowledgement of these boundaries. I
132 For instance, group cohesion is based on measuring the links o f each individual with every 
individual.
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use some of the methodological insights of the network analysis literature to guide 
my analysis in the next chapters. I rely however on qualitative analysis to identify 
the role of different boundaries in the constitution of the state as an actor.
I consider the generic strategies for boundary specification identified by Laumann, 
Marsden, and Presky valuable for the discussion in the next two chapters (Marsden, 
2005, p. 9). These strategies are known as the ‘positional approach’, which creates 
boundaries according to the nodes’ formal membership criteria or their features; and 
‘an event-based approach’ that relies on the participation in a specific activity. 
Individuals can be considered members of a network if, for instance, they are 
Romanian citizens or if they are involved in different activities -  for instance regime 
change. The boundaries will be drawn around spaces that are constituted by specific
1 Hpractices: for instance the practice of over-stating production needs or bribing. In
this manner, the project will examine more than the role of the formal network to 
explain the agency of the Romanian state. The focus on social practices transgresses 
the traditional division between the domestic vs. the international dimensions.
To conclude, this section has interrogated the manner in which complexity science 
conceptualises boundaries through the concept of autopoiesis. The analysis has 
argued against a strong differentiation between the inside of the entity and the 
environment when it comes to social networks. The argument rejected the translation 
of autopoiesis to non-biological entities based on the theoretical position elaborated 
in the previous chapter. The conceptualisation of states as networks makes necessary 
the focus on multiple spaces. It also emphasises the fact that elements can be nodes
133 Campbell, for instance, speaks about FP as a ‘boundary’ producing and enforcing exercise 
(Campbell, 1998).
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in more than one network. This section has also considered the methodological issue 
of boundary identification.
5.2.2. The nonlinearity and emergence assumptions: implications for 
understanding state agency
Complexity science argues that networks, as complex systems are non-linear and 
emergent entities. The aim of this section is to show that the notions of nonlinearity 
and emergence strengthen the argument made in the previous chapter regarding the 
ontological difference between individuals and states.
Non-linearity of the social world more broadly assumes a certain degree of 
unpredictability or openness in terms of the form social life takes despite the fact that 
there are stable features or patterns defined within the relations (Elliott & Kiel, 1997; 
Mihata, 1997). The system is open because the possibilities of interaction between 
its elements are ‘open’. This is what makes a system complex and not the increasing 
number of elements. This means that even when patterns of interactions are present 
within social interaction, the manner in which interaction occurs makes it impossible 
to trace outcomes to one element alone (Marion, 1999, p. 15).
The propositions of nonlinearity regarding the unpredictability of social life fit well 
with the argument developed in the previous chapter about the indeterminacy of 
human action. The social psychological understanding of human agents has also 
emphasised the idea of contingent action in spite of the social embeddedness of 
reflexivity and intentionality. In this respect, the non-linearity assumption 
strengthens the argument made thus far in relation to social action.
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Incorporating the assumption of non-linearity as a property of networks means also 
providing explanations of state action that are not premised on linear causation of 
the ‘A determines/causes B’ type134 (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 262). The argument 
in the previous chapter on the agential features of social relations relied also on a 
broader understanding of causality that is not limited to linear or efficient causes. 
The complexity assumption of nonlinearity favours multi-causality (Casasanto, 
1998). Social action does not rely on deterministic patterns or covering laws 
whereby once the general laws are discovered, they can be equally applied to both 
the past and the present (Marion, 1999, p. 42). This is what accounts for the 
unpredictability of interactions. My epistemological preference for multi-causal 
explanations, which acknowledge the complex manner in which social action 
emerges, translates also into a rejection of dichotomies such the normative vs. 
instrumental or material vs. ideational. If causes are multiple and interacting in a 
complex manner, then the role of material or ideational resources becomes entangled 
in the outcome.
Linear or mono-causal thinking underpins the explanations of state agency in the 
second and third chapters: a certain relationship between the state and society 
determines the position of the state internationally. For instance, the state holds a 
strong position internationally and domestically if it is the dominating actor in the 
relationship (Katzenstein, 1981). Others make the opposing claim: if societal groups 
influence the definition of interests, then the state is strong internationally 
(Gourevitch, Spring, 1996; Hobson, 2000). Another scenario is that of a
134 See Kurki (Kurki, 2006). Also, (Juarrero, 2002).
135 Chapters 6 and 7 show that such dichotomies are difficult to defend in historically informed 
analysis. Constructivists also make this point. However, when it comes to historical analysis, Hobson 
for instance focuses on the material over the ideational. The emphasis on material factors allows him 
to build an explanation that favours linear causality.
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domestically autonomous state but one that is weak in international negotiations due 
to the fact that it cannot resort to the argument of ‘internal coercion’ to reject an 
international proposal (Putnam, 1998). Making state agency dependent on the state- 
society relationship is a relational move. Claiming that there is one fundamental 
relationship, that between the state and society, which determines state agency, and 
identifying one possible scenario as a result of a specific type of relationship 
between the two, makes explanations deterministic in character.
The proposition that complex systems display emergent properties supports the non- 
linearity claim. Emergent properties such as common values, goals, protocols and 
identity, result out of the interaction between the constitutive elements yet they have 
different properties that are not traceable to one particular element (Simmel 1922:
133)136 nor to all elements. The understanding is that the whole is simultaneously 
more than the sum of its parts (Marion, 1999, p. 81) as well as less than the sum of 
its parts (Cilliers, 1998). This means that the processes of interaction between 
elements result in properties that cannot be found in the elements. In the previous 
chapter, I have already argued for the need to differentiate between individuals and 
states as different ontological kinds, the latter being practice dependent. The concept 
of emergence endorses such a differentiation. The focus on both the elements and the 
emergent totality (Marion, 1999; Mihata, 1997) that comes with this concept is key 
to furthering the distinction between the elements and the whole.
Emergence allows for the emergent agentic properties of the entity to be understood 
both as a function of the relational aspect of the individual nodes to each other but 
also in relation to the whole. From this perspective, aiming to understand state 
agency only based on emergent properties is as flawed as taking the opposite view of
136 in (Staubmann, 1997, p. 83).
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explaining agency by reference to the individual properties of constitutive elements.
Mead’s example137 of water -  as an emergent physical agent of the interactions
between oxygen and hydrogen -  illustrates the relational and emergent view on
agency. Taken separately the chemical components of water would not achieve the
same effects such as quenching thirst or extinguishing a fire. It is water as the
combination of the two that has those effects. The critique of the theories discussed
in the second and third chapters gains here another dimension. It is not only that they
are internally inconsistent, but, from the perspective of these ontological
commitments, they are also missing on important social processes to account for
state action. Statist theories overemphasise the whole, while the pluralist accounts
focus on the constitutive elements. These theories leave under-theorised the
relationship between the leaders or negotiators and the state. As I have shown in the
second chapter, explanations of international state action collapse the two
1ontological categories: states and leaders are used inter-changeably.
Complexity science also provides the language to speak of individual actorhood and 
acknowledges the role of human agents (Price, 1997, p. 14). Revolutionary figures 
can be examples of what complexity theory terms a ‘catalyst’ -  a stimulus that 
provokes certain changes in the social relations enabling his actions and which 
transforms itself in the transactions (Marion, 1999, p. 34).
If one takes the case of the Romanian revolution of 1989, Laszlo Tokes, the priest 
held in house arrest in the city of Timisoara in December 1989 illustrates well the 
above propositions about the role of human agents as well as about the non-linear
137 Mead in (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 272).
138 More generally, even claims made within an absolutist regime -  see the famous expression ‘I am 
the State’ by Louis XIV -  cannot be taken at face value and explain the constitution o f France as an 
actor.
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features of social action. While initial protests grew out of solidarity with his stand, 
this particular individual did not directly cause the fall and the change of regime. 
The individual agent, in this case Tokes, contested the type of social relations 
informing material and symbolic practices, such as censured information, reduced 
access to goods and so forth. These social relations defined both the social space and 
his possibilities of action. They constituted the constraining and constitutive 
conditions for the existing type of regime. These conditions shaped and enabled the 
existence of a specific state form.
Tokes represented a catalyst as his agency changed from ‘reproductive’ to 
‘transformative’. Conceptualising the state as a network is useful here for the 
explanation of change. Tokes had been a broker in the informal networks as well as 
the illegal networks contesting some of the state policies.139 His roles in these 
networks were important when he openly challenged the formal network. Identifying 
the required conditions for the change of social relations that constitute the regime 
type is an empirical question, i.e. to determine the type of threshold required for 
fundamental shifts to occur. Similar contestations, which involved significantly 
larger numbers of human agents, such as the miners’ strike in 1977 or the workers 
revolts in 1987 had less successful outcomes. In this particular case, it is evident that 
the changes are dependent not only on the manner in which the elements organise 
internally, but also on broader contexts such as Cold war politics within Europe for 
example.
139 For instance, he contributed to the clandestine Hungarian-language Review ‘Counterpoints’. He 
became known to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was aware of his activity, 
through informal networks. For more information on his biography, see (Deletant, 1999, pp. 158 - 
160).
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Such an account also reflects the complexity view that change occurs incrementally 
(Eve, Horsfall, & Lee, 1997). The contestations of relations in different social 
network ‘spaces’ were central to understanding and explaining the changes in the 
constitution of the state occurring in 1989. The new features of the state are framed 
as emergent from over-lapping and multiple practices of human agents and not the 
direct cause or intention of one single agent. Similarly, a discussion of state actions 
and foreign policy goals should also maintain the difference between the intentions 
of individual leaders and the actions of the state. Underpinning such a distinction is 
the epistemological preference for non-linear and multi-causal explanations.
To conclude, this part of the chapter linked the literature on networks and that on 
networks as complex systems. It argued that the language of complexity science is 
helpful to support the claim that states are distinct social entities from individuals. 
The analysis also exemplified the role of these concepts for understanding state 
agency. It also emphasised the role of contextual or empirical-historical analysis for 
discussing the agentic potentialities of states.
More broadly, this second part of the chapter has critically combined the insights of 
networks and complexity to further the understanding of the state as an actor. The 
framework does not take the emergent network to be a self-generating, stable and 
coherent entity with clear-cut boundaries. The network analysis literature, with its 
emphasis on network forms and network spaces, has offered the theoretical 
possibility to acknowledge the differentiated and varied potential of the state. The 
indeterminacy of human action, as demonstrated by social psychology and re­
enforced in this section by the complexity findings, recognises the potential for 
change of the emergent totality.
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5.3. Power, agency and networks
The definitions of power and those of agency often implicate one another. For 
instance, agency is linked to the ability or the exercise of power (Wight, 2006), 
while power has been defined as the ability to produce intended effects. Power, 
however, has also been defined as a feature of social relations. This section 
addresses the question of the relationship between these two concepts. In doing so, it 
also reflects upon the implications of the view of power argued for below on earlier 
arguments in this chapter regarding the features of networks.
Before moving to the actual discussion of the relationship between power and 
agency, I will briefly review the meanings of power as they have developed in 
political science and IR. Barnett and Duvall’s framework of power offers a useful 
introduction to the diversity of conceptualisations of power within the literature.
Barnett and Duvall identify typologies of power based on two main understandings 
of social relations: social relations of interaction among ‘previously constituted 
social actors’ and constitutive social relations. The latter interpretation assumes that 
social relations ‘analytically’ pre-date the subjects which they constitute as social 
beings ‘with their respective capacities and interests’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 
2005, pp. 44, 46). Power premised on the first understanding takes a behavioural 
form as ‘power over’. Power becomes in this sense ‘almost a property of actors’ and 
it is ‘rooted in behaviour’. It is a ‘compulsory’ form of power. In the second sense, 
power is ‘irreducibly social’ and designates ‘power to’ define actors and their
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capacities and practices. (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, pp. 45 - 46) This form of 
power is associated with the structural types.
Compulsory or instrumental power in IR has been defined as the ability to impose 
one’s interests (Dahl, 1957; Fuchs, 2005).140 This form of power focuses on 
successful outcomes or effects. It assumes spatial and temporal proximity (Barnett & 
Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 47) of the two agents and linear causality (Fuchs, 2005; 
Guzzini, 2005). It rests on possession of material capabilities. Compulsory power 
refers, in short to both the ability and the possession of resources.141 The rationalist 
literature analysed in Chapter 2 works with such a definition of power as the ability 
to act, bargain and instrumentally engage in international politics.
Structural power is the power to define the type of social beings actors are (Barnett 
& Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). As just mentioned, it is underpinned by an 
understanding of social relations as constitutive of actors’ identities, capacities and 
interests. It is a type of power that is not ‘possessed or controlled by any single 
actor’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 44). The literature refers to different types 
of structural power such as material, discursive or institutional. The (neo) realist
140 It is also termed in IR the ‘relational’ view on power as it is a feature of a relation between two 
agents (Diez, 2005, p. 616). Some authors argue that intentionality is an essential condition for power 
while others reject it. Intentionality and consciousness in the exercise of power are emphasised for 
instance in the Weberian definitions. Guzzini is also in favour of a definition that emphasises 
intentionality and awareness of resources in order for actors to be considered powerful (Guzzini, 
2005). I subscribe to an understanding of power that does not rely on this condition -  power can 
emanate from unintended behaviour and non-action. Arguments in this direction have been developed 
by (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005; Cohen, 2000; Lukes, 2005; Strange, Autumn, 1987). In Chapter 
7, it will become evident that the practices of human agents in informal and illicit networks had as 
unintended consequences the subversion of the formal network of the state and more broadly of the 
social relations legitimising it. This makes these acts expressions of a specific form of power -  
informal. See discussion below in this section.
141 Some authors differentiate between relational power, which is found in classical realism and 
behaviourist political science, wherein the focus is on the ability of the actors to impose their interests 
and power as resources as in the neorealist writings (Schmidt, 2005). Yet, it seems that the two are 
mutually implicated since the ability of the actors to act in their interest rests on possession of 
material capabilities (Sterling-Folker & Shinko, 2005, p. 640)141. For a similar point see also (Barnett 
& Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 49).
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frameworks, for instance, use structural power in the material sense. It denotes the 
relations between the units’ military and economic capabilities142. Krasner, Keohane 
and Nye, and the pluralist frameworks have used such a definition of power, which 
favours the material dimensions. On the other hand, discursive power refers to the 
power of symbolic resources, such as knowledge and discursive practices, to create 
the meanings of legitimate social action and social roles (Fuchs, 2005; Holzscheiter, 
2005). Institutional power places emphasis on organisational rules and procedures, 
which shape institutions and frame the possibilities of action or nonaction (Barnett & 
Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). The concept of diffuse and indirect institutional 
relations replaces the understanding of power as the direct influence of agent A over 
B in virtue of the possession of resources. Therefore, it is A’s position within the 
institutional framework that make possible exercise of power over B (Barnett & 
Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). The bureaucratic politics model of Allison and Halperin 
discussed in the second chapter is the most obvious example of institutional power. 
The argument of their model rests on the claim that the position in the bureaucratic 
apparatus determines the position vis-a-vis political events. It is the reflection of the 
dictum ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.
From the brief discussion of types of power identified and conceptualised by the 
literature, it becomes evident that some of the definitions of power are almost 
synonymous with the definitions of agency. My interest is in a definition of power 
that enhances the relational understanding of social entities argued for in Chapter 4.
142 ‘Although capabilities are a unit level attribute, Waltz argues that it is a structural attribute in that 
he is most interested in how capabilities are distributed across the international system. Waltz 
explains that “although capabilities are attributes o f units, the distribution of capabilities is not”.’ 
Waltz quoted in (Schmidt, 2005, p. 539).
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The similarity is noticeable in the definition of instrumental power and agency as 
they both focus on the ability to create effects. The definition of agency taken in this 
thesis does include the ability to create effects. However, the ability to create effects 
has been theorised as social. The institutional understanding of power is more in line 
with the concept of agency as social, as argued for in the fourth chapter. I take the 
ability to act and create effects due to institutional arrangements to be a form of 
power.
My understanding of human agency embedded in different types of networks such as 
formal, informal, illegal requires an understanding of power that is not only 
associated with formal institutional roles. From this perspective, the institutional 
definition of power becomes limiting because the social context, which embeds 
social action, refers only to the organisational context. This means that it is possible 
to conceive of cases when the centre does control resources and is hierarchically 
above in relation to the other node, yet, the potential for agency remains open even 
for the ‘lower’ nodes. Hierarchically higher nodes within formal institutional 
structures do not make them de facto the most powerful ones. For instance, the 
withholding of information or avoidance of paying taxes within the relationship 
taxpayer and tax collector can signify limited resources on which the central node 
could draw and limit authority.
I subscribe to those structural understandings of power that equally incorporate 
symbolic-normative and material resources. An actor may get around its lack of 
material resources by constituting alliances with others or convincing another 
influential actor to represent its interests, or by actually having access to knowledge 
resources (Holzscheiter, 2005, p. 736). The strategy o f ‘shaming’ used by NGOs in
133
relation to states (Keck and Sikkink 1998:207) is also illustrative of the importance 
of normative resources (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 50; Diez, 2005).143
The understanding of power as ‘not controlled by any single actor’ makes more 
evident the assumption on which the existence of networks is premised. The logic of 
the network is that no single element can survive by itself or impose a decision on 
the others in virtue of some intrinsic qualities. It frames social action as non-linear in 
its effects and not dependent on spatial proximity. Furthermore, the understanding of 
social relations as power-laden (Touraine, 1988, p. 49)144 supports the argument 
developed in the second part of this chapter that networks can be conceptualised as 
hierarchical. It means that unevenness in terms of social roles or/and access to 
resources is a feature of networks.
To conclude, expressions of agency are suggestive of different forms of power -  
institutional or more broadly structural power. The notions of structural power are 
taken here as a condition for agency or for the ability to create effects. They inform 
the reproductive, constitutive and transformative facets of human agency, which 
have been discussed in Chapter 4. The different forms of power make human agency 
varied and differentiated. The section has also argued that structural power enforces 
the view of networks as hierarchical. Human agents reproduce and challenge social 
relations and consequently, specific forms of power, which constitute states. Such 
processes of production and transformation inform state agency or the agentic 
capabilities and potentialities of states in specific contexts or in relation to specific 
issues.
143The legal norms can be used by less powerful members of the Security Council to ‘constrain the 
actions of the powerful’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 50).
144 ‘[A] 11 social relations include power relations. There is no purely horizontal social relation’ 
(Touraine, 1988, p. 49).
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Finally, I should mention that questions of what it means for states to have power or 
whether or not or when they are powerful are only addressed in the next two 
chapters through notions of ‘weak’ or ‘high’ agential power. I subscribe to the 
dilemmas identified in the power literature over the difficulty of quantifying or 
settling such issues (Schmidt, 2005). The next two chapters will focus more on 
illustrating the manner in which the agency of the Romanian state can be 
conceptualised as non-unitary and differentiated.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the state is a hierarchical network as well as an 
emergent and non-linear entity. In the first part, the analysis has critically engaged 
with the literature on networks to argue that hierarchies can also be considered a 
feature of networks and that states are hierarchical networks. The discussion in this 
section has questioned the use of the concept of the network to refer only to a 
historically specific type of state such as the postmodern state or the informational 
state. It has made the case for the network as an ontological premise for framing the 
organisation of socially complex actors, of which states are an example.
States as networks denote not only the network of social relations and practices but 
also the networks of actors embedded simultaneously in several of these social 
spaces. Informed by empirical analysis, the network analysis literature provides a 
variety of terms to refer to network forms: for example, formal, informal, illicit, star- 
like and so forth (Degenne & Forse, 1999, p. 140). The network analysis literature, 
with its emphasis on network forms and network spaces, offers the theoretical
possibility to acknowledge the differentiated and varied potential of the state. The 
section has also argued that the concept of the network is suitable to conceptualise 
states because it enhances the relational understanding of social entities put forward 
in the previous chapter.
The second part of the chapter used the insights of complexity to discuss the 
constitution of networks in general and the state in particular. The first section 
interrogated the manner in which complexity science conceptualises boundaries 
through the concept of autopoiesis. It argued against the idea of clear-cut boundaries 
between the entity and the environment to conceptualise the boundaries of social 
networks. This line of argument is supported by the conceptualisation of states as 
networks. This makes necessary the focus upon multiple spaces and upon the 
potential of elements to be nodes in more than one network. This section also 
discussed the methodological issue of boundary identification. The second section 
contended that the notions of nonlinearity and emergence strengthen the argument 
made in the previous chapter regarding the ontological difference between 
individuals and states. The findings of complexity acknowledge the indeterminacy of 
human action and the potential for change of the emergent totality. The analysis also 
exemplifies the role of these ideas for understanding state agency. It also stresses the 
role of contextual or empirical-historical analysis for discussing the agentic 
potentialities of states.
The final part of the chapter offered a discussion of the relationship between power 
and agency. It contended that these concepts have often been considered 
synonymous. It argued for a notion of structural power that involved material, 
symbolic-normative, formal and informal dimensions. The different forms of power
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make human agency varied and differentiated. They inform the reproductive, 
constitutive and transformative facets of human agency, which have been discussed 
in Chapter 4. The processes of production and transformation of specific forms of 
power also underpin the understanding of state agency. The discussion in this 
section reinforced the argument regarding the hierarchical nature of networks.
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Chapter 6: State constitution and state agency: Times of
change (1944 -1948)
Time goes by, time comes along/All is old and all is new (...)145
This chapter challenges the understanding of regime change occurring in Romania 
following the end of the Second World War between 1944 and 1948. The process of 
regime change culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of 
the republic on 30 December 1947. The historical accounts argue that the cause and 
the agent of change was the Soviet Union and/or Stalin. Stalin’s will and the 
coercion by the Red Army explain the changes to the state in terms of its formal 
relations and institutions.
The broad aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that these changes were the outcome 
of complex processes. I also intend to show that the Romanian state cannot be 
conceptualised as a static entity. In doing so, I will reframe the linear explanations, 
which identify one or two causes directly responsible for regime change, with an 
account that acknowledges the role of multiple and layered social networks as well 
as social relations in the constitution of the Romanian state.
The chapter is organised in two main parts: one dealing with the constitution of the 
state prior to the coup of 1944 and the second part looking at the changes occurring 
after. The first part identifies the networks of social relations constituting the
145 Eminescu in (Cartianu, 1991).
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Romanian state formally, illicitly and informally. The underlying assumption that 
guides the analysis is that social networks of agents and social relations contain 
explanations for the possibilities of future state action. Specifically, this part also 
intends to acknowledge the illicit and informal practices emerging from exclusionary 
politics, which are usually relegated to the status of ‘context’.146 It also discusses the 
type of human agency associated with different social networks. This part reflects 
upon the manner in which the different networks of social relations and human 
agents informed Romanian state agency during the pre-1944 years.
The analysis in the second part of the chapter intends to show that radical change 
becomes consequential when social action targets more than particular individuals. 
Institutions such as bureaucracies, which socialise a larger group of people, and 
social relations that inform more broadly the social practices within a space or 
domain need also to be changed. The stages of regime change are indicative of the 
implicit manner in which human agents think of states as political entities: i.e. states 
are more then the sum of individuals. By looking at social processes occurring 
during the regime change in the 1944-48 period, I also aim to demonstrate that 
boundaries between what was ‘inside’ and what was ‘outside’ the state were blurred.
6.1. Tracing the paths of change
The assumption that previous social relations and practices enable change, even 
sudden change underpins the discussion in the first part.147 To paraphrase one of the
146 The status of ‘context’ suggests that social processes are taken to be the ‘environment’ in which 
the state acts, to which it reacts and adapts. The manner in which I have defined the state makes 
central also non-formal social networks and social relations and practices, which embed these 
networks.
147 Questions always remain of whether one could, by analysing the data predict whether such radical 
change will happen or not. For example, is the Burma state on the verge o f change? I subscribe to the
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authors writing on the Prague Spring, the formal regime change, which took place in 
December 1047, had started in the years before (Retegan, 2000, p. 147). This does 
not intend to deny the importance of the immediate context in the constitution of the 
Romania state as an actor. The analysis acknowledges these relations and practices 
despite the fact that they are not considered in this chapter directly or uniquely 
consequential for the changes occurring from 1944 onwards.
Envisioning states as structurally complex actors constituted by layered social 
relations and practices makes the researcher sensitive to additional historical data, 
which the political histories consider context. Broadly speaking, in the pre-1944 
years the institutions constituting the Romanian state -  the parliament, the political 
parties, the government, the constitutional monarchy, the judiciary, and the 
bureaucratic apparatus -  were tailored after Western ones.148 The Romanian 
Constitution of 1923 and various laws such as the electoral law or the law on 
education, allowed, for example, national minorities149 rights to political 
representation in compliance with the Peace Treaties of Trianon and Versailles, 
which had been signed at the end of World War l .150 Yet, between the 1938 and 
1944, anti-Semitic and xenophobic legislation was passed, which excluded from 
political life the urban non-Romanian population.151
complexity theory argument developed in the previous chapter. The nonlinear aspect of social actions 
and the non-proportionality principle, i.e. small actions can produce big effects, make such 
predictions about moments of change impossible.
148 Officially, during 1918- 1938, Romania was a liberal constitutional monarchy. Historians note 
however that the only ‘relatively free elections’ were those o f 1928 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 16).
149 Minorities made up 20% of the population (Halperin, 2004, p. 162).
150 Parties of different nationalities were created. A Hungarian-ethnic party was created in 1922, a 
German one in 1929 and a Jewish one in 1931.
151 The great majority of Romanian ethnics did not live in cities. This discriminatory legislation was 
intended to increase the number of Romanian ethnics living and working in urban areas. For more on 
this see (Livezeanu, 1998, p. 17).
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Formal social and institutional relations, which encouraged practices such as voting 
and party consultations, were coexisting with illegal and informal practices. Wide­
spread practices of patronage, corruption, nepotism, and bribing were constitutive of 
the political process of the time (Deletant, 1999b, p. 23). Exclusionary politics and 
discriminatory social relations and practices created the potential for alternative 
networks, which coalesced around these practices, to emerge. In the following
1 Odecades, this tendency would be exacerbated , as will be shown in Chapter 7. For 
instance, according to the legislation, Jews, Armenian and Greek business people 
could not participate in the public service. The willingness of the bureaucracy to take 
bribes attenuated these provisions. Bribes, nepotism and so forth were practices that 
brought politically marginalised individuals into the formal network. They 
represented a way to enlarge the social space of the formal networks by informally 
including agents who would be otherwise excluded due to the formal rules. 
Individuals as nodes in both social spaces made the link between these types of 
networks.
These illicit practices were consequential for the constitution of the state. They 
enabled the emergence of ‘internationalist’ practices in the interwar period. The 
formal social rules instantiated in the specific legislation and institutional practices 
mentioned above, increased the disposition of the excluded human agents to subvert 
and change these relations by getting involved, either as party members or as 
financers, in alternative social networks. Historians note that national minorities 
constituted the majority of adherents to the Communist Party and Marxism-
152 It is interesting to note that some of the rhetoric of the time, fascist and communist, associated 
illicit practices with the bourgeois state. However, Chapter 7 also shows that the process of creating 
or searching for spaces for action through such illicit practices flourished during communism as well.
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Internationalism (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 83 - 84; C. A. Stoica, 2006; Tismaneanu, 
2003, p. 77).153
Marxism-Leninism represented the ideology154 that offered these agents the potential 
for constitutive and transformative agency. It created an alternative space in which 
these individuals were recognised and acknowledged as legitimate actors. The 
internationalist agenda of Marxism-Leninism aimed at undermining states as actors 
by redefining the social relations enabling communities. A first step was to change 
the capitalist and fascist relations155 that constituted the bourgeois state. This would 
then create the conditions for the dissolution of the state (Braun, 1978, pp. 57 - 58). 
National ideology as a symbolic resource underpinning the official networks of 
power of states was viewed as the cause of the annihilation of the ‘international 
sense of solidarity of the proletariat.’156
Such ideational spaces informed the activity of formal organisations such as the 
Comintern and Communist Parties. The Comintern, created in March 1919, was to 
coordinate the achievement of the aims mentioned above across different national 
networks. The connecting nodes to this transnational organisation were members of 
the Romanian Social Democratic Party (the SDP), the main leftist democratic party 
in Romania. It is worth noting that there were differentiated views amongst the 
members of the SDP regarding the desirability of a state organised formally by 
Marxist relations (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 10, 11). For instance, the ‘centrists’ and
153 Deletant writes for instance that the Communist Party was attractive ‘for the national minorities, 
dissatisfied with their situation in interwar Romania’ (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 83 - 84).
154 I use the concept of ‘ideology’ here to denote the set of ideas regarding social relations, the 
organisation of society and role of human agents in society.
155 There was a change of discourse in the Comintern due to the signature of the Molotov- Ribbentrop 
pact on 23rd August 1939. Initially, the threats to peace and socialism in Europe were Hitler and 
Fascism. The enemies changed to the West and states such as Britain and France. After the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union on 22nd of June, the anti-fascist discourse returned.
156 Lenin quoted in (Braun, 1978, p. 57).
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‘minimalists’ opted for less radical change in social relations and practices. For 
them, the internationalist agenda was a complementary space rather than an 
alternative one.157 They favoured socialist relations of production but did not intend 
to challenge the constitutive relations of the political institutions. The maximalists, 
on the other hand, subscribed to the internationalist agenda of challenging all 
existing formal relations constituting the state. On October 4,1922, the maximalist 
section created the Communist Party from Romania as a section of the Comintern. 
These different views are also important in understanding the dynamics after the end 
of the war.
The Romanian communist agenda aimed for instance to equally enlarge and limit the 
boundaries of the state. The intention to make the Comintern part of the decision­
making structure of the state was one way of changing the formal boundaries of the 
state. Another way was by narrowing the territorial boundaries of the Romanian state 
to the boundaries prior to the Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) and the Treaty of 
Trianon (June 1920). The former treaty allowed for the annexation of two regions, 
Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Romanian state. The latter treaty enlarged the 
territorial basis of the state by officialising the annexation of Transylvania, 
Maramures, Crisana, and the Banat regions. The material and ideational resources on 
which inter-war Romanian communists drew for support were not only institutions 
such as the Comintern but also other states such as the Soviet Union, and other 
communist parties in Europe.
157 This is not an isolated phenomenon. The communist movements were not unitary in their view 
regarding the role of Marxist social relations in informing all areas of social life. See (Deletant, 
1999b, p. 11). The Soviet communist party was itself made up of different factions. These factions 
coagulated around different ideational and policy preferences into a working class ‘left’ led by 
Trotsky, a bureaucratic ‘centre’ led by Stalin, and a peasant-oriented ‘right’, whose more prominent 
representatives were Bukharin and Rykov. See for instance (Alexander, 1981).
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The type of decisions politicians of the Liberal and Peasants Parties took during the 
pre-war years reflect a real concern that the formal social space could change and 
that the territorial boundaries of the state would be challenged. The concern was also 
with the potential of the Communist networks to broaden their social basis. In this 
context, the land reform of 1921 was a measure intended to limit the influence of the 
internationalist networks and of their propositions about communal property 
(Deletant, 1999b; C. A. Stoica, 2005). It increased the number of peasants with 
access to resources.158 The right to own land was also significant for their identity as 
peasants. Universal male suffrage established by the Constitution of 1923 also 
formally empowered peasants. The decision to declare the Communist Party illegal 
in 1924 constitutes the official recognition of the threat the communist networks and 
ideas were thought to pose to the formal organisation of the state. By the end of the 
war, there were fewer than 1,000 members (Colt, 1999).
Historians use the low membership rate to argue for the inconsequential role of the 
communists in the decision-making process and, following from that, for the 
constitution of the Romanian state as an actor. It is fair to say that several factors, 
including the ones mentioned above,159 worked against the consolidation and 
integration of these networks within the official or formal networks constituting the 
Romanian state. My argument is that the relationship between the formal networks 
and the communist ones was nevertheless constitutive of the state. I use the evidence 
provided by the same historical accounts in order to support this claim.
158 Small-scale farming was not a moneymaking activity but it secured their means of survival. Not all 
peasants benefited equally from the land reform. In Transylvania, peasants of Hungarian origin 
received less land than those of Romanian background (Halperin, 2004, p. 163).
159 Other factors were important to account for their reduced numbers. The numbers of the members 
decreased from 4,210 to about 1,000 also because of the territorial annexation in 1940 of Bessarabia 
by the Soviet Union and of Northern Transylvania by Hungary respectively. Deletant also notes that 
the numbers were low due to the ‘small size o f the industrial proletariat’ (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 11,83 - 
84).
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Human agents constituted the links between these social spaces. Party financiers, 
who came from the ranks of the middle class, acted as the nodes in both social 
networks.160 Members of the Communist Party were present in politics by entering 
alliances with the other political parties. I have already mentioned that the Social 
Democratic Party had internationalist sympathies. Historians also note that 
communists became members of other political parties such as the Ploughmen’s 
Front and the Hungarian People’s Union, who had leftist preferences (Veiga, 1993, 
p. 223). During the 1938 - 1944 period, they were also involved in political life by 
setting informal alliances with the National Renaissance Front (Pokivailova, March 
1997, p. 48), and the Liberal and Peasants parties.
In fact, at different times in the pre-war years, political parties became illegal or 
officially dissolved. The Communist Party was illegal from 1924 until August 1944. 
The 1938 Constitution dissolved all political parties, including the Liberal and 
Peasants’ parties. During the legionary state period, from September 4, 1940 to 
January 20, 1941, the military and the fascists groups, such as the Iron Guard161, 
occupied the important institutional positions. Then, in January 1941, the military- 
led government declared the fascist groups illegal. The political alliances of that time 
excluded the members of the Liberal and the Peasants parties, who refused to be part 
of the government. While illegal, members of these parties were politically active, as 
the historical literature points out. Such a shift in the official institutional outlook of 
the state illustrate the type of negotiations of state boundaries taking place within the
160 By the end o f 1939, however, their role in securing funds for the communists diminished. They 
retained ideological sympathies (Pokivailova, March 1997, pp. 46 - 47).
161 The Legionary Movement and the Iron Guard were openly anti-Semitic and xenophobic. The Iron 
Guard was an offspring of the legionary movement. It was less formal than the existing political 
parties. The majority of the supporters came from peasants and students. Its aim was to create an 
alliance between political or nonpolitical organisations and groups that shared its fascist, anti-semitic, 
anti-western and anti-communist struggle.
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context of the World War 2 .162 Between 1938 and 1944, the Romanian state was 
proclaimed a monarchical dictatorship and a legionary state. The executive power 
shifted from the institution of the monarch to the military-led government of General 
Ion Antonescu.163 These changes opened up the potential for the communist social 
networks to create ties with the Liberal and Peasants’ parties, which themselves 
acted informally during the 1940 - 1944 period. This is because they were equally 
interested in undermining the centrality of the military networks (Cioroianu, 2005, p. 
62).
From the above, it becomes evident that the politics of that time was in fact difficult 
to contain only to the processes associated with the legal institutions. Politics during 
the pre-war and war years involved social networks, whose status shifted, as argued 
above. This made the communist ideational space and the networks constitutive of 
the state. They became formally constitutive of the agential potential of the state 
during the events that followed in August 1944.
During this period, political leaders, who occupied top institutional positions within 
the government, the monarchy, the military, the bureaucratic apparatus across the 
country, and the politically involved intelligentsia164 had transformative agency. 
Most citizens had, in the interwar period, reproductive-constitutive agency. The 
existing social relations and material resources informed the reproductive agency of 
this population. According to the 1930 census, 80% of the population was living in 
villages, illiteracy was high, and the transport and communication infrastructure was
162 See also (Cutler, 2002) (Final Report o f the International Commission on the Holocaust in 
Romania, November 2004).
163 Needless to say that the political processes and events taking place during that time period are 
more complex than described here.
164 For a description of the interwar ideological trends amongst intellectuals and politicians of the 
time, see (Gallagher, 1999, pp. 23 -  52; Mihaylova, 2001 - 2002).
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weakly developed. These material conditions made it difficult for all these individual 
agents to be actively constituting or challenging the relations enabling the state. It 
did not require intentional and active reproduction, except for the time of voting. 
Measures such as the land reform of 1921 secured reproductive rather than 
transformative human agency.
At the same time, political actors of the Legionary Movement and the Iron Guard 
attributed transformative agency to peasants and the urban population. The 
discursive practices constituted these categories as able to create and challenge the 
social relations that constituted the Romanian state.165 The unifying feature between 
these categories was Orthodox Christianity, which emerged in the discursive 
practices also as a would-be feature of the Romanian state. This type of symbolic- 
discursive resource was not only potentially empowering to citizens, who otherwise 
had limited access to material resources. It was also intended to secure the agential 
potential and of these anti-Semite and xenophobic networks.
These different types of agential potentialities and capabilities of human agents, 
which were informed by specific social relations, were consequential for the 
constitution of the state and state agency. They allow us to explain the variations in 
the emergent agential potentialities states have within specific historical contexts, in 
this case, Romanian state agency at the end of World War 2. The Romanian state 
was, at the end of World War 2, simultaneously agentially weak and strong.
The Romanian state was weak if the focus is on the economic, communication 
resources constituting human agency, which limited the formal role of the majority 
of the population in contributing to the political processes that shaped state policies.
165 This transformative agency was to come at the expense of other minorities’ potential for acting.
On the other hand, it was agentially strong if the emphasis is on the fact that the 
formal networks constituting the state were uncontested by the majority of the 
peasant and urban population.
The Romanian state was agentially weak in its relations with the West and the Soviet 
Union if one takes into consideration the xenophobic and anti-Semitic legislation 
that constrained the agential potentialities of non-Romanian ethnic groups. On the 
other hand, the position of the Romanian state in its relation to Germany was 
strengthened by such exclusionary practices.166
At the same time, the politically active networks that supported liberal institutions 
and political practices informed positively the relationship with the West. It 
constituted the Romanian state as a potential ally of the Western Allies. However, it 
placed the Romanian state in an antagonistic position to the USSR. The ‘bourgeois’ 
networks, Romanian or otherwise, informed by liberal social relations, were 
considered within the communist networks across Europe as the cause of the World 
War 2 .167
To conclude, this first part has argued that social relations and practices as well as 
networks of social actors usually regarded as ‘outside’ the state, or labelled context, 
were in fact important for understanding the agential potential of the state prior to 
the regime change and at the time of the coup. The discussion identified the agential 
potential associated with different networks such as communists, peasants, and elite. 
It used the analysis to illustrate the differentiated agential potential of the Romanian
166 It is thought that there was competition between Romanian and Hungarian war efforts so as to 
secure a better bargaining position with the Germans regarding the Transylvanian matter (i.e. which 
side was to keep this territory after the war).
167 The underpinning logic was that socialist states would not fight each other.
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state prior to the 1944 coup. An understanding of change as dependent on previous 
social relations and practices, yet not determined in any clear way, has underpinned 
the analysis in this part. The immediate context was equally important, as will 
become evident next, as a catalyst for making some social relations and networks of 
human agents more important than others.
6.2. Times of change: 1944 - 1948
Historical narratives regarding the changes in Romania at the end of the WW2 
invoke Stalin’s will and the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe, and the 
Yalta agreement between Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt, which reflected 
Stalin’s will and intentions for Eastern Europe. The Soviet interference is seen as 
synonymous with or accounted for in terms of Stalin’s intentions to create and 
enlarge the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of the war. Within this narrative, the 
Romanian state is regarded as an object rather than a subject of politics, upon which 
change is imposed by this external force. The ‘takeover’ is achieved through the 
armistice and through the instrumental use by the Soviets of the Romanian 
communists (Deletant, 1999b; Tismaneanu, 2003).
The aim of the rest of the chapter is to offer a more nuanced account of the 
constitution of the Romanian state at the end of the war that moves away from the 
deterministic view: the Romanian state and state agency -  the epiphenomenon of 
either the structural division of the world or Stalin’s intentions. In order to construct 
my account, I build on the idea of the existence of multiple insides and outsides of 
the Romanian state prior to 1944. The discussion of regime change intends to show
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not only that the state should be considered a dynamic social entity but also that it is 
more than the sum of individuals.
6.2.1. The Coup of 23 August 1944: the catalyst for change
The first part of this chapter painted in broad brush the existing networks of social 
relations constituting formally, informally and illicitly the Romanian state. The coup 
represented an important catalyst for change in the social relations and practices 
constituting the Romanian state. It triggered struggles between agents favouring 
liberal, social-democratic, fascist, and socialist relations and institutional outlooks. 
After the coup, social relations that would enable conflicting conceptions for its 
organisation formally constituted the Romanian state. Casting these processes as the 
struggle of the state vs. other actors such as communists, Stalin or the Soviets, not 
only involves static conceptions of statehood, but it is also inaccurate from the 
perspective of the processes constituting the Romanian state.
King Michael, the Liberals, the Peasants Party, and the Social Democratic Party 
plotted the coup of 23 of August 1944 against the military dictatorship led by 
Antonescu. The switch of arms against the Axis, which resulted in Romania joining 
the war alongside the Allies, followed the coup. Members of the Communist Party 
such as Dej and Patrascanu also participated and supported such a move. These 
actions reflect the temporary alliance between liberal and internationalist networks 
against the fascist ones. As argued above, the years of the military dictatorship,
168 Dej would become the leader of the Communist Party while Patrascanu would occupy the position 
of Minister of Justice between 1944 and 1948.
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which traditional political actors also opposed, created the enabling conditions for 
communists to acquire transformative agency.
The aim of the coup was to change, on the one hand, some of the main political 
actors in central decision-making positions during the war, such as Antonescu and 
his pro-German government. On the other hand, the coup aimed to change the extant 
legislation, especially the Constitution of 1938, which limited the action of state 
institutions such as political parties and the Parliament. This was done with the 
inevitability of the Soviet occupation looming ahead.169 The removal of some of the 
key human actors, as well as the change in the institutional arrangement from a 
military to a civilian government, constituted the state as a legitimate negotiating 
actor in relation to the Allies. This was in spite of the fact that formally the 
Romanian state was still an enemy of the Allies.170
The Romanian communists were not merely the ‘outcome’ or instruments in the 
political processes of the time, but they were actively strengthening their position in 
the struggle over which social relations and practices should become dominant in 
constituting the Romanian state. In this context, what followed was not a literal 
‘seizing of power’ or taking over of the Romanian state by the Soviets. Generally 
speaking, political actors were aware of the importance of being hubs in the 
decision-making process. Multiple spaces and resources embedded their actions. For 
the traditional actors, the material resources on which they could draw -  the formal
169 The Soviet troops entered Bucharest on 30th of August 1944.
170 The situation created after the coup is illustrative of the consequences o f the non-unitary nature of 
state agency. After the coup, the Army became responsible to the King, who ordered the switch of 
arms against the Germans on the same day. However, parts of the army supported the removed 
military government. This made the Germans consider the situation still ‘reversible’. As a formal 
armistice was not signed, the Romanian state was officially an enemy of both sides, the Axis and the 
Allies, yet informally acting as an ally against the Axis. The Soviet Union treated the Romanian state 
as an enemy until the formal signature of the armistice on September 12,1944. During this time, the 
Soviet Army took over 100,000 soldiers as war prisoners (Constantiniu, 1997).
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171economy -  were limited due to the war effort and the diminished industrial 
capacity of the economy. They had the support, at least at the level of discourse, of 
the Western Allies, who were interested in promoting liberal democracies.
Romanian communists were experienced political actors and understood the 
importance of social networks. The legalisation of the Communist Party represented 
a significant point in acquiring transformative agency. The cooperation of the 
Communist Party with the most important peasant party of that period, the 
Ploughmen’s Front, and one of the traditional parties, the SDP, increased the 
agential potential of the communists. The Ploughmen’s Front was a political party 
with left-wing sympathies. The poorest of peasants were its electoral base. Some 
sources estimate the membership of this party to be around 800,000 and some up to a 
million (Pokilvailova, November 1995; §tefan, November 1995).172 Together they 
formed the Bloc or Front of Democratic Parties.
The international context allowed the communists to better position themselves in 
formal networks. The communists had the political advantage of being able to relate 
to the Allied High Commission due to their ideological sympathies. Communists 
used the resources of the Allied High Commission for Romania to increase their 
ability to act. The Commission was created after the signature of the armistice on 
September 12, 1944 between the Romanian state and the Allied (Soviet) High 
Commander on behalf of the Allied Powers. The internationalist agenda was gaining 
ideational ground against the incumbent formal ones.
171 Fighting the war alongside the Axis was costly and income was reduced as the oil resources were 
sent to Germany without any payment received.
172 It should be noted that the later plans of land collectivisation put the two parties into conflict 
(Cioroianu, 2005, p. 161).
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It is fairer to say pace the arguments mentioned above focusing on Stalin’s will, that 
the greater involvement of the Soviets in the Allied High Commission for Romania 
in the administration of the armistice, could be regarded as the result of international 
bargaining. Once the Allies, the UK and the USA, marginalised the Soviets’ 
involvement in the administration of the armistice in Italy and Western Germany, the 
Soviets used the same logic to negotiate the limited role of the Western Allies in the 
territories on which the Red Army was present (Gross, 1989, p. 205). It is counter- 
factual to speculate on whether a greater involvement of the Western Allies in 
Eastern Europe could have led to a different outcome in terms of the outlook of 
Eastern European states. If one subscribes to the complexity theory proposition that 
small events could have greater effects, then it is possible to conceive of such 
scenarios. For instance, greater involvement of the Allies in the administration of the 
armistice could have enabled the formalisation of different social relations, such as 
social-democratic rather than socialist. Such a direction does not seem untenable if 
one also takes into consideration the fact that the Communist Party was not a 
homogenous entity but rather made up of different factions, which subscribed to
i n*xdifferent interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This type of logic challenges 
explanations in terms of Stalin’s intentionality or will to create a socialist Romanian 
state. It places the political processes occurring in relation to the Romanian state in 
broader and more complex contexts.174
173 Ana Pauker, the leader of one of the factions, was willing to cooperate with the traditional parties, 
the Liberals and the Peasants Parties to form the interim government on March 1945. The members of 
the faction led by Dej refused the cooperation. Dej drew his support from the Allied High 
Commission for Romania.
174 Deletant notes that the coup pre-empted the Soviets from seizing power immediately (Deletant, 
1999b, p. 31). This statement can be read in two ways. It can be taken to suggest that the evolution of 
the Romanian state towards a socialist republic was an ineluctable path rather than one of the possible 
outcomes inscribed in the social relations of the time. Or it can be read as a remark made with 
hindsight. I disagree with the first reading on the basis o f the theoretical argument developed in 
Chapter 5, regarding the non-deterministic view of social action. As for the second reading, this 
chapter presents the argument against treating the Romanian state as an object of politics.
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The coup exposed the contradictory networks of social relations and of agents 
informing the constitution of the Romanian state. The coup brought about the 
abolition of the 1938 Constitution and reinstatement of the 1923 legislation and 
consequently of the constitutional monarchy. The re-instatement of democratic 
procedures and a non-fascist leadership, which formally made the state a 
constitutional monarchy, informed positively the relationship with the Western 
Allies.
The relationship with the USSR was also informed by their previous ‘enemy’ 
relationship during the war. The ‘bourgeois and fascist’ relations and institutions 
were considered responsible for informing the actions and interests of the Romanian 
state during the war and particularly its opposition to the USSR. The Soviets 
regarded the social relations underpinning the constitution of the Romanian state as 
the cause for the reluctance of the Romanian state to work with the Allied Soviet 
High Commission after 1944. The relationship between Romania and the USSR was 
informed by the understanding that the formal institutional outlook of the Romanian 
state, the constitutional monarchy, was reproducing the same anti-progressive social 
relations (i.e. bourgeois and anti-revolutionary social relations) as before the war. 
However, the presence of the communists in coalitions with the traditional parties 
constituted the Romanian state as an actor with potential internationalist features. As 
said, the coup created the political space for members of the Communist party to be 
involved in the formal decision-making process.
The presence of the Soviet Army on Romanian territory until August 1958 
represented a resource that enhanced the agency of the state, from the perspective of 
the Romanian Communists. This is because it could be used against the ‘counter­
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revolutionary, bourgeois-fascists elements’. At the same time, it was limiting the 
state’s agential potential in international and ‘domestic’ matters from the perspective 
of the traditional political parties and from the perspective of Western states. In this 
respect, the Romanian state’s agential power was again difficult to frame as uniquely 
low.
To conclude, I have suggested in the theoretical chapters that conceptualising the 
state as a network and non-unitary entity also means acknowledging the different 
types of ideational, interest, and geographic boundaries constituting the state and 
state agency. A conception of the state, which can be clearly delimited, informs the 
narrative of the historical accounts. Explanations, which are framed in terms of the 
Romanian state vs. the Soviets and/or the Romanian state as submissive to the 
Soviets175, reflect such a view. Explanations that emphasise the ‘highjacking’ of the 
state by Soviets or local communists are inadequate as they work with a view of the 
state as an object rather than a dynamic entity.
The analysis has offered explanations that incorporate factors identified by 
historians, such as the presence of the Red Army on the Romanian territory, or the 
interest of the Soviet Allied Commission in the development of a communist regime 
in Romania, but has gone beyond them. The analysis has pointed to a more complex 
understanding that places the focus on the social processes and relations that 
constitute the Romanian state as a contradictory social actor. Such processes were 
changing the position of the Romanian state internationally by changing the 
relationships with the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.
175 Deletant describes, for instance, the relationship between the USSR and the eastern European 
‘satellite states’ as a ‘master-servant relationship’ (Deletant, 1999b, p. 88).
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6.2.2. Tendencies towards uniformity
The discussion above has pointed to the manner in which catalytic events and 
contexts can stimulate change. A fierce struggle to occupy institutional positions 
opened after the coup. Previously ‘marginal’ yet constitutive networks such as the 
communist ones grew to become central to defining institutional practices.
The discussion in this section identifies the measures that enabled regime change. In 
doing so, it aims to illustrate the point that states are more than the sum of 
individuals. This section also intends to show that in spite of policies and tendencies 
towards uniformity, the Romanian state of that time remained constituted by 
multiple social relations. It also argues that the domestic-international boundary is 
difficult to settle when looking at the networks of social actors constituting the 
Romanian state.
Reshaping the agentic potentialities of the state was to be achieved by initially 
getting access to high-ranking institutional positions and by removing a critical 
number of potentially challenging agents from institutional positions. By taking 
charge of key ministerial positions, the Communists of the Romanian Communist 
Party had more opportunities to promote policies that would boost and 
simultaneously consolidate their institutional roles. In the interim government 
formed after the August 1944 coup, members of the Communist Party occupied the 
ministerial positions of Interior (Home Office), Defence and Justice. Within the 
existing parliamentary system, occupying cabinet positions was central to initiating 
policies that could enable actions and practices aimed at making deeper changes in
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social relations. The decisional responsibilities of the government were increased 
since the members of the Parliament were yet to be elected.
The communists kept the same offices in the new government of March 5, 1945.
17 f iGroza, the leader of the Ploughmen Front, led the government. They also gained 
an additional portfolio of the Ministry of National Economy. The government was in 
charge of organising general elections in post-war Romania, which took place on 
November 9,1947. Such positions offered the institutional basis, in addition to the 
ties with the Cominform177 and the High Commission, that enabled and reproduced 
their potential to act. Their agency was in fact emergent from their participation as 
nodes in more than one network.
The actions of the government members were oriented towards devising policies that 
were to re-shape the agential potentialities of the human agents involved in the 
process of state constitution and reproduction. The new civil servants were to fulfil 
reproductive agency of new social practices. As members of the government, the 
communists suggested several measures that would considerably diminish the 
number of agents, whose identities and actions were informed by extant social 
relations. These new agents were described as ‘honest, democratic, and capable 
elements’. For instance, forty-five percent (i.e. 2,851) out of the 6,300 employees of 
the Ministry of the Interior (Home Office) were placed on reserve while 195,
176 He had been deputy minister under the provisional/interim government and a trusted politician by 
the Communists and of the Prosecutor General of the USSR, Andrey Vyshinsky. (Deletant, 1999b, p. 
42)
177 Cominform was to replace the former Comintern, which dissolved on May 15, 1943. In the 
declaration of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, it was stated that ‘the solution of the 
problems of the labour movement of each individual country through the medium of some 
international centre would meet with insuperable obstacles.’ 
http://www.marxists.org/history/intemational/comintem/dissolution.htm. Cominform was the new 
network o f communist parties set up in September 1947 as a response to the Marshall Plan. 
Cominform stands for the Communist Information Bureau. The headquarters of the Cominform were 
initially in Belgrade. The Cominform was made up of the communist parties of USSR, Yugoslavia, 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, France, Italy and Romania. It had its own newspaper 
entitled For Lasting Peace, fo r People's Democracy.
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representing around 3%, were sacked. Thousands of magistrates were also sacked in 
April 1945 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 43).
The policies were aimed not only at replacing high-ranking members of the political, 
military, and bureaucratic apparatus. They had been designed to secure a critical 
number of loyal agents, who through their practices would reproduce the new rules 
of social engagement. The numerical reduction of the armed forces and the police 
after the armistice, and their infiltration with agents that were sharing the same 
revolutionary goals, were such examples of measures aimed at enlarging the social 
basis of the communist network.
The discursive attribution of agency to the ‘masses’ by the Communist Party needed 
to be converted into party membership. Party membership signified increased 
political legitimacy in the struggle over the mechanisms of institutional 
representation. It meant securing discursively and formally a large basis for 
reproductive agency. The newly created Guards of Patriotic Defence served as anew 
instrument of coercion in the urban areas, especially in factories where workers 
rallied around the constitutional order represented by the constitutional monarchy 
(Tismaneanu, 2003). The king and the members of the Liberal and the Peasants 
parties constituted the reference actors enforcing and protecting the constitutional 
order.178
As discussed in the previous part, the predominantly agrarian population fulfilled 
reproductive agency. The strategies pursued had to maintain the ties with this
178 For instance, in November 1945, pro-monarchy demonstrations took place in Bucharest. Since the 
appointment o f the new government, in which traditional parties did not occupy governmental 
positions, the King had refused to counter-sign and pass legislation. The royal strike ended in January 
1946, after the Groza’s government’s agreement to give two Ministerial positions (without portfolio) 
to the opposition parties.
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population while at the same time to re-frame the basis of the relationship. The land
1 7Q
reform passed by the Groza government in March 1945 was one such strategy. 
The alliance with Groza’s Ploughmen’s Front provided the Communist party with 
access to the poor rural population. The communists recruited the members of the 
legionary movement after 1944, which was well represented locally and skilful in 
mobilising the agrarian population (C. A. Stoica, 2005, p. 694). The organisational 
resources and skills of the Iron Guard were put to work to strengthen the ranks of the 
communist network, although the discursive content changed to reflect the type of 
social relations the communist favoured. For instance, the discourse did not promote 
religion anymore as a binding ideational resource, but, rather, social equality. As a 
result of these moves, the membership of the Communist Party increased from 
around 1,000 in 1945 to 720,000 by the end of 1946 (C. A. Stoica, 2005, p. 693).
1 80By the end of 1947, when the communists won the elections of November 9, 
political practices were intended to create a uniform, self-enclosed, and well-defined 
inside and a centralised decision-making institutional structure. However, the need 
for repressive political action is suggestive of the fact that the Romanian state was 
not constituted as a coherent entity.
As we have seen, policies had targeted until then individuals in high-ranking 
positions such as politicians, military and magistrates, who had been sacked, 
marginalised, or imprisoned. The formal social relations and the social institutions 
had to be aligned in order to inform the practices of a larger number of agents than 
the ones at the centre of the formal network. The new Constitution of 1948 brought
179 The collectivisation of land that followed in 1949 annulled this measure.
180 The results were rigged. The UK recognised the outcome of the elections while the USA did not 
(Deletant, 1999b, p. 57). The limited recognition offered hoped to the pro-monarchy supporters that 
the change may not be irreversible.
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about the de facto de-legitimation of the extant institutional settings as well as of the 
agents whose practices these relations enabled. Social networks enabled by and 
supportive of the principles of the constitutional monarchy were marginalised. 
However, they continued to constitute the Romanian state. By their participation in 
activities that challenged the new Constitution, they contributed to the constitution of 
the Romanian state as a contradictory actor. The Liberal and the Peasants parties 
alongside the monarch were involved in rallying the support from local 
movements181 and Western states.
Political action in this period is illustrative of the tendency to institutionalise socialist 
social relations so that they informed all social practices. The measures of the new 
government targeted all spheres of social life in order to diminish the potential for 
multiple social relations and practices, such as liberal or social democratic, to 
constitute the state. The organisation of different domains of activity, such as 
agriculture, industry, education, economy, law, was officially founded upon 
‘internationalist’ Marxist-Leninist principles. Uniformity could be achieved if 
individuals belonged to only one social space or network. The communists 
understood, in other words, the value of transnational networks as they themselves 
were benefiting from such networks. As such, they aimed to limit the possibilities of 
other social agents to draw on alternative ideational and material resources than 
those legitimised by the formal space. A new law of Religious Confessions, passed 
on August 4,1948, brought religion, an ideational resource that informed the identity 
of a large part of the population, under state purview. The law placed the Ministry of 
Cults in charge of giving legal recognition to religious cults. The Greek Catholic 
church was disbanded and its assets confiscated due to its organisational links to the 
Papacy. The educational system was also restructured following the same logic. New
181On the local opposition, armed and civilian, see (Deletant, 1999a).
textbooks were written in which the message was the inevitability of the change that 
had occurred. Faculty were dismissed and imprisoned and foreign schools and 
religious shcools were closed. Trade unions were re-organised to secure the 
allegiance of their members to the newly formalised socialist relations (Deletant, 
1999a).
On the other hand, the Constitution acknowledged and guaranteed, for instance, the 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, public demonstration, worship and the right to 
own private property. It was also set to guarantee ‘the protection of the person from 
arbitrary arrest, the inviolability of the home, and the secrecy of the mail’ (S. Stoica, 
2007). The constitutional arrangement created at least formally the potential of 
individuals not only to reproduce but also to challenge social relations by means of 
demonstration and freedom of speech. It allowed agents to have access to symbolic- 
material resources. The rights inscribed in the fundamental law of the state created 
discursively and formally a different type of state -  one to which the Western states 
could relate.
Another set of laws circumscribed these provisions. For example, the right to private 
ownership of property was guaranteed with the caveat that the means of production, 
industry, banks and insurance companies could be nationalised when the ‘general 
interest’ required. The General National Assembly passed a law less than two 
months after the adoption of the constitution that invoked this exception to 
nationalise all business. In the same way, demonstrations or public and private 
organisations that were deemed ‘fascist or anti-democratic’ in character were 
prohibited. The Secret Police, Securitatea, was given discretionary powers to decide 
upon such issues.
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Such provisions achieved several things. They stripped not only the working class 
itself, but also other professional categories, of any real formal agential potential to 
create change or challenge social relations and institutional practices. The goal itself 
was not different from the pre-war times, yet the logic underpinning this type of 
agency was poles apart. Limiting access to resources rather than increasing it 
represented the means by which reproduction of the formal institutions was to be 
ensured.
I have argued thus far that multiple social relations and practices constituted the 
Romanian state. The social networks enabled by such relations made the inside- 
outside distinction difficult to discern. Characterising, for instance, a decision as 
‘internal’ may face challenges in the light of the difficulty of settling whether 
specific agents or even institutions could be considered as being part of the ‘inside’ 
or the ‘outside’ of the state. If one takes, for instance, the Allied High Commission 
in Romania, the case can also be made that it was constitutive of the state rather than 
‘hijacking’ the state.182 The Soviet Councillors appointed by the High Commander 
of the Allied forces to serve in the ministerial institutions were territorially inside the 
Romanian state, sharing the ideational space with the Romanian communists and 
participating in the decision-making process. Similar questions can be raised about 
the leadership of the Secret Police, which was made up of individuals that were also 
part of the Soviet security police.
Individuals were nodes in multiple networks. If one looks at the position of the 
Romanian Communists, in different social networks, the relationship between the
1821 have already shown that the view of the Romanian communists as instruments in the hands of the 
Soviets or as actors outside the state is not supported by the political process prior to and post 1944.
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outside and inside becomes even fuzzier. In the case of the Romanian Communist
Party members, the difficulty is not removed by their having Romanian citizenship. 
It is interesting to note that the term ‘Moscow’ that historians use elliptically to refer 
to the USSR or Stalin or the Soviet Communist Party, could also be used to include 
members of the Romanian Communist Party with strong affiliations with Moscow. 
The faction of the party led by Ana Pauker operated from Moscow during the war 
was dubbed the ‘Moscow Bureau’. She was a member of the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern and head of the External Bureau of the Romanian Communist 
Party and future Foreign Minister of Romania from 1947. Emil Bodnaras is another 
example. He was a high profile Romanian communist trusted by Dej. He was not 
only a member of the Political Bureau of the Romanian Communist Party and vice- 
president of the Council of Ministers and minister of the Military Forces, but also a 
member of the Soviet Special Military Services (Retegan, 2000, p. 19). These highly 
ranking political leaders were drawing on resources and networks of power such as 
the Cominform or the Soviet state that were territorially located outside the 
geographical boundaries.
To conclude, the processes taking place after the 1947 elections could be taken to 
suggest tendencies towards the creation of a uniform social space underpinned by 
socialist relations. Social action was directed to create stable boundaries around what 
was ‘inside’ and what should stay ‘outside’. All the above social institutions, from 
schools to factories, theatres, press, bureaucracy, secret service, and so forth were 
considered important to sustain a certain vision of the state, which was the socialist
183 Deletant details the type of communist networks that emerged after the coup, which could not be 
divided by the formal ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ distinction. Pauker of the ‘Soviet’ faction was 
willing to ally with traditional parties while communists of the ‘home’ faction, such as Dej, draw 
more extensively upon the ‘external’ networks. Deletant uses this historical data to make an argument 
regarding the rise to the leadership o f the Romanian Communist Party of Gh. Dej (Deletant, 1999a).
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state. However, the section has also suggested such practices made evident that 
alternative social spaces still existed. These spaces coalesced around the values that 
a constitutional monarchy would promote, such as free elections, separation of 
powers, and private property. The Liberal and the Peasants parties, and their broader 
social networks, embodied these relations through their opposition and activities. 
The section has also argued that a claim regarding the existence of a single “inside” 
with clear boundaries would be difficult to support in the light of the existence of the 
different social networks that constituted the state.
Conclusion
The processes taking place during regime change help us illustrate the manner in 
which states are constituted as actors. Human agents have been salient in such 
processes in their roles of reproductive, challenging and transformative agents. As 
this chapter has shown, a swift change in social practices, institutions, and social 
relations more broadly could have only occurred when human agents that were 
informing previous social relations were physically annihilated, marginalised, or 
removed from the state’s constitutive institutions. Once key social institutions 
constituting the state, such as the governmental ones, were populated with 
communists, the changes could proceed from the centre of the organisational 
structure. The new principles shaped agents’ capabilities and potentialities in such 
ways that only reproductive practices were deemed legitimate. Furthermore, 
reproductive agency experienced a shift from the pre-war to the post-war years in 
that, access to resources, as a premise for consent, was replaced by limiting such 
access in order to secure reproduction.
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This chapter has raised questions about the historical interpretations of the events 
occurring during and after the WW2. The real cause or agent of change, which 
culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and declaration of the republic on 30 
December 1947, was identified in the literature as being the Soviet Union and/or 
Stalin. The argument made in this chapter suggested that processes prior to 1944 
were important for understanding the potential for action after the coup. My 
argument has shown that other factors, such as international bargaining and the role 
of communist networks, were also important. From the perspective of the argument 
made in this chapter, it is difficult to argue for a view of the Romanian state as a 
static object or entity. State agency was being exercised and changing in the mere act 
of declaring Romania a republic in 1947. Agents sustaining and defending a liberal 
parliamentary regime, for example, found themselves confronted with a lack of 
resources and removed from the social institutions that enabled them as legitimate 
actors.
The legitimate-illegitimate boundary was blurred depending on whose perceptions 
were involved. For actors such as the King, the members of the Peasants and Liberal 
political parties, and for a larger number of agents such as university professors, 
priests, journalists, and peasants, the new Marxist-Leninist principles were deemed 
‘outside’ of what the state was thought to be. It is from this point of view that the 
historical literature notes that Romania had no ‘independent’ agency to pursue its 
interests.
There were sufficient internal contradictions in the constitution of the state to 
consider the actions in relation to the USSR and the neighbouring states as both 
internal and external to the state, depending on which networks of relations we look
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at. The Soviet army can be termed constitutive of the Romanian state as well as an 
external force. The Red Army was simultaneously limiting and enhancing of state 
agency. For instance, from the perspective of the West and the members of the 
Peasants and Liberal parties, the Red army constituted the Romanian state as a weak 
and dependent actor.
It is of course unlikely that the treaty with the USSR, signed on February 4, 1948, 
would have been agreed on with the previous political elite still in the main decision­
making positions. At the same time, however, one needs to acknowledge that, since 
the communists gained power, there was a sudden change in the outlook of the state 
in terms of institutions, social practices and consequently in terms of interests. Other 
factors discussed above allowed for greater potential of action for the communist 
networks. The fact there was no consensus on what those interests were only 
illustrates the point that the state was not constituted in a cohesive manner.
The changes targeted not only individual agents but also more broadly institutions 
and social relations in which agents were to be embedded. Historians noted that the 
subservience to the USSR was achieved by destroying internally the ‘existing 
structures of society’(Deletant, 1999b, p. 57). If this is the case, the acts of 
‘subservience’ were internal to the Romanian state. Creating effects through policies 
should not be framed as external to the state, but rather as constitutive of the state. 
This is the meaning of the claim made in the previous chapters about state 
constitution being part of the definition of state agency.
The regime change occurring in Romania in 1989 also illustrates from a different 
angle the manner in which states are constituted. It is often the argument in the
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‘transitional’ literature that the practices and some of the underlying principles 
informing state agency are reminiscent of the communist regime. This is another 
way of saying that over-layered social relations and practices constituted the 
Romanian state. A sudden regime change did formally occur. However, the removal 
of some of the main leaders from the state functions, together with the formal change 
of social relations, was not sufficient to trigger such sudden changes in political 
practices as it did in the period after 1944. Repression and marginalisation of a 
considerable number of human agents played an important role in the latter regime 
change. As such, after 1989 a variety of social relations embedded the actions of 
human agents. Human agents could be nodes in different social networks. This 
example also illustrates the network-like character of the state.
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Chapter 7: The totalitarian state: a relational, network 
state: Romania (1965 -  1980s)
This chapter challenges the historical explanations regarding the constitution of the 
Romanian state and its agential potential internationally. The chapter is particularly 
important in making a fundamental point about the relational, network, and emergent 
character of the Romanian state between 1965 to mid 1980s. The example chosen is, 
as already mentioned in the rationale of the case studies, one that would counter the 
criteria for a ‘network’ state according to the typologies existent in the literature, 
such as Sorensen and Castells for instance. The Romanian state of that period is 
characterised by the historical literature as a highly centralised state with a leader, 
Nicolae Ceausescu, in control of the key decision-making positions in the state. The 
policy of economic autarchy and virulent nationalism would also enhance the view 
of the Romanian state as an entity with a well defined and unitary inside.
The chapter exposes the type of assumptions underpinning the political histories of 
the period. While these histories are rich in detail about the events of the two 
decades, the narrative style often exposes ontological and analytic preferences for 
pluralist or/and statist assumptions. In aiming to illustrate the theoretical points put 
forward in this thesis, such narratives make the work increasingly difficult. For 
instance, in some accounts the causality for the same action is attributed to 
Ceausescu and in others to the Romanian state while in others to the Romanian 
Communist Party (RCP). In some respects, these chapters have been like a puzzle- 
solving exercise. I compare different historical accounts and I additionally use the
insights of political anthropology and economics to reveal that the Romanian state 
was not only hierarchical and highly centralised but also networked and multiple in 
the agentic instantiations in relation to the same or different state or non-state actors.
7.1. Social processes and totalitarian states: networks of social 
relations and networks of agents
The aim of this first part is to demonstrate that, in spite of the formal highly 
centralised organisational structure, the Romanian state was nevertheless constituted 
as a network of social relations and networks of agents. The first section looks at the 
centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state institutions and 
practices. It also reflects on how these tendencies have been used to explain the 
constitution of the Romanian state as a certain type of actor. The next three 
subsections make the argument about the network nature of Romanian state. This is 
achieved by looking at several issues: the conceptual and factual differentiation 
between the party and the state and the effects of the policies of bureaucratic, 
political, and economic centralisation. The contributions of political anthropology, 
particularly the work of Katherine Verdery, which details the social practices in 
communist Romania, and those of economists who have written on the logic of 
socialist economies, are extremely useful in supporting my argument in this first 
part. It must be noted at this point that this section only begins to address the issue of 
state agency ‘internationally’ with further analysis being developed in the last 
section. It acts as the foundation for the second part of the chapter.
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7.1.1. ‘The Party, Ceausescu, Romania’184: Locating the discussion 
about Romanian state action
This section exposes the type of explanations and narratives present in the political 
histories regarding the Romanian state and the relationship between the state, the 
leader, and the party, between the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s. It also identifies 
pluralist and statist understandings of politics underpinning these explanations.
The institutional organisation of the Romanian state indicates that there were 
powerful centralising tendencies constituting the official network of the state. The 
General National Assembly (GNA), a single-chambered parliament, formally 
represented the institutional mechanism by which the ‘will’ of the people would be 
expressed. The GNA was the supreme organ of state power according to the 
Constitution of 1965 and the 1968 Administrative Laws (Nelson, July 1976, p. 658). 
It was intended to supervise the organisation of all other institutions. MPs were
1 Of
elected from mass organisations, such as the Social Unity Front , which was 
subordinated to the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).186 The GNA elected out of 
its members a State Council. The State Council exercised in effect legislative power 
throughout the year, as the assembly was not in session for most of the time. The 
State Council was also the main executive authority. It represented the state in 
international relations, it established election dates, it supervised the activities of the 
Council of Ministers and so forth (Verona, July 1989). The president of the State
184 This is a line from a popular Communist song.
185 The Social Unity Front was an umbrella organisation consisting of labour unions, cooperative farm 
organisations, youth, women’s, veterans’ and student organisations, cultural and scientific 
organisations and so forth. In order to be eligible to run in elections, candidates needed the approval 
of the front. See (Bachman, 1989).
186 It should be noted that the RCP has changed its name over the years. In 1945, it changed its name 
from the Communist Party of Romania to Romanian Communist Party. In 1948, it took the name ‘the 
Romanian Workers’ Party’. It was renamed RCP in 1965.
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Council was also the head of state. The Council of Ministers was considered the 
main body of the state administration. Its members were appointed by the State 
Council if the GNA was not in session. With few exceptions, the members of the 
State Council and the Council of Ministers occupied senior positions in the Central 
Committee of the RCP. The general prerogatives of the Council of Ministers 
included the implementation of policies, drafting the state budget and supervising the 
economic development. However, specific areas of competence for each minister 
were not set. The creation of the institution of Presidency in 1974 led to a 
diminishment of prerogatives of the State Council. For instance, the President took 
over the supervision of the Council of Minsters, and represented the state in 
international affairs. The President was elected by the GNA and occupied the 
position of General Secretary of the RCP.
The RCP was also organised hierarchically as the state institutions were, according 
to the principle known as ‘democratic centralism’(Nelson, 1980). Local Party 
organisations187 were accountable to county organisations and the latter to the 
Central Committee of the Party in Bucharest (Stoica, 2005). According to the party 
statutes, the party congress, which was made up of county delegates, represented the 
supreme organ of the RCP. It convened at least once every five years. It elected, for
1 fifi 180instance, the General Secretary and the Central Committee. When it convened,
it also sanctioned the policy proposals coming from the Central Committee. The 
Central Committee was in charge of setting the overall direction of the party and 
with policy implementation. It established party sections, which in effect duplicated
187 Their size varied from a minimum of 3 persons to a maximum of 300 members (Stoica, 2005, p. 
705).
188 The Central Committee initially elected the General Secretary o f the Party, i.e. the Party leader, 
but, after 1969, this prerogative was taken by the party congress. This measure was to counter Soviet 
interference in the election of the party leader. It also made it more difficult for individuals in high- 
ranking positions, i.e. in the Central Committee, to topple the leader (Stoica, 2005, p. 705).
189 In 1984, the Central Committee had 265 full members.
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the government ministries. Sections on agriculture, foreign policy, culture, and so 
forth were set up. The Central Committee also elected a Secretariat, which was to 
oversee the implementation of decisions. The Political Executive Committee 
Permanent Bureau (Politburo) was the most important body, which the Central 
Committee also elected from amongst the members of the Secretariat, at least 
according to the party statutes. The leading party members made up the Politburo. Its 
numbers fluctuated throughout the years from five to fifteen. The General Secretary 
of the Party was the head of the Secretariat and of the Politburo, and he chaired the 
latter. The literature notes that the programs and policies of the central organs were 
‘unconditionally binding on all lower organs and on individual members’ (Bachman, 
1989; Verona, July 1989).
Additionally, several measures reveal the centralised nature of the Romanian state 
and the concentration of decision-making in the ‘hands of a few’(Braun, 1978, pp. 
18-19). For instance in July 1965, an amendment to the Party statutes forbade any 
party member ‘to hold more than one full-time post in either the party or state 
apparatus’ (Deletant, 1999b, p. 112). This was to increase the advantage of the 
incumbent actors in relation to other aspiring or challenging ones. The policy was 
reversed by the policy of ‘leadership unification’ in the early 1970s which allowed 
accumulation of party and state positions by the same person (Bachman, 1989). It 
signalled a second stage in the consolidation of power by Ceausescu, after ridding 
himself of the opposition (Deletant, 1999b).
The accumulation of official functions that Ceausescu held is indeed striking. In 
brief, Ceausescu was the General Secretary of the RCP from 1965 and thus, head of 
the Politburo and the RCP Secretariat. From 1967 he also occupied the position of
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president of the State Council, which made him officially the head of the state 
(Retegan, 2000, p. 58). He subsequently became President of the Republic in 1974, 
when the office of the president was formally set up. By 1989, he was also 
chairperson of the Defence Council, supreme commander of the armed forces and 
chairperson of the Socialist Unity Front. Another way to enhance his control over the 
decision-making process was by appointing members of his close and extended 
family to top party and state positions (Crowther, 1989, p. 211; Deletant, 1999b, p. 
118). Linden, amongst others, writes that ‘[b]y the time of the 1969 party congress, 
Ceausescu had established himself and his own people as the dominant rulers of the 
party, the state, and society’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 372).
The leadership unification policy was supported by an additional package of laws 
passed in 1971 and 1972, such as The Law for the Protection of State Secrets and the 
National Defence Law. These increased the importance of Party organisations in the 
state decision-making process by moving institutions such as the Ministry of Interior 
from the purview of the Council of Ministers to the joint control by the Council and 
the Central Committee of the RCP. The military, for instance, had to implement both 
‘“party and state policy’” rather than simply ‘state policy’ (Crowther, 1989, p. 212). 
The overlapping of state and party functions was to reduce, according to party 
ideologues, the need to negotiate differences that might appear over policies between 
the party and the state. The policy of ‘cadre rotation’ of 1972 meant that none of the 
party members or occupants of state positions could establish either enough support 
or party clientele or enough public support on behalf of the population. ‘ [L]ong-term 
affiliation with any single institution’(Crowther, 1989, p. 210) prevented actors from 
challenging the Party leadership or from constituting potential political opposition 
(Deletant, 1999b, p. 119). Officially, the policy was to ‘increase individuals’
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experience’ with various aspects of administration by rotating them in state and party 
functions at intervals. This legislation constituted the bureaucratic apparatus as 
highly centralised and hierarchical. Its role was to reproduce the formal network by 
implementing the directives coming from high-ranked actors.
When the literature notes the highly hierarchical nature of the decision-making 
process, it not only provides useful information for understanding the organisational 
structure of the state, but it also uses this information to embed a certain type of 
explanatory claim regarding what the state is and what enables agency.
A high degree of centralisation, as well as overlap between state and party 
responsibilities, make many authors equate the state and the party with the leader, 
Ceausescu. The historical literature uses the above evidence regarding the 
organisational structure of the state to argue that the leader had supreme power. This 
is reflected in explanations of outcomes, from ideological orientations to foreign 
policy in general, in terms of the leader’s intentionality. For instance, Ceausescu 
was ‘the dominant actor in Romanian politics’ (Crowther, 1989, pp. 209 - 210), with 
no opposition to challenge his position (Stoica, 2005, p. 694). The members of the 
Politburo were his ‘yes-men’ (Deletant, 1999b, p. 124). The policies of leadership 
unification and cadres rotation ‘consolidated Ceausescu’s power’ (Deletant, 1999b, 
p. 119). Also, ‘Romania’s rapid economic development enabled the party leader to 
increase his power’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 348). Tismaneanu writes that ‘[t]he 
Communist party was no longer an autonomous body and existed only to implement 
Ceausescu’s most extravagant plans’ (Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 86).190 Sowards 
suggests that in domestic affairs, ‘Ceausescu brought the period of relaxation to an 
end with his July theses of 1971, in which he demanded a return to rigid ideological
190 Ilie takes a similar position (Ilie, 1998, p. 58).
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orthodoxy and reasserted the leading role of the party’(Sowards, 1996). Deletant 
and Tismaneanu argue that Ceausescu ‘launched’ the ‘mini-cultural revolution’ after 
his visit to China and North Korea in 1971 and promoted socialist realism in the 
cultural domain (Deletant, 1999b, p. 121; Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 86). A country study 
on Romania of the U.S. Library of Congress also reads that: ‘[a]fter his China trip 
[1971], Ceausescu removed Premier Maurer and thousands o f  managers and 
officials who advocated or implemented the earlier191 economic reform, and he 
replaced them with his proteges (Bachman, 1989). Psychological factors are given 
important explanatory weight. The Romanian position internationally and 
domestically after 1968, when it opposed the Warsaw Treaty Organisation invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, is directly linked to Ceausescu’s delusional perception of himself 
as an omniscient, invincible, untouchable and omnipotent leader (Retegan, 2000, p. 
111).192 The discourse of the RCP, as well as the media discourse, does enhance 
such a view. Ceausescu is portrayed as a ‘defender of Romania’s independence and 
sovereignty’ against the ‘Soviet threat’. Discourse analysis of the documents of the 
time reveals that Ceausescu is given discursively the role of a ‘hyper-agent’, i.e. an 
‘initiator of actions’, and the rest were agents by virtue of ‘performing the action’ 
(Ilie, 1998, p. 68).
The manner in which the evidence concerning the organisational structure of the 
state is used in the explanatory accounts reflects IR’s statist and pluralist 
assumptions. First, state action is reduced to the interactions between the Party 
nomenklatura. Explaining state action by reference to the hierarchy of the party
191 My emphasis. I will return to this example below in Section 7.1.3.
192‘The effect o f this praise [of Romanian’s FP] was disastrous in the long run, and had a share in 
projecting into Ceausescu’s mind his own image as a strategic genius and a man capable of solving all 
the problems of humanity. For the simple man which Ceausescu was, all these plaudits coming from 
Paris, Washington, London, and other capitals might have had unusual effects on him, such as his 
self-evaluation as a person whose analyses were always infallible, regardless of the field’ (Retegan,
2000, p. 111).
175
and/or the state can also suggest a statist view: the state is well defined and 
distinguished from the rest of the society. Linden argues for instance that:
the governing dynamics in Romania at the middle of the 1970s were unquestionably top-to-bottom 
and centre-to periphery. A relatively closed top party leadership, essentially those around Ceausescu, 
determined both the country’s overall direction and the parameters of its day-to-day activities, and 
implemented its decisions through the party to the government and through both to the society at large 
(Linden, Spring 1986, p. 350).
The top-down organisational structure and decision-making process could illustrate 
Castells’ concept of hierarchical entities. According to him, hierarchical entities are 
fundamentally opposed to networks due to the logic of their organisation, as lower 
nodes have no agency on deciding the courses of action.
As said, the literature regards the party leadership and the state as synonymous: one 
often finds them used interchangeably. From this conflation of what should be 
analytically and ontologically distinct entities, it is only a short step to assume the 
unitary and person-like condition of the Romanian state. For instance, Retegan 
writes that: ‘Romania’s thoughts’ needed to be discovered by other states during the 
events leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Retegan, 2000, p. 98). 
There is an assumption of a distinguishable and well-defined inside. The centralised 
nature of the state and the politics of nationalism constitute the evidence for such an 
assumption. If the state is centralised, then the state is assumed to be unitary. 
Romania constitutes, in this case, a good illustration for Sorensen’s modem type of
1 Q 'l
state in terms of its constitution and functioning internationally.
To conclude, this section has looked at the institutional structure of the Romanian 
state as well as of the RCP. It has illustrated how the historical literature uses the 
formal organisational structure to discuss Romanian state action. This section has
193 See section 7.2.1 for an analysis of the explanations of Romanian foreign policy provided by the 
historical literature.
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also showed that statist and pluralist assumptions regarding the nature of the state 
and state action underpin the arguments of the historical literature.
7.1.2. Assessing the relationship between the state and the Party
This section looks at the party -  state relationship and argues that, despite the 
centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state institutions, 
there is evidence to support the claim that the two should be kept separate. The 
section also intends to show that the centralising logic of the state policies opened up 
the social space for informal and illicit social practices. The discussion shows that 
these practices created the opportunity for individuals to be more than reproductive 
agents.
Several issues illustrate the claim that the party networks, although central to 
understanding the politics of the era, maintained their distinct roles from the state. 
The political practices of the time could be taken as evidence for the significance of 
occupying positions in both state and party institutions. Access to party and state 
resources meant that high-ranking political actors enlarged their pool of resources 
and agential potential, which allowed them to decide on policies. In other words, a 
high-ranking position in the party needed to be complemented by a high-ranking 
position in the state institutions. Ousting an opponent from the senior party ranks 
needed to start with securing their removal from state institutions. This occurred in 
spite of the fact that the Politburo would often direct the ministers on the desired 
policy outcomes.
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For instance, the position of Ministry of Internal Affairs constituted a key 
governmental position, due to the attributes associated with the job such as 
supervision and appointment of servants in the police force. The institutional 
position in the state hierarchy offered not only formal decision-making powers. It 
would have also constituted the incumbent as a hub, an individual who could rally 
support at different local and county party levels as well as within the bureaucratic 
apparatus. In 1965, the Minister of Interior, Draghici, was first voted out from his 
ministerial position. According to historians, this measure was intended to ‘deny him 
his power base’(Deletant, 1999b, p. 112). Such acts represent an acknowledgement 
that an institutional separation between the state and the RCP in terms of 
responsibilities and agential potential existed.
The state and the party had been discursively constructed as distinct although 
complementary entities. The state for instance maintained a central role in achieving 
a communist social order while the party was considered a ‘state organ’ that 
‘educated, led, directed, and organised’ social life (Braun, 1978, pp. 51, 53). 
Ceausescu, for instance, claimed that the role of the state would be augmented while 
the party was assigned the role to take the state into the next stage of development 
(Ceausescu, September 1965, p. 10).194 Additionally, the party had been discursively 
securing its legitimacy for decades by identifying with the working class. 
Accumulation of state and party functions was, in this light, the manner in which 
human agents broadened their institutional agency and secured broader ideological 
legitimacy. During the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1980s, there were indeed
194 The official name of the republic was changed in 1965 from a ‘People’s Republic’ to a ‘Socialist’ 
republic. This change of name was intended to signal the fact that the state has moved into a new 
stage of development.
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attempts to further identify the party with the Romanian state at a discursive level195 
(Ceausescu, 1982; Radulescu, March 1966, p. 12). Such a discourse was 
accompanied by the duplication and overlapping of responsibilities, as specified in 
the first section. The state maintained nevertheless an important role during this 
period (Braun, 1978, p. 55) in the official discourses.
The Romanian state was distinguishable from the party although it was constitutive 
of and constituted by the RCP. The differentiation between the state and the party 
was important to the relationship with the West. For example, foreign policy was a 
prerogative of the state and communication between the Romanian state and 
Western states went through state institutions, including, for instance, negotiations of 
money borrowing from international institutions. On the other hand, the 
identification between the party and the state was central to the relation with other 
socialist states. Socialist states also conducted relations such as exchange of 
diplomatic notes at the party level - through the Politburo of the respective 
Communist Parties (Retegan, 2000, p. 99). Such practices reproduced both the state 
and the party as distinct entities in spite of the discursive identification.196
Aside from the issue of the party and state relationship, the first section discussed 
some of the specific policies of the state and of the party, which were meant to 
increase the centralisation of the decision-making process. Transformative agency 
for example within the Romanian state was associated with what is termed the 
‘centre’ or the top bureaucracy, the leadership (Politburo) and the agents in high 
state positions. They were the ones controlling the decision-making process and the
195 Radulescu published in the newspaper of the RCP an article in which he promoted this 
identification o f the party with the state.
196 The functioning of the Romanian state after the 1989 revolution and the formal dismantling of the 
RCP without the state becoming ‘a collapsed’ or ‘failed’ state is indicative of the existence of a 
socially complex entity that was more than the RCP.
allocation of resources. The rest of the bureaucratic apparatus was concerned with 
the implementation of decisions and management of the allocated resources 
(Campeanu, 1988, pp. 117 - 118). As mentioned, discourse analyses of the Party 
publications and Ceausescu’s speeches reveal that semantically Ceausescu is given 
the role of a ‘hyper-agent’, i.e. an ‘initiator of actions’ (Ilie, 1998, pp. 63, 68).
However, these policies had more than centralising effects as intended by the centre 
of the formal network. The policy of cadre rotation signified indeed the formal 
centralisation of the political process. At the same time, it resulted in a reduction in 
the available time top bureaucrats in the regional and local administration had to get 
acquainted with their respective jobs and their institutional environment (Zhong, 
2003, p. 119). It translated into a lack of coherence and urgency in the formulation 
and the implementation of policy and a focus on short-term achievements. 
Proliferation of illicit practices such as corruption, nepotism, and clientelism was 
closely linked to these dynamics. Such social practices enabled the discretionary 
powers of agents.
Discretionary powers were manifested at all levels of the bureaucratic-administrative 
apparatus. It meant that ‘lower nodes’ in the bureaucratic network constituted also 
illegal networks on the basis of which they acquired more agential potential then 
intended by the centre. Anthropological studies document the discretionary powers 
enabled within the networks of actors constituting the state (Ciobanu, 2004; 
Kideckel, May, 1982, p. 323; Sampson, 1984; Verdery, August 1991). Verdery for 
instance notes that ‘local executors of central policy bend and redefine it in accord 
with their own style of leadership, their capabilities for enforcement, and so 
on’(Verdery, August 1991, p. 427). Policies that needed to be implemented locally
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can by ‘ignored, corrupted, over-executed or otherwise, adulterated’ (Verdery, 1991, 
p. 84).
These centralising tendencies created the potential for action of ‘lower’ actors. It 
allowed lower nodes to act and produce effects that were not intended by the ‘centre’ 
or the leader. Their practices did not challenge the socialist social relations but meant 
that the ability to create effects was not exclusively associated with nor explained 
only by reference to the centre of the formal network. Thus, while the policies and 
practices initiated at the top level intended to reduce the transformative potential of 
actors in institutional positions, the effects were not coherent and did not constitute a 
unitary, uniform ‘inside’ of the state. In fact, the discussion here shows that the 
Romanian state was not in practice the hierarchical entity assumed by historical 
accounts.
To conclude, this section has focused on the conceptual differentiation between the 
Communist party and the state in order to argue that state action cannot be reduced 
to party politics. The explanatory consequences are important in that it makes the 
RCP central to the state yet not synonymous. Explanations of state action should go 
beyond identifying the party as the cause for the position of the Romanian state in 
relation to specific policy goals or other actors. Keeping a focus not only on the 
formal design of the state but also on the informal and illicit social practices reveals 
an entity constituted by contradictory and overlapping facets or insides. These 
‘insides’ inform its differentiated agential potential, as I will discuss in the second 
part of the chapter.
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7.1.3. The consequences of economic centralisation upon state agency
This section looks at the centralising logic underpinning the economic process and 
its consequences for understanding the state as an actor. It constitutes a second 
building block for the broader argument about the network nature of the Romanian 
state.
Economic practices were intended to mirror and enhance the centralising tendencies 
of the state and top-down control over decision-making. The centre of the formal 
network controlled the means of production. It was regarded as a source of power.197 
This is because it constituted the formal state network as the only allocator of 
resources. The high-ranking political actors considered the allocative capacity of the 
state to be relative to that of other actors. This meant that potential or actual 
networks of organisations had to be prevented from existing and proliferating so that 
‘no one else could get things done or associate for purposes other than those of the 
centre’ (Verdery, 1991, p. 76). This is what Gross calls, for instance, a ‘spoiler state’ 
(Gross, 1989, p. 210).198 The strategies were nationalisation of means of production 
such as land, businesses, banks, and industry, and five-year production plans. 
Nationalisation prevented other ‘foci of production’, such as private firms, to 
constitute themselves as ‘an alternative to the central monopoly of goods.’ (Verdery, 
1991, p. 76) The five-year production plans designed by the top officials in party and 
state institutions established the economic targets to be achieved.
197 The means of production are deemed by Verdery as a source of power (Verdery, 1991). I agree 
with this. However, in the light of the discussion of Chapter 5 ,1 understand this as a formal source of 
power, which underpins the actions of the formal network.
198 Recall for instance Keohane and Nye’s definition of the state as an organisation whose main 
purpose is problem-solving and its underlying goal is efficiency. States such as the Romanian one 
would not qualify for this definition.
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The historical literature makes the point that the state as the only owner of the means 
of production and the only employer199 were important means of coercion of the 
population. They ensured the existence of the critical mass of reproductive agents, as 
the latter were dependent on the allocation of material resources through a top-down 
process. Secondly, it also enhanced the centralising tendency of the state. 
Reproductive agency was the basis for the coherence of political space and 
reproduction of centralised decision-making. It supported the historical arguments 
that identified the leader as the cause of state action. It supported the arguments that 
viewed the state as unitary in its exercise of agency.
I use the writings of economists to argue that the economic and political practices of 
the Romanian state resulted not only in centralisation but also in a weakening of the 
agential potential of the centre of the formal state network. The analyses in the 
economics literature unveil the contradictory effects of the centralising economic 
logic of the state, which was emerging out of the socialist social relations. The 
Romanian state did not have the same means as capitalist ones to discipline labour 
by ‘firings, lockouts, unemployment, bankruptcies’ (Verdery, 1991, p. 85). There 
were no financial penalties for economic units if they did not achieve their targets, or 
more broadly, for inefficiency. This is what economists call ‘soft budget constrains’, 
i.e. a reliance on the state institutions such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
to bail out underperforming economic firms (Komai, July 1979).
Furthermore, the growth targets set in the five-year plans reflected the assumption 
that an economy underpinned by socialist relations of production can only expand.
199 This understanding by the centre came with a policy of over-employment in the state institutions. 
The over-employment reflected in turn a zero-unemployment target set by the centre. It meant that 
responsibilities were not only multiplied but also downsized in order to accommodate a larger number 
of individuals.
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The economists Bauer and Komai argue that the expansionist tendencies of socialist 
economies are generated not only from the top, through the growth-oriented five- 
year plans, but also from below (Komai, July 1979, pp. 801,814). The expansionist 
drive from below means that nodes at lower levels of the production process 
consistently overstate the material and investment needs for production (Komai, 
1992). This is due to several overlapping conditions: firstly, economic managers 
who were in charge of implementing and achieving the five-year plan were aware of 
the possible consequences in case of failure to achieve targets (Verdery, 1991, p. 
81); and secondly, it was evident that the allocation of resources from the centre was 
a zero-sum game. That is to say that the pool of resources was limited, and all 
allocation occurred at the expense of someone else’s access to resources. The focus 
of individuals in managerial jobs was on inputs or their ability to draw resources 
rather than outputs or production results. Thirdly, the soft budgetary constraints, 
which did not allow managers to focus on efficiency, also contributed to the 
expansionist tendency. The social practices enabling an expansionist economic drive 
from ‘below’ were also enhancing and being enhanced by the effects of the policies 
discussed in the previous section regarding the overlapping and the multiplication of 
responsibilities.
The consequences of the overstatement of material and production needs 
corroborated by the false reporting of targets are salient for understanding the 
agential potential of the state. Such processes illustrate the fundamental reliance of 
the centre of the formal network (central planners) upon the lower nodes for 
information about the actual costs of production figures in order to devise the next 
five-year plans (Verdery, 1991, p. 84, August 1991, p. 426). Thus, economic 
managers and other technocrats may not have had direct control over the policy
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plans, yet, their actions and practices have been constitutive of such plans. The state 
was constituted by contradictory tendencies emerging from the interaction between 
the top-down centralising practices and the practices o f ‘lower’ nodes in managerial 
and administrative positions. Such tendencies are important for the constitution of 
the Romanian state as an actor internationally, as the second part of the chapter 
discusses. It allows for acknowledgement of the differentiated agential potential of 
the Romanian state.
In the light of the above, the claim that the goals and policies of the Romanian state 
could be explained by reference to the leader or the centre becomes untenable. The 
approach I have suggested allows me to explain the specific agential powers of the 
Romanian state without simplistically attributing to the leader each single action. By 
integrating Ceausescu’s action200 within the analysis undertaken so far in this 
section, it becomes plausible to make a more complex argument when explaining the 
firing for instance of ‘thousands of managers’ responsible for proposing a revision of 
the centralising policies. The firing of the ‘thousands of managers’ can be framed as 
the outcome of potentialities existent in the networks constituting the state. There 
was a tendency towards reproducing the centralising measures as they enabled 
practices out of which lower nodes could benefit despite the formal dependent 
relation on the centre. This met with Ceausescu’s preference for even greater control 
over decision-making and planning activities. The explanations that over-emphasise 
the leader as the causal agent of economic and political policies such as firing of 
managers, the over-industrialisation and so forth, miss important processes such as
200 This type o f argument should not be read as an exoneration of Ceausescu’s role in the reproduction 
of the political regime of the time. I accept that based on such a view of the state, new questions can 
be asked about the type of responsibility associated with individuals and states. This however 
constitutes the subject of another thesis altogether.
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the ones just mentioned. State agency is thus placed in the practices of networks 
rather than with one person or a static centre.
This section has discussed the implications that centralising tendencies manifesting 
themselves in the economic process have for understanding the constitution of the 
Romanian state as an actor. It showed that overlapping networks of social practices 
in fact constituted the Romanian state. These practices reproduced the centralising 
logic of the organisational structure. At the same time, the illegitimate and informal 
practices countered the effects of that logic. The argument also re-shifted the focus 
of explanations from the leader or the centre to the networks of social relations 
constituting the state.
7.1.4. Ideational resources: not top down or nationally bounded
The focus of this section is on symbolic-ideational resources: the national idea and 
Marxism-Leninism. The aim is to show that the process of creating a unifying 
identity was not top-down nor confined to ‘national’ boundaries. This section 
illustrates the relational aspect of meaning production. In doing so, it casts further 
doubt on explanations framed exclusively in terms of the leader’s role due to his 
megalomaniac drive.
The national idea, which constituted an important ideational resource before 1945, 
was temporarily marginalised during the process of exclusion from the formal 
networks of the political actors such as the Liberals, the Peasants, and the Iron 
Guard. The discourse on the national idea gained ideational ground in formally
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defining the state from the 1960s onwards. This process was the outcome of a 
synchronisation of processes taking place within different networks.
The discourse aimed at creating a homogenous inside, which was based on 
affiliation to a common past, traditions and to common ideological ideals and 
projects such as the communist society. It constituted a resource that the centre of 
the formal state network could use in order to deter the coagulation of challenging 
networks to the formal one. Reproductive agency was enabled by such resources 
rather than by financial incentives (Skinner & Winckler, 1969; Verdery, 1991, pp. 85 
- 86). Alongside the bureaucratic and economic centralisation, it was a means to 
reproduce and maintain a highly centralised decision-making structure. Ideological 
debates at the party level about the relationship between workers and intellectuals 
resulted in a change in the party membership policy. It allowed intellectuals, 
formerly labelled as bourgeois, to become party members (Jowitt, 1987, p. 316; 
Stoica, 2005, p. 691). Such a measure can be considered an important catalyst in the 
revival of the discourse on the national idea. This is because it legitimised, at least 
formally, intellectuals participating in political life, even if many did not become 
party members.201 It enabled the creation of alliances between factions of the party 
and cultural elites (Verdery, August 1991, p. 429).
Romanian nationalism, that is, the discourse of independence and emphasis on the 
national idea, was the result of relational practices. The reconciliation of Marxist 
ideas about the leading role of the working class, and the nationalistic ones, which 
based the legitimacy of the state and the party on identification with the entire
201 Verdery draws on Nancy Heer’s book (Heer, 1971) to argue that there is no simple dividing line 
between the party and the scholars. They do not endorse oppositions such as between ‘intellectuals’ 
and ‘the Party’ or between ‘government ideologists’ and ‘dissidents’ although Verdery admits that 
‘on the surface, the politicization of culture makes it look as if  those who defend their cultural 
authority are doing so from a dissident position’ (Verdery, 1991, p. 92).
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society, was not an exclusively ‘internal’ process. It did build on tendencies extant 
for further centralisation. However, it also resonated with changes in the ideational 
resources constituting to different degrees other Eastern European states such as 
Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the USSR (Jowitt, 1987, p. 316). A variety of 
political processes associated with different states in the region weakened the 
internationalist Marxist-Leninist arguments, which emphasised the need for 
homogenous ideational resources and similarity in policies in the socialist bloc. The 
internationalist ideas that focused on the unity of socialist states were being replaced 
with an ideological emphasis on regime individuality within the bloc (Jowitt, 1970, 
p. 38, 1987, p. 315).
Two main directions of the discourse on the national idea were evident: one that 
differentiated between the party, the nation and the state and a second one that 
superimposed the three (Verdery, 1991, p. 119). The latter emerged as dominant. 
Verdery’s study on the production of the national idea shows that Ceausescu was not 
controlling the meanings of the ideational resources. The high-ranking politicians 
‘struggled to maintain the initiative in the use of this rhetoric’ (Verdery, 1991, p. 
125). While the leadership ‘authorised the language’, it did not have the control from 
the top over the meanings of symbolic production (Verdery, 1991, p. 122). Scholars 
from within or outside the RCP were better equipped to initiate discussions and thus 
shape the ideational resources constituting the state (Verdery, 1991, p. 91). Their 
actions were not only a contest over the authoritative sources of knowledge but also 
a contest over resource allocation, as the cultural domain was also dependent on the 
state for funding (Verdery, 1991, p. 96). The competition over the allocation of 
material resources as discussed previously merged with the production of a type of 
nationalism, which stepped up the flattery and laudatory comments towards the party
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and its leader. Thus, although the national idea was not caused in any direct way by 
the drive for material resources, it found favourable ground in economic and social 
practices. In order to explain the emergence of Romanian nationalism and a specific 
type of Marxism-Leninism, a mix of ideological and material-based struggles need 
to be considered. This illustrates the argument made in chapter 4 about the 
impossibility of disentangling the causative role of material over ideational factors.
The explanation thus far has acknowledged the role of the leader in sanctioning 
tendencies emerging from the negotiations between networks of actors. The value 
added for the explanation lies in consolidating the argument about the difficulty of 
framing meaning production as a linear process with specific individuals or groups 
as the causal agents or as the result of a top-down process. The second part of the 
chapter will build on this understanding to discuss the issue of the ‘independent’ 
foreign policy of the Romanian state.
To conclude, this first part has demonstrated that the logic of the social relations 
underpinning the policies and institutions of the state allowed both centralising and 
decentralising tendencies to co-exist. The discussion has showed that managers, 
bureaucrats, and scholars had a peculiar kind of reproductive agency. ‘Lower’ nodes 
had a complex mix of reproductive and transformative agency. They did not 
challenge the deeper social relations and institutions on which the state was 
premised. However, the informal and illegal practices created effects that were not 
intended by the centre of the formal network.
202 The goal of economic development, which will be discussed in the next part, enabled and was 
enabled by such a discourse.
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Thus, in explaining and understanding Romanian state constitution and agency, one 
must look beyond the ‘formal’ relationships or the organisational structure of the 
state. The argument acknowledges the role of human agents yet focuses on the non- 
linearity of human action for constituting the state. In the light of this analysis, 
accounts that reduce explanation to interactions between the party nomenklatura or 
as the direct consequence of an omnipotent leader are not tenable.
Contradictory practices constituted the Romanian state as a multi-faceted entity. The 
homogenous symbolic-ideational space, which was premised on resources such as 
the national idea and Marxism-Leninism, was only one of the constitutive spaces of 
state agency. The social spaces ordered around social practices in the economic and 
the political-administrative domains were equally important for understanding the 
emergent agency of the state. The argument moves away (pace Wendt) from 
identifying a common identity, that is, a common ideational space created by the 
national idea, as the basis for unitary state agency.
This part has also demonstrated that totalitarian states were not constituted only by 
top down processes, although they were hierarchical in terms of organisation and 
constraining in terms of the boundaries of meaning production. Network theory 
maintains that network-like entities are bound together by broader principles termed 
the ‘logic’ of the network. It also argues that entities are networks if lower nodes 
have the agency to decide upon the courses of action. This is certainly the case for 
the Romanian state. The Romanian state was constituted as a centralised yet network 
actor, highly coercive yet not able to control outcomes from the top-down.
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7.2. Re-framing the explanations of Romanian Foreign Policy
The second part of this chapter aims to show that Romanian state agency is emergent 
from visions and instantiations of multiple ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’. More 
specifically, it illustrates the network and non-unitary nature of Romanian state 
agency in terms of actions and positioning in relation to other states and 
organisations. In doing so, the analysis does not claim to provide new historical 
insights into the events. It rather proposes a new reading that challenges the existing 
explanations. The first section briefly analyses the assumptions underpinning the 
explanations of Romanian foreign policy provided by political histories and assesses 
their coherence. The second section tackles the important argument about the 
independence or lack thereof of Romanian foreign policy. The last section of this 
chapter looks at two closely related foreign policy goals: economic development 
through industrialisation and the payment of the national debt.
7.2.1. Existing explanations: the Romanian state: unitary, maverick 
and/or dependent on USSR
This section assesses the historical approaches to Romanian foreign policy. It aims 
to unveil the internal logic of these explanations and their silent ontological 
assumptions. Unitary state agency internationally is invoked in all accounts. The 
formal organisational structure of the state is used to justify implicitly the unitary 
claim. Additionally, it is supported by the empirical focus on the formal discourse of 
sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention. The proofs lie, according to 
the literature, in the formal documents of the era: foreign policy manifestos, and
speeches of political actors (Ceausescu, 1969). These principles emphasising a 
strong inside-outside distinction are regarded as fundamentally constituting the 
Romanian state as a territorially and politically bounded entity.
When unitary agency is assumed within the argument about independent state 
agency vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the supposition is that goals and actions are 
internally produced and they constitute challenges to the USSR. Several examples of 
policy goals or state actions, which were not synchronised with the rest of the 
Eastern bloc or the USSR, are invoked in this context. For instance, the Romanian 
state recognised West Germany in 1967 and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
in 1976 against position of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It positioned itself 
against intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. It criticised 
Israel during the 6 Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1979, while also 
being the only country from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to maintain diplomatic 
relations with Israel. The Romanian state supported the Chinese position during the 
Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s. It undertook economic development through 
industrialisation when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or the 
Comecon suggested that Romania should specialise in agricultural production. In 
the 1970s, it pursued membership in the non-alignment movement (G77), the only 
other socialist country that was a member was Yugoslavia. Based on this 
membership, it created voting alliances in the UN with the least developed countries 
and the Arab world (Weiner, 1984). It was the first Eastern European state to join the 
International Monetary Fund (1972) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development or the World Bank. In 1973, it established special ties with the 
European Economic Community, being the first CMEA country ‘to receive
203 The aim of the CMEA was to achieve economic growth by division of labour between the 
participant countries.
192
generalised trade preferences from the EEC’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 360). In 1975, 
the USA granted Romania the "most favoured nation" status. It entertained active 
diplomatic relations with the West un-mediated by the USSR. In May 1968, De 
Gaulle visited Romania, in 1975, President Ford, and in 1979, President Nixon.
Goals and policies are not only seen as internally produced but they are also causally 
attributed to the leader(s). Ceausescu initiated and caused all political action. For 
instance, Tismaneanu writes ‘Ceausescu’s autonomist course in foreign policy (...) 
ensured the regime a certain authority in international affairs. Unlike other Soviet- 
bloc leaders, Ceausescu was not perceived as the Kremlin’s puppet, and his 
initiatives were often praised for their farsightedness’ (Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 85). 
Other historians focus on the role of material factors and suggest that the 
independent foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s can be regarded as a consequence 
of Romania’s energetic independence from the USSR (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 352; 
Retegan, 2000, p. 31).204 The shift here is from individuals to material explanations 
for the foreign policy.
On the other hand, often the same explanations place Romanian state agency as an 
effect of USSR foreign policy, or of Cold war politics. They equally assume unitary 
agency. The fundamental observation is that in spite of the self-determination 
discourse, the Romanian state repeatedly renewed its loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation and the Comecon (Braun, 1978, p. xi). The loyalty was maintained 
discursively not only through speeches but also formally through treaties such as the 
treaty of friendship and mutual aid between Romania and the USSR signed on July, 
8 1970 (Braun, 1978, p. 92). Thus, while states in Eastern Europe signed treaties
204 ‘Energy imports in 1975 constituted 15% of Romania’s energy consumption, the lowest in Eastern 
Europe, and Romania was by far the largest net exporter of oil and natural gas in the region’ 
(Retegan, 2000, p. 31).
and had diplomatic relations, the aims of the foreign policy ‘were not “theirs”’ 
(Retegan, 2000, p. 17). The Romanian state seems then an entity fully determined by 
its environment. The degree o f ‘dependence’ varies, with accounts conceding that 
the Romanian leader (sic!) managed to instrumentally stir political action in an act of 
balancing against the USSR (Braun, 1978, p. 73).
The first important issue that comes out from the reading of the political histories is 
the silent preference for pluralist or/and statist assumptions in framing political 
events. Often, the causality for the same action is attributed to Ceausescu, to the 
Romanian state or to the Communist Party. More often than not, it is attributed to the 
leader. The interchangeable usage of the concept of the state and the leader comes 
also with the identification between individual and state instrumentality. The 
personhood assumption regarding the state is located also in such a move. Historical 
accounts themselves need to compensate for the lack of historical data. For instance, 
Braun writes: ‘It is not clear whether the main impetus for such action [tightening 
domestic control in 1971] was concern by Ceausescu to prevent events from getting 
out of control205 or whether it was a result of attempts to attenuate Soviet 
apprehensions (Braun, 1978, p. 12).’ He concludes by emphasising the dependency 
on USSR and Ceausescu’s role in achieving a balance between the domestic and 
USSR’s needs (Braun, 1978, p. 73). Such moves suggest that implicit analytical and 
ontological assumptions about how political action occurs become the organising 
principles of the available data.
Lastly, there is a central unresolved question regarding the nature of the Romanian 
state as an actor. On the one hand, the emphasis is on the centralised and hierarchical
205 By ‘things getting out of control’ he means Ceausescu losing his control over the party and state 
institutions.
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organisational structure and strong national ideology, which work as premises for 
unitary agency. This emphasis appears in all accounts. Its corollary is the supposition 
of internally created goals: the Romanian state is in this case a self-generating entity. 
Authors make the implicit assumption that there are such things as internally created 
aims. This also resonates with the statist assumptions that Krasner has put forward in 
his writings. The environment or the ‘outside’ is secondary in the process of goal 
definition. On the other hand, the emphasis on the dependency of the Romanian state 
on the USSR suggests that goals are exogenous to the Romanian state. The 
environment determines in this instance the orientation of foreign policy.
To conclude, this first section has critically reviewed the type of explanations of 
Romanian foreign policy and suggested the silent inconsistencies present in the texts.
7.2.2. The issue o f ‘independent’ foreign policy
This section re-frames the answer provided by the political histories to the question 
of whether Romanian foreign policy can be termed ‘independent’. It aims to embed 
the explanation in a relational framework while also pointing to the empirical 
elements that sustain such an endeavour. It does this by building on previous 
analysis in the first part of the chapter. The section also raises questions regarding 
the necessity or the relevance of focusing on independence vs. dependence in 
explanations of Romanian state action. Based on the analysis of ideational resources 
in the first part, I argue here that the focus of explanations on independence vs. 
dependence is misguided.
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The independence discourse had a constitutive role in Romanian foreign policy. For 
the Romanian politicians, terming the foreign policy goals and the policies of the 
state as ‘independent’ constituted the formal network as legitimate. For instance, the 
party membership increased after the refusal of the Romanian state to participate in 
the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The ‘USSR as a threat’ to the Romanian state 
worked as a central discursive resource for the formal network of the state and for 
the RCP. The RCP was instrumental in reproducing the discourse and keeping the 
threat alive (Korkut, 2006, p. 149). For the policy makers of other states such a 
perception was important for shaping the policy goals of their respective states in 
relation to the Romanian ones. A claim and/or act o f‘independence’ (not necessarily 
both) by Eastern European states constituted the ‘socialist camp’ as polycentric. 
These were signs that the Eastern bloc was not monolithic and subordinated to the 
USSR.
At the same time, there was ideological proximity and affinities between Eastern 
European states in terms of the socialist relations underpinning their economic and 
political organisation. The formal documents acknowledge the role of Marxist- 
Leninist principles in guiding foreign policy. I have already shown that the national 
idea, i.e. the type of nationalism developed in Romania, was reflective of social 
processes and tendencies that were not exclusively ‘internal’ to the state. The 
particularistic foreign policy can be linked to changes in the ideational resources 
constituting to different degrees other Eastern European states. The internationalist 
ideas that focused on the unity of socialist states co-existed with the ideological 
emphasis on regime individuality within the bloc.
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While the foreign policy goals were particular to the Romanian state, political 
processes that transgressed the territorial and the legal inside-outside boundary 
enabled their emergence. These ideas were as argued emergent from transactions 
between different networks of social actors -  not necessarily the formal centre of 
decision-making. In this light, the Romanian state did not act ‘against’ the USSR - 
i.e. not in the sense that there was a pre-constituted problem-solving ‘self that 
reacted to the USSR - since the action was premised on a relational ‘self.
In 1967, for example, the Romanian state recognised West Germany. It also 
maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Israel when the USSR and other 
Eastern European states had severed them as a form of protest against Israel’s Six 
Days War.206 Ceausescu, as president, and Gheorghe Maurer, the prime-minister, 
took turns in criticising the USSR for putting pressure on the socialist states to 
conform with USSR policies. They also took turns in expressing the friendship that 
existed between the two states due to the common Marxist-Leninist principles that 
organised their states.207 Historians note the close relationship between the two men, 
Ceausescu and Maurer, and conclude that it is likely that they staged it in order to 
make ‘less clearly identifiable the target’ against whom the Soviets could have taken 
action. The Romanian position is explained in terms of the leader’s instrumentality, 
i.e. in terms of Ceausescu’s desire to maintain power and fear that he would be 
replaced by other more loyal politicians to the USSR (Braun, 1978, p. 23).
206 Braun’s phrasing is: ‘Ceausescu appeared vulnerable’ because of these actions (Braun, 1978, p. 
23).
207 On May 7, 1967, it was Ceausescu criticising the USSR and on the 8th it was Maurer taking the 
‘soft line’. Afterwards, on July 24, in a speech in front of the GNA, Ceausescu expressed the close 
affiliation between the two states while Maurer criticised the Soviet FP on 25th. See (Braun, 1978, p. 
23). Robert S. McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, also recalls a similar instance at the verge 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the relations between the USSR and the USA. McNamara recalls that 
within the space of an hour, the Soviet administration sent two contradictory messages (both signed 
‘Khurshchev’) regarding the consequences of USA action against USSR. One note was threatening 
and the other reconciliatory. ("The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. 
McNamara," 2003)
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These are plausible conditions for action, although documentary evidence for such 
an explanation is missing. This represents another instance of silent preference for 
state action in terms of leaders’ actions. The reasons for action invoked above cannot 
be held as being the necessary nor sufficient factors in explaining Romanian state 
action in relation to the USSR. This is because one could simultaneously argue that 
removing two instead of one politician would not have proven a more difficult 
problem for the USSR.
The two positions instantiated in the speeches of both leaders are however revealing 
about the extant ideational resources constituting the Romanian state. Nationalism 
and internationalism informed the formal social space. They enabled opposing 
reactions and positions of the Romanian state internationally. Leaders sanctioned 
such meanings but did not control their production as argued in the previous part of 
the chapter. National ideas and Marxist-Leninist ideas were coexisting and they 
constituted the formal social space. These ideas informed the agential potential of 
leaders to act as they did in the example above. In other words, goals and policies, as 
well as state actions, were emergent from complex processes non-reducible to 
human agents. Such a conclusion does not reject the role of the leader or negotiator 
for understanding state action, but provides a deeper understanding of social action. 
This is pace Putman, Katzenstein, Krasner who suggest that the personal desire for 
power and the domestic constraints of the party are the key determinants in 
explaining his/her actions.
Moreover, treating the Soviet state as unitary is also questionable. Although there is 
no space to explore this in detail, there is evidence in the historical literature to
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suggest otherwise. For instance, there were different military options put forward by 
the Soviet military, which varied in their attitudes and strategies towards the 
Romanian state from interventionist to more ‘laissez-faire’(Braun, 1978, p. 94). 
These attitudes matched the different ideational interpretations of Marxism- 
Intemationalism.
In conclusion, explanations regarding the nature of Romanian foreign policy should 
aim to integrate broader social processes, which may not be actively invoked by 
political actors as reasons for acting. Focusing upon the personal reasons leaders 
might have for acting leaves only partially answered the question of what facilitated 
and constituted Romanian state agency in relation to ‘foreign’ others.
It must be said that for each of the above positions of the Romanian state 
internationally mentioned at the beginning of Part 1, a detailed and thorough analysis 
would be needed to appropriately and accurately show the processes behind each of 
the stands. In what follows, I will discuss these questions in relation to the goal of 
economic development through industrialisation and the goal of debt payment.
7.2.3. Industrialisation and debt payment as ‘independent’ foreign 
policy goals
The claim in this section is that the foreign policy goals of the Romanian state were 
emergent from the confluence of socialist and capitalist social practices and social 
relations, which involved intertwined symbolic-material processes. These social
208 Braun writes that ‘Romania was faced with both tolerant and intolerant influential Soviet military 
leaders.’
spaces constituted the Romanian state as an actor with differentiated agential 
potential. This section specifically discusses industrialisation as the main foreign 
policy goal of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s and the debt payment as the goal of 
the 1980s.
Economic development through industrialisation
Economic development through industrialisation was one of the general ‘foreign’ 
policy goals that the Romanian state pursued during the period in question from the 
1960s until the 1980s. This policy goal is regarded by the historical literature as a 
‘challenge’ to the USSR mostly because the USSR was the driving engine of the 
Comecon. The CMEA, the socialist equivalent of a common market, was based on 
the principle of ‘international division of labour’.209 According to this division of 
labour, Romania was to become a prime exporter of agricultural products. The goal 
was also seen as a means for Ceausescu to increase his legitimacy (Linden, Spring 
1986).
Industrialisation was one of the comer tenets of socialist principles. It not only meant 
economic material development but it was also intended to secure the reproduction 
of a socialist state. The policy strengthened the reproduction of a socialist state 
because it resulted in an increase in the number of workers. This explains the 
interest of the formal network in pursuing such a goal. Additionally, the emergent 
nationalism and version of Marxism-Leninism in the 1960s incorporated
209 Khrushchev launched this plan in 1962 but the plan never achieved implementation.
210 This was important since the working class was formally regarded as the avant-garde force in the 
process of achieving a communist society.
200
industrialisation as a matter of social and national development as well as an 
essential condition for the stability of the socialist bloc.
Industrialisation and increased production in manufactured goods was also a way to 
increase the pool of material resources that the centre of the formal network could 
dispose of. This is because manufactured goods offered a better return than 
agricultural products. The social practices and policies portrayed in the first part, 
such as overestimation of production and needs, cadre rotation, upward revision of 
five-year plans by the centre, were fuelling the need to pursue further 
industrialisation.
Industrialisation, as an independent policy goal against the Comecon suggestions, 
resulted in a favourable relationship with Western governments and banks. The 
pursuit of this goal could be regarded as one of the conditions for a positive 
relationship with the West. During these years, the Romanian state became a 
member of international financial institutions. At the same time, industrialisation as 
a foreign policy goal was enabled by other factors such as detente, the West German 
Ostpolitik and the favourable global economic environment (Braun, 1978). Access to 
Western financial and technological markets was central to pursing such a goal, as 
industrialisation required policies of investment of capital and technology. Such 
trends were enhanced by the social processes and practices discussed above, such as 
overestimation of needs, upward revision of five-year plans and so forth. 
Industrialisation was both an outcome of Romanian state action, but also a premise 
that enabled good relationships with the West, the relationship being central to the 
pursuit of the goal.
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Western capital was forecasted to contribute fourteen percent or 3 billion dollars to 
the five year investment plan of 1971 -  1975 (Braun, 1978, p. 26). The favourable 
loans from the World Bank and IMF and the commercial and governmental loans 
financed the trade deficit211 and the investment plans (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 354). 
The trade with capitalist countries exceeded by 1974 the trade with the countries of 
the Comecon (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 360). They reflected and produced at the 
same time the Romanian state as economically strong and as a politically reliable 
partner.
The circular logic of keeping the balance of trade positive or close to zero, that is, 
exports at least equal to imports, stimulated industrialisation. Borrowing money in 
the pursuit of industrialisation meant that exports needed to increase for two reasons: 
keeping a positive balance of trade and getting the hard currency needed to repay 
loans. In its turn, export capacity was to be achieved through excessively increasing 
the oil-refining capacity, which then fed the necessity to import higher quantities of 
crude oil. More foreign loans were needed to pay for the imports. Since 1970, 
Romania became a net importer for instance of crude oil from the Arab world and 
Iran (Braun, 1978, pp. 27 - 28). Each of these conditions was reinforcing each other 
in feedback loops. In this light, although the decisions to increase oil refinery 
capacity is attributed to Ceausescu, the logic of economic processes seems to suggest 
that the Romanian state’s foreign policy goal was emergent out of the relationship 
between socialist and capitalist social relations and practices. These relations and 
practices are constitutive social spaces of the Romanian foreign policy goals.
211 By 1978, the trade deficit with the least developed countries was 600 million dollars and 800 
million dollars with Western states. (Linden, Spring 1986)
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The debt payment -  the policy goal of the 1980s
Paying the debt became the new foreign policy goal of the Romanian state from the 
1980s onwards. The industrialisation policy, as an expression of economic 
development, was however, not abandoned (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 362). Paying 
the debt was a decision attributed to Ceausescu. Ceausescu’s perceptions of the 
Romanian position after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, for instance, were given 
central stage in explaining the policies. Linden writes that the ‘effects of the [1973] 
crisis were not enough to “shake” Ceausescu’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 372).
This section looks at the mechanisms that triggered the change in foreign policy 
goals and the consequences of pursuing such a goal for the position of the Romanian 
state internationally. In doing so, it challenges the over-emphasis on leaders as well 
as the over-emphasis on the structure of world economy as exclusive explanations 
for the position of the Romanian state.
The prognosis of growth in the five-year plan of 1976-80 was dissociated from the 
economic recession tendencies felt in Western Europe after the first oil shock. The 
fact that international lenders continued to lend money to the Romanian state and oil 
suppliers, especially Iran, continued to sell, contributed to the plan of 1976-80. 
Romania had also just received ‘the most favoured nation status’ in 1975 from the 
USA (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 361). It is worth restating here two things. Firstly, that 
the plan was the result of more than top-down decision-making, as demonstrated in 
the first part of the chapter. Secondly, that industrialisation as a goal worth pursing
212 Iran was Romania’s main oil supplier. The situation changed after 1979, with the Iranian 
revolution and the Iran-Iraq war (1980 -1988). The immediate and long-term consequence of those 
events was the reduction of oil exports towards Romania due to inconstant levels o f production. The 
oil from other markets was very expensive (Deletant, 1999b: 125).
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was not only an outcome of the relationship with the West but also a condition for 
action. It constituted the Romanian state as a reliable actor that could sustain such 
development.
Repaying the hard currency loans, which sponsored the industrialisation plans -  
prior to the decision to make the debt payment central to foreign policy -  had not 
been achievable. Repayment of the loans was dependent on high exports. However, 
exports were low due to several reasons such as the reduced consumption in the 
West and least developed countries after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises; the reduced 
productivity of Romanian labour by the early 1980s (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 362); 
and the poor quality of Romanian products (V erdery, 1991, p. 82). The quality of the 
products was due to the reduced investment on behalf of the centre, the concomitant 
waste of resources in the production process and reduced import of technology from 
the West. Since exports were low due to these conditions, then imports had to be 
kept low for the sake of the balance of trade. Keeping imports low exacerbated the 
problem of production and the quality of products and the ability to obtain hard 
currency. The manner in which these factors fed back and forward into each other 
illustrates the non-linear feature of social action.
By 1981, the Romanian state accumulated a foreign debt of 10.5 billion dollars, of
0 1 'Xwhich 10 billion dollars were owed in hard currency (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 
367). In 1982 and 1983, the Romanian state agreed on rescheduling its loans from 
foreign banks and governments. The debt repayment had become a formal foreign 
policy goal. The payment of the debt was to be achieved through the reduction of 
imports, the reduction of domestic consumption of food, electricity, and petrol, and
213 The debt had been 3,6 billion dollars in 1977(Deletant, 1999b, p. 125). From 1981, the Romanian 
state did not take any commercial loans although it continued to borrow from the IMF and the World 
Bank until 1983.
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redirection of goods previously meant for internal consumption towards exports 
(Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986).
Several factors enabled the change of the main foreign policy goal. One such factor 
was the inability of the state to obtain hard currency. This in itself was the result of 
several other processes as described above. Secondly, defaulting on the debt was not 
an option the Romanian state considered. Defaulting on a loan was internationally 
recognised as a sign of substantial weakness on behalf of a state. Such an action 
would have changed the premises of the relationship between the Romanian state 
and other states and international organisations.214
The Romanian leadership regarded the payment of the debt as a mechanism that 
could prevent interference in the economic policy-making of the state (see; Verdery, 
1991; Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986). According to the discourse of the 
leadership, the Romanian state would have maintained its ability to determine 
internally its policies and course of action as well as its position internationally.
This links in with a third enabling condition for the shift in the policy goal: the 
construction of the Romanian state as a ‘developing state’. In 1976, Romania’s 
candidacy to G77 was accepted and it became a formal member. The historical 
literature identifies Ceausescu as the ‘initiator’ of the Romanian discourse against 
foreign capital. Linden argues that ‘Ceausescu began to see the Romanian economy 
as becoming hostage to the very economic forces that had helped it develop’ or 
‘Ceausescu began to complain about “new forms of exploitation including those of 
financial capital’” (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 375). Without going into the details of
214 Poland announced that it may default on its foreign debt in March 1981. On the problems arising 
from a threat o f default see (Lowenfeld, March 1988).
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the politics of the G77, it is worth noting that this type of discourse was common 
amongst the G77 member states (Kennedy, 2006, pp. 122 -128). It is then possible 
to conceive of the fact that there were more complex processes involved in such a 
discourse becoming predominant at the time.
Fourthly, the natural disasters of 1980 and 1981 (earthquake and floods) amplified 
the economic problems. They disrupted industrial production and food production 
and decreased the quantity exported. These contingent events made more pressing 
the need to change the foreign policy goal. Lastly, the existence of a critical mass of 
formally reproductive agents allowed the centre of the formal network to change and 
pursue the new goal.
After 1984, the Romanian state could have reconsidered the policy of debt payment. 
This is because funds became more available, especially government credits from 
the West, the USA included, and increasingly more from commercial banks (Woods 
& Oechsler, June 9, 1986). The explanation for the persistence of the goal of debt 
repayment is unanimously attributed to the leader. A study released by the U.S 
Department of Commerce noted that ‘part of the continuing decline in the region's 
[Eastern Europe’s] commercial debt is attributable to a conscious decision by some 
East European nations to further reduce outstanding debt levels’(Woods & Oechsler, 
June 9,1986).
The explanation provided above regarding the enabling conditions, which led to the 
change in the foreign policy goal, makes evident the need to see the actions of the 
state as more than a reflection of Ceausescu’s intentions. The persistence in pursing 
the debt repayment goal was indeed sanctioned by the leadership. However, I
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consider the broader social networks in which the Romanian political elite 
participated, such as the G77, as equally important. The relationship that enabled a 
position of the Romanian state as a reliable actor, which could pay the debt, was also 
more important to the Romanian leadership. At the same time, one has to recall that 
the centre of the formal network had never been seriously challenged as most 
citizens acted formally as reproductive agents of the social relations.
The pursuit of the debt payment goal constituted the Romanian state in two opposite 
ways in relation to the Western governments and banks: as a still reliable state as 
well as an oppressive and weak state. The position depended on the type of social 
relations and practices that became relevant in the relations with foreign others.
The pursuit o f the debt payment goal through strategies such as limiting internal 
consumption and redirecting goods from the internal market towards exports made 
more evident the fact that the state was weak economically. Paradoxically, it was a 
reliable economic partner since its repayment commitments were kept. By 1984, the 
debt was reduced from 10.5 billion dollars to 7.5 billion dollars (Linden, Spring 
1986, p. 376). Directing resources towards the payment of the debt meant that the 
inputs into production were drastically diminished. The allocative capacity of the 
centre was disrupted and so was the access of lower nodes to such resources. Even 
loyal networks of party members, bureaucrats and the military found it more difficult 
to access resources (Crowther, 1989; Stoica, 2006, p. 217). This intensified the 
practices of over-estimation of needs (Verdery, 1991, p. 100). The non-fulfilment of 
the five-year production plans brought about more top-down restrictions. For 
instance, workers were penalised through lower wages (Deletant, 1999b).
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Terror as a practice for keeping the formal organisation of the state unchallenged 
was becoming more visible. Dissent become frequent -  the miners strikes from 
1977, 1983 and the workers strikes of 1986 and 1987 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 132). 
Illegal networks, from the perspective of the formal network, which Romanians from 
within or abroad formed, made more evident the fact that challenging practices had 
been constitutive of the state.215 The actual numbers of openly challenging actors to 
the formal social relations, institutions, and practices were not as high as in Poland, 
or as well organised. However, they were constitutive of the state in at least two 
ways: by virtue of the coercive and repressive practices that the state had to sustain 
in order to minimise their influence, and, secondly, by influencing the manner in 
which Western actors related to the Romanian state. Such practices acquired an 
important weight in defining the Romanian state and its position internationally 
within the context of a US foreign policy, for instance, that placed human rights at 
the centre of their agenda 216(Bachman, 1989; Pilon, June 26,1985). It constituted 
the Romanian state as an oppressive state.
To conclude, the discussion of the goal of economic development through 
industrialisation and payment of debt aimed to provide grounds for an explanation of 
Romanian foreign policy that avoided the voluntarism and determinism inherent in 
the historical accounts. This explanation acknowledges the role of human agents and 
the fact that there were options available. It also acknowledges the role of broader 
social processes in enabling such goals and the role of contingent events. The 
discussion has demonstrated the relational nature of the foreign policy goal of debt
215 Free Europe and Voice of America were two formal institutions involved in these networks. Here 
the inside-outside distinction is difficult to make. These institutions, although part of the 
establishment of other states, were actually run by the Romanian diaspora and the contributors were 
often from within Romania.
216 This becomes more predominant during the Carter administration (1977-1981). I am not making 
here any claim about the coherence of this aspect of US foreign policy in terms o f practice.
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repayment. The potential to act of the Romanian state in a certain way was enabled 
by networks of social relations, practices and human agents across the domestic- 
international divide.
This second part of the chapter has built on the analysis of the first part to discuss the 
issue of the nature of Romanian foreign policy and the specific goals of 
industrialisation and debt payment. The first section assessed the explanations put 
forward by the political histories. It unveiled and questioned the logic of these 
explanations and their silent ontological assumptions. The second section provided 
an alternative position on the question of ‘independence’ of foreign policy goals by 
pointing to the empirical elements that could sustain such an account. The section 
also debated the necessity or the relevance of focusing on independence vs. 
dependence in explanations of Romanian state action. The final section discussed the 
foreign policy goal of industrialisation and the payment of the national debt. It 
suggested contra the accounts put forward in the literature that state action and state 
goals were emergent of social spaces across the domestic-international divide. It also 
illustrated the manner in which such social relations, practices, and specific 
historical contexts constituted the Romanian state as (a) differentiated actor in terms 
of agential potential.
Conclusion
During the period 1965 -  1980s, the centralising tendencies of the state increased 
through a wide range of policies and practices that affected the functioning and 
design of state institutions. Ideational resources -  Marxist-Leninist principles and the 
national idea-w ere informing these tendencies. The formal organisational structure
of the state was set to be pyramid-like, with concentration of decision-making at the 
top, and lower institutions having only reproductive or implementation functions. In 
this respect, the Romanian state would fit the description of Castells’ ‘modem’ state, 
as lower nodes had formally no input into the orientation policies would take.
In the first part of the chapter, I have shown that even such states are in fact network­
like in the production of meaning, in the functioning of the administration and in the 
production of material resources. In spite of the centralising organisational structure 
of the state, the logic of the social relations unpinning the policies and institutions of 
the state enabled several types of networks to constitute the state. When all these 
aspects were taken into account, the conclusion was that totalitarian states are not 
constituted only by top-down processes, even though they are hierarchical in terms 
of organisation.
‘Lower’ nodes had an intricate mix of reproductive-transformative agency. Human 
agents were subverting the agentic potentialities associated with a presumably 
unified state although not directly challenging the formal network. Such practices 
constituted the state as a contradictory actor in terms of agentic potentialities and 
capabilities. Such processes would fit Castells’ definition of a network state as lower 
nodes did have the agency to act within the boundaries of the ‘network logic.’ A 
relational approach to analysing the state broadened the understanding of the 
constitution of the Romanian state as an actor internationally. It allowed the 
discussion to focus on the networks of actors and relationships emerging through 
practice rather than be limited to the formal organisation of the state.
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The analysis has shifted the focus from individual leaders as the direct cause of 
events. It has argued that state actions and goals were emergent out of multiple 
social processes across the domestic-international divide. They were not pre­
constituted in the sense of an objective national goal or one stemming from the 
leader. In this light, the acts of separate individuals alone could not account for the 
type of agentic properties the Romanian state had within specific contexts. The 
discussion throughout illustrated the non-linear aspect of social action. The analysis 
illustrated the manner in which goals and state action were not the direct 
consequence of one or more human agents. They were rather the consequence of 
overlapping social processes and practices that feed back and forward to account for 
the position of the state. The explanation developed in this chapter illustrates the 
claim that there should not be an a priori preference for inside-outside or outside- 
inside causal explanations, as the authors in the first chapters propose.
The understanding of goal formation in the historical accounts is underpinned by a 
specific understanding of instrumental rational action. A pre-constituted self that 
rationally takes decisions when faced with a well bounded other in order to promote 
the national interest and/or in order to accrue the leader’s power. My analysis raises 
questions also about the tenability of claiming a stable self for the state. This is 
because for each goal or state action the state constitutes itself at the confluence of 
social relations, practices, and new contexts. As such, a differentiation between role 
identities and a stable self (a la Wendt) become becomes difficult to sustain when 
aiming to explain state action. It also places action and goals as emergent from 
networks of social relations, practices, and historical contexts. The self, which is 
epitomised by the leader, the centre, or the elites, does not control nor cause in any 
direct sense the goals, as the explanations that favour linear causality have implied.
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The explanations provided in this chapter avoid the reification of certain type of 
relations or elements, such as sovereignty, territory, and population while 
simultaneously acknowledging that practice can be reproductive. Different 
symbolic-ideational spaces and networks of human agents, which did not follow the 
legal or territorial inside-outside distinction, informed the agency of the Romanian 
state. Sovereignty, for instance might offer recognition of the state as an actor 
internationally, but it does not exclusively nor essentially enable states to act. The 
analysis showed that agential potential is networked and differentiated depending on 
the type of relations drawn on during the transactions. In this light, the ‘hypocrisy’ of 
the state (sic! Krasner) is in fact a way of admitting that state agency is relational: 
depending on the relations involved in the transactions and contexts in which 
transactions take place. As such, state agency can be considered non-unitary.
In the case of the Romanian state, labels such as ‘socialist’, ‘maverick’, 
‘developing’, ‘dictatorship’, were not mere ‘role’ identities or instrumental ones, 
which are used in a controlled manner as suggested by some of the historical 
literature. Rather, they were examples of how the boundaries between the inside and 
the outside were being negotiated in relation to different or even the same ‘foreign’ 
others. This is because such state positions involve social relations and practices in a 
different manner. A focus on the ‘developing’ element would suggest, if we were to 
follow Sorensen’s typology, a state with low agential potential and a blurry inside- 
outside distinction due to the reliance on international banks and institutions. 
Organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, the G77 and other states were 
important to the process of constitution of the Romanian state. On the other hand, a 
‘maverick’ position makes the distinction outside-inside more prominent and
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suggests that the inside of the entity has the agency to impose its decisions in spite of 
the environment (Cold War) or others (USSR). The chapter has argued that even the 
claims of ‘maverick’ and independent policy should be reframed in order to 
acknowledge the relational aspects of state action across the inside-outside divide, 
despite the discourse of the Romanian state on non-intervention and sovereignty in 
its foreign policy documents, which emphasised this divide.
The discussion of the goal of debt payment has illustrated the manner in which 
multiple relations and practices constituted the Romanian state as an actor with 
differentiated agential potential. The decision of the leadership to pay the debt and 
continue doing so during the 1980s seems to illustrate the point made by Krasner 
about the state as an autonomous entity from other social forces, which can 
internally produce goals. However, the exposition of the mechanisms by which 
payment of debt became a foreign policy goal has revealed that goal formation was 
the outcome of relational practices and contingent factors. The goal repayment 
constituted the Romanian state as a reliable actor internationally. It also constituted 
the state as weak and oppressive.
By demonstrating the complexity of the social processes involved in the constitution 
of the Romanian state as a non-unitary actor, the analysis rejects the accounts that 
identify one main relationship (e.g. state-society for instance) as the cause for the
7 1 7agential potential of the state internationally. The analysis also suggests, pace 
Sorensen, that one should not associate a type of state with a specific agential 
potential - for instance, developing states as weak actors internationally and post­
modern states as strong. States that are constituted by practices such as the reliance
217 For instance, Gourevitch and Hobson argue that the more the links with society, the higher the 
agential potential internationally whereas Krasner argues the opposite.
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on international funds are not exclusively weak internationally. My analysis has 
shown that the Romanian state found itself in both positions at the same time. It also 
showed that the state was in a good position to negotiate foreign loans because its 
‘independent’ relationship to the USSR was also informing the relationship the West 
had with Romania.
The chapter has also exposed the type of assumptions underpinning the political 
histories of the period. While these histories are rich in detail about the events of the 
two decades, the narrative style often exposes ontological and analytic preferences 
for pluralist and statist assumptions. Thus, while my analysis makes the case 
indirectly for the role of historically informed analysis, it argues against the type of 
ontological assumptions that silently inform many historical accounts. 
Anthropological writings on the communist societies and economics literature have 
proved central in making the case for the network nature of a totalitarian modem 
state.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
The thesis started by claiming that the discipline of IR is arranged around the 
concept of the state even when theories dispute to different degrees the ontological 
and/or analytical utility of the concept. Postmodern writers such as Bartelson 
maintain the difficulty of transcending the state-centric discourse about reality. He 
argues, for instance, that there is an inevitable circularity when aiming to escape the 
representational space constituted by the state or a state-centric discourse. This is 
because the state has been both the starting point of any theorising, that is, the 
representation of political order, as well as its object of analysis. The rationalist and 
constructivist theories discussed in this thesis propose different working assumptions 
and starting points for the conceptualisation of the state and of state agency. FPA 
theories, for instance, emphasise the role of leaders, the elites, the bureaucracies, and 
interest groups in determining political outcomes. Nonetheless, explanations of 
international politics come with an assumption that it is states that do the acting 
internationally. When attributing an ontological or an analytical status to the state 
internationally, such theories treat states as corporate persons. Systemic theories, 
such as the Wendtian one, justify the personification of the state and the assumption 
that its agency is unitary as necessary conditions for explaining international politics. 
States as persons, and state agency as unitary, presupposes a conception of entities 
with a coherent and well defined inside. Furthermore, the everyday language that 
refers to state action is evocative of such assumptions and legitimises, according to 
these authors, such theoretical moves. It is not difficult to find reports that resort to 
personifications -  states feel anger, humiliation, etc, or articles that identify the
leaders (such as presidents, prime-ministers, or elites) as the main cause for a 
specific action of a state internationally.
The thesis acknowledges the need to still speak of states as actors for explanatory 
reasons. Nevertheless, it has posed the question of whether it is justified to explain 
state action as if states are the sum of individuals, leaders, elites, top bureaucracies 
or as if states are persons. This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to maintain 
a concept of agency while rejecting essentialist personifying assumptions about the 
state. It has argued for explanations of politics that are premised on recognition of 
the different ontological status of states and human agents. It has proposed a 
conception of the state as a relational and emergent network actor and a conception 
of state agency that is non-unitary, differentiated, and diffused.
The argument has been built in several incremental steps. It started with an 
immanent critique of various IR theories. It then suggested that the inconsistencies 
identified in these theories are due to their essentialist understandings of social 
entities (individuals and socially complex actors) and agency. The thesis rejected the 
conceptualisations of the state that rely on translating assumptions about the 
properties of biological kinds, such as unchangeable features and well determined 
boundaries, to socially complex actors. It also argued against the translation of 
human properties, such as unitary intentionality and agency, and emotions, to such 
entities. Based on this critique, the project proposed a re-framing of such concepts 
using the insights of relational sociology and process philosophy as well as the work 
of Wight on agents and structures. The thesis has then contended that the concept of 
a network is more appropriate to frame understandings of socially complex actors. 
The analysis then showed how the language of networks and of complexity science
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could be used to conceptualise the state and state agency. The case studies fulfilled 
two interrelated purposes. Firstly, they illustrated the manner in which the 
framework can be put to work to reframe the historical explanations regarding 
Romanian regime change and the actions of a highly centralised state. Secondly, 
they reinforced the theoretical claims about the network, relational and emergent 
features of the state.
In what follows, I will go through the steps just mentioned in order to outline the 
main points that the thesis has put forward.
The critique of a wide range of IR theories has revealed the internal inconsistencies 
of these theories as well as the mismatches between their theoretical claims and the 
empirical analyses of authors such as Krasner, Keohane and Nye, and Hobson. 
Equally important, the analysis identified the interesting avenues that were worth 
exploring more systematically when conceptualising the state as an actor.
The discussion has shown that, in spite of the different starting points, statist and 
pluralist accounts of the state end up with similar conceptualisations of the state and 
state agency. They also share similar problems when, for instance, they 
conceptualise the international and the domestic as fundamentally different and self- 
contained social spaces; or when they emphasise material structures as the main 
sources of state action. My analysis has shown, for instance, that the FPA writers 
start with the state as a sum of interests or by identifying the state with the negotiator 
or leaders, while at the same time working with a silent assumption of the state as a 
corporate actor. On the other hand, Krasner’s statist argument relies on an 
assumption of states as instrumental and unified actors but his conception of the state
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as a unified actor becomes problematic when applied to empirical analysis, as his 
own empirical analysis reveals. Keohane et al. define the state as a multi-issue entity, 
which allows for the inclusion of different social spaces, such as the subnational or 
transnational, within the explanations of state action. However, the analysis argued 
that the potential of a conceptualisation of the state as non-unitary in its agential 
potential is inconsistently pursued. For example, Keohane et al.’s understanding of 
the political process as bargaining relations narrows, for instance, the understanding 
of the sources of state constitution and state action.
The constructivist ontology that informs the conceptualisations of the state in the 
third chapter allows for the integration of ideational factors within the theoretical and 
empirical works. History also becomes an important coordinate to frame the 
understandings of the state and its agency. The analysis acknowledged the 
theoretical potential of conceptualisations of the state that discussed state agency as 
varied and informed by different social spaces and the desirability of multi-causal 
explanations.
Some important issues have emerged out of the critical discussion of these theories. 
My discussion questioned, for example, the explanatory payoffs of treating states as 
persons endowed with a sense of self. It also problematised the analytical focus on 
ideal types, which enforces the traditional disjunction between the international and 
the domestic and the classical view of social entities. The analysis also revealed the 
tensions between the theoretical frameworks and the empirical analyses. It 
suggested, for instance, that Hobson’s theoretical preference for multi-causal 
explanation is limited by the focus on material factors and by the over-emphasis of 
the state-society relationship as the main relationship informing state agency.
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The analysis then demonstrated that the inconsistencies identified in the analysis of 
IR and FPA theories are due to an essentialist understanding of social entities, social 
action, and agency. Relational elements are present especially in the constructivist 
and historical sociological theories. My analysis showed that essentialist 
assumptions were responsible for making the theories internally inconsistent, since 
conceptualisation of entities, agency and social spaces were shifting between 
essentialist and relational understandings. They also accounted for the discrepancies 
between the conceptual frameworks and empirical analysis.
For instance, the pluralist accounts offer a conception of the state as a non-unitary 
actor. At the same time, the international and the domestic are seen as autonomous, 
self-contained and having idiosyncratic properties. As mentioned, a silent conception 
of state agency as unitary underwrites the explanations of international politics 
provided by the pluralist accounts. These two last claims are expressions of 
essentialist conceptions of social spaces and agency. They reinforce a claim about 
the state as a unitary and an autonomous actor, which contradicts their initial 
definition. This means that these theories do not match their conception of entities 
with their conceptions of social spaces and state agency. Similar scrutiny has been 
applied to all of the other rationalist and constructivist theories. In some cases, such 
as Krasner’s, the insights of the empirical argument suggests an understanding of the 
state as a less coherent actor with interests that are not exclusively internally 
constituted.
The thesis argued at this point for a shift in the ontological foundations informing the 
conceptualisation of social entities and agency in order to overcome the
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shortcomings identified thus far. Process philosophy and relational sociology, as 
well as Wight’s work on agents and structures, have been central to such a move.
The thesis explored the implications of a relational and processual ontology for 
thinking about structurally complex actors such as the state. It has discussed the 
notions of social relations, social selves, and agency. A relational view advocates 
that the constitution and potential of individuals as agents depends on the type of 
relations and processes within which they are engaged. Social relations are regarded 
as constitutive of actors rather than something in which pre-constituted agents 
engage. The analysis treated the subjectivity and reflexivity of individuals as socially 
embedded. It also argued that individuals are specific due to their subjective 
interpretation of social relations and positioning within social contexts. This position 
is different from the one that differentiates between a self or T  and social identities 
or roles because it places both within social contexts. Using the social and 
psychological views of the individual self, the argument suggested that unity or 
coherence are not natural features of individuals. It concluded that if anti-essentialist 
propositions apply to individuals then they should also underpin conceptualisations 
of structurally complex actors.
Chapter 4 proposed a view of the state as de-centred or non-unitary and without a 
stable self. It argued that state agency is social, relational, and non-unitary in 
character. It defined the state in terms of historically specific social relations, 
practices, and meanings. It argued that human agents reproduce, change or reshape 
(intentionally or not) the boundaries of the state through their practices. Social 
relations, which are existent and emergent through practices, inform different types 
of agential potential associated with states.
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The thesis argued that the concept of the network allows for the conceptual 
acknowledgement of the relational view of social entities. It showed that the concept 
offers a more flexible sense of boundaries -  multiple spaces (i.e. insides and 
outsides) and roles, and an understanding of agency that takes them into account. 
The argument also claimed that the concept opens up the conceptual space to 
acknowledge the contingencies of state forms, such as modem, post-modem, weak, 
or strong, and the shifting of ‘outsides’ and ‘insides’. States as networks denoted not 
only overlapping social relations and practices but also the networks of actors 
embedded simultaneously in several of these social spaces. Thus, while legally the 
state is unified in time and space, it exists in multiple spaces and times.
My analysis in Chapter 5 made a case, pace Castells, for states as hierarchical 
networks, due to the formal institutional arrangement and to the uneven access to 
resources and decision-making. My discussion of power as present in social relations 
strengthened the view of networks as hierarchical. I have argued that networks can 
involve impersonal authority and top-down decision making.
The thesis has contended that the conceptualisation of states as networks makes 
necessary the focus on multiple spaces. It also involves an understanding of 
individuals as nodes in more than one network. On this account, the project has 
argued against a strong differentiation between the inside of the entity and the 
environment when it comes to social networks. Such a differentiation would be 
entitled by the literature that considers networks to be complex systems, and, as 
such, autopoietic entities. The autopoiesis assumption applied to social networks 
would mean considering networks as self-organising and self-producing. It would
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also make change internally determined and not specified by the environment (i.e. by 
the outside). The analysis pointed to the theoretical implications of this assumption 
for the reification of relations and spaces in IR theory (for example, the reification of 
the domestic, of the corporate self, and of the national interest). The argument 
suggested that the network analysis literature proposed a more adequate conception 
of social boundaries, focusing on the multiple social spaces constituting the network.
Chapter 6 used this new framing of the state to challenge historical accounts that 
present or suggest a conception of the Romanian state that can be clearly delimited, 
such as those that frame the narrative in terms of the Romanian state vs. the Soviets 
and/or the Romanian state submissive to the Soviets. The chapter on regime change 
illustrated the networks of social relations constituting the Romanian state formally, 
illicitly and informally. It identified the agential potential associated with different 
networks such as communists, peasants, and top politicians. It also argued that the 
historical information that is usually relegated to the status of ‘context’, such as 
illicit practices, exclusionary politics and so forth, constituted important social 
spaces. These social spaces informed the constitution of the state. Based on these 
multiple insides, the discussion also showed the differentiated agential potential of 
the Romanian state during the pre-1944 years. The chapter provided an explanation 
that did not treat the state as a taken-for-granted object, but rather as a dynamic 
entity.
Chapter 6 has also illustrated the difficulty of settling what constituted the ‘inside’ 
and the ‘outside’ of the Romanian state. The same actors belonged to Romanian as 
well as ‘Soviet’ institutions and social networks. I argued that characterising a 
decision as ‘internal’ may face challenges in the light of the difficulty of settling
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whether specific agents (or even institutions) could be considered as being part of 
the ‘inside’ or the ‘outside’ of the state. I used the examples of the Allied High 
Commission in Romania, as well as of the networks in which Romanian communists 
were implicated. I argued, for instance, that the Allied High Commission in Romania 
was constitutive of the Romanian state, rather than ‘hijacking’ the state. The 
discussion of the issue of ‘independent’ foreign policy in Chapter 7 has made a 
similar point about the problematic aspect of considering the policies of the 
Romanian state as internally or externally produced and determined. More generally, 
it is likely that state action can be deemed simultaneously independent and 
(interdependent, instrumental and normative, and so forth, depending on the type of 
relations and processes regarded as relevant by the observer or by political actors
n i o
within a specific political context.
Pace the FPA and IR theories discussed in the thesis, I have argued that it is possible 
to maintain a concept of agency while rejecting essentialist personifying assumptions 
about the state. These latter assumptions have created internal inconsistencies in the 
Wendtian theory, for instance, and limited its explanatory potential. The thesis has 
developed an understanding of state agency that relies on constitutive and 
behavioural effects rather than on the existence of unitary intentionality. Having 
defined states as specific social relations re-produced and transformed through social 
practices, one can consider states as having the ability to constitute as well as to 
cause social action. States as causative entities means that states have the ‘capacity 
to do’. I have argued that the state can be an actor if agency is understood as the 
ability to create effects. The understanding of state agency has been broadened to 
incorporate a constitutive function as well.
218 This means, for instance, that associating ‘interdependence’ as a feature o f the ‘international’ in 
modernity, as Keohane and Nye do, makes sense only if we refer to the intensity of transactions.
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I have argued that the blurred relationship between human agents and states as actors 
makes the translation of human attributes to states a likely and common move in the 
theories discussed. The potential similarities between persons and the state have also 
been enabled by the legal definition of the state. Territory, amongst other elements, 
has been central to the legal definition of the state as a legal person. Based on such 
reasoning, state agency has been considered unitary, while states have been 
considered coherent, person-like entities. The existence of an institutional ‘memory’, 
through procedures and reports, has also prompted analogies with persons. The 
thesis argued that, if the essentialist view of social spaces and social entities such as 
individuals were reconsidered, then the concept of unitary, person-like state agency 
would also need to be reconsidered. The language to discuss state agency would also 
need to be changed. As stated earlier, the initial justification for such a conceptual 
move was related to the explanatory limits and the internal inconsistencies created 
by treating states as persons, unitary in their agential potential, and in treating social 
spaces as self-contained and internally determined.
The thesis argued that attribution of agency to the state in virtue of its legal standing 
is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for understanding state action. State 
agency is justified aside from the legal provision by provisions that do not 
necessarily need to involve the same attributes (intentionality, reasoning) as a 
person, but rather the ability to reconstitute itself and to create effects. State agency, 
as defined in the thesis, can be exercised without a link between the unitary 
intentionality enabled by collective beliefs and by a top-down decision-making 
apparatus. Such a proposition is supported by the literature on types of state, which 
indicates that network states, informational states, or postmodern states, can indeed
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be decentralised in the manner I suggest, yet still be efficient and able to act (for 
instance, to pursue foreign policy goals). In chapter 7, the argument has established, 
for instance, that the homogenous symbolic-ideational space premised on resources, 
such as the national idea and Marxism-Leninism, was only one of the constitutive 
spaces of Romanian state agency. The conceptualisation of state agency proposed 
here aims to maintain the ontological differentiation between individual and state 
agency. I argued, for instance, that state agency is socially constructed through the 
discursive and behavioural social practices of individual agents. I will return to this 
issue below.
State agency as practice dependent makes state agency reliant on human agency. 
Following Wight, the framework acknowledges the role of human intentionality, 
reflexivity, and action in reproducing and changing the social relations constituting 
the state and informing particular state functions, goals or actions. The thesis 
proposes several inter-related facets of human agency on which state agency in its 
constitutive and behavioural moments relies. Human agency can be constitutive, 
representational, and transformative of social practices and of structurally complex 
actors. The facets of human agency suggested in Chapter 4 can also be taken to 
reflect the more general claim that the human self is relational and non-unitary, i.e. it 
is constituted by contradictory and multiple roles. I have used the network analysis 
literature to enhance this understanding of human agency. My discussion in Chapter 
5 took the facets of human agency as suggestive of different forms of power -  
institutional or more broadly structural power. The different forms of power make 
human agency varied and differentiated. Human agents reproduce and challenge 
social relations and, consequently, specific forms of power, which constitute states.
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Individuals can be nodes in different social networks and, as such, acquire different 
agential potential. They can be simultaneously followers and brokers, or catalysts in 
the language of complexity science, who initiate transformation. In this context, I 
have also argued that individuals maintain a potential to have transformative agency 
even if they do not occupy formal institutional positions. State agency relies not only 
on the role agents take in formal institutions. Notions of reproductive, 
representational and transformative human agency lie at the foundation of state 
agency.
Both Chapter 6 and 7 have shown the importance of human agents in their roles of 
constitutive, representational and transformative agents to enable different social 
practices and relations as constitutive of the Romanians state. For example, in the 
period after 1944, a swift change in social practices, institutions and social relations 
more broadly could have not occurred without the removal or marginalisation from 
institutional positions of a critical mass of human actors. A considerable change in 
the number of agents reproducing a social-liberal state was aimed at changing the 
existing social practices and, consequently, enforcing new social relations. The 
analysis has also pointed to the qualitative changes in these types of agency. For 
instance, the logic underpinning reproductive agency experienced a shift from the 
pre-war to the post-war years. Limiting the access to resources rather than increasing 
it represented the means by which reproduction of the formal institutions was to be 
ensured. This qualitative shift was central amongst other factors to the proliferation 
of illicit and illegal practices and to the emergence of a particular form of 
transformative agency for nodes placed in lower positions in the formal 
organisational apparatus.
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I have argued that the relationship between human agents (such as leaders, 
bureaucrats, politicians) and the state has remained under-explored in the FPA and 
IR writing discussed in the thesis. My conceptualisation of the state relies on 
distinguishing between individual and state agency. Properties such as intentionality 
and reflexivity associated with persons are dependent on practice but their existence 
is not practice dependent. This makes individuals as biological entities 
fundamentally different from states, whose existence is exclusively reliant on 
practice. This is an argument that was deepened by the discussion of the concept of 
emergence and the non-linearity of social action.
Conceptualising states as emergent entities allows the framework to consider the 
properties of states such as common values, goals, social roles, and interests as the 
result of interaction between the constitutive elements. These properties cannot be 
traceable to one particular element nor to all elements. This means conceptualising 
states as more than the sum of human agencies, although the different facets of 
human agency above acknowledge the role of human agents. The framework 
suggests that individuals, as basic nodes of a socially complex entity, have different 
forms of agency in virtue of the emergent whole into which they are plugged, and 
which they also constitute, represent and transform. Incorporating the assumption of 
non-linearity as a property of networks means also providing explanations of state 
action that are not premised on linear causation of the ‘A determines/causes B’ type. 
It also means acknowledging the impossibility of tracing outcomes (i.e. the manner 
in which the state acts) to one element alone.
These two assumptions come with a focus on both the elements and the emergent 
totality.
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The critique of the theories discussed in the thesis has gained at this point another 
dimension. It is not only that these theories are internally inconsistent, but that, from 
the perspective of these ontological commitments, they are also missing out on 
important social processes that account for state action. Statist theories 
overemphasise the whole, while the pluralist accounts focus on the constitutive 
elements.
Outcomes are understood in the thesis as a function of the relational aspect of the 
individual nodes to each other but also in relation to the whole. State actions, such as 
strategies and policy goals, could reflect or not the intentions of some of the human 
actors involved in the political process. However, state action, goals and positions in 
the international cannot be explained by reference to a particular individual or 
individuals. Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the consequences of maintaining the 
distinction between states and human agents for explaining state action and state 
goals. For example, the analysis in Chapter 7 shifted the focus from individual 
leaders, such as Ceausescu, as the direct cause of events to networks of relationships 
-  the confluence of social processes and contexts.219 The acts of separate individuals 
alone could not account for the type of agentic properties the Romanian state had 
within specific contexts.
The discussion in Chapter 7 illustrated the non-linear aspect of social action. Goals 
and state action were not the direct consequence of one or more human agents but 
rather the consequence of overlapping social processes and practices that feed back 
and forward to account for the position of the state. By showing how goals and
219 The type of argument put forward in this thesis should not be taken or read as an exoneration of 
leaders (i.e. Ceausescu’s role in the reproduction of the political regime of the time). I accept that, 
based on such views of the state, new questions can be asked about the type of responsibility 
associated with individuals and states. This however can constitute the subject of another thesis 
altogether.
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actions were emergent from networks of social relations, practices and historical 
contexts, notions of instrumental rational action undertaken by a pre-social self also 
became problematic.
The thesis claimed that the processes of regime change illustrate as well as reinforce 
the conceptualisation of the state as an emergent network of social relations and 
agents. The analysis of Chapter 6 showed that, in order for radical change to become 
consequential, it must target not only particular individuals but also institutions and 
social relations that inform more broadly the social practices within a space and/or in 
different social areas such as economics, law, politics, and culture. The chapter 
briefly contrasted the regime change occurring in the 1944-1948 period with the 
regime change taking place in 1989. A sudden regime change did formally occur in 
1989. However, the removal of some of the main leaders from the state functions 
was not sufficient to trigger such sudden changes in the political practices as it did in 
the period after 1944. This explains the references of the transitional literature to the 
social relations and practices reminiscent of the communist regime. I have 
considered these types of arguments as a different illustration of the network-like 
and emergent features of the Romanian state.
The thesis questioned the use of the concept of the network to refer only to a 
historically specific type of state, such as the postmodern state or the informational 
state. Castells’ network state, for instance, is regarded as the organisation of the 
present, whereas unitary and homogenous entities are those of modernity. I have 
shown that Keohane and Nye, and Sorensen, propose similar evolutionary 
approaches in the conceptualisation of the state through their concepts of the multi­
issue state, which is the outcome of increased economic interdependence, and the
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postmodern state respectively. My analysis has made the case for the network as an 
ontological premise for framing the organisation of socially complex actors, of 
which states are an example. It argued that conceptualising social organisations as 
networks is an ontological commitment that allows us to consider different patterns 
of relations and acknowledge the flexibility of forms of organisation. My argument 
suggested a weaker emphasis on typologies of states, especially if they enhance the 
inside-outside division and the related views on unitary and person-like agency. At 
the same time, the thesis argued that the conceptualisation of states as network-like 
actors does not make networks desirable or evolutionary superior forms of 
organisation. I have used the examples from the network analysis literature to 
illustrate this claim -  for instance, network spaces can be exclusive or restrictive.
Chapter 7 illustrated this argument. The Romanian state between the 1960s and 
1980s, as a highly centralised state undergoing industrialisation, fitted prima facie 
the model of the modem state. Network theory maintains that network-like entities 
are bound together by broader principles, termed the ‘logic’ of the network. It also 
argues that entities are networks if lower nodes have the agency to decide upon the 
courses of action. My analysis showed that the Romanian state was network-like in 
the production of meaning, in the functioning of the administration and in the 
production of material resources. The chapter demonstrated that the Romanian state 
was not constituted only by top down processes, although it was hierarchical in 
terms of organisation, and constraining in terms of the boundaries of meaning 
production. The chapter demonstrated that the logic of the social relations 
underpinning the policies and institutions of the state allowed both centralising and 
decentralising tendencies to co-exist. This reflected in the type of agency managers, 
bureaucrats, and scholars had. Individuals as ‘lower’ nodes in the formal networks,
230
as well as nodes in the illicit and informal ones, had an intricate mix of reproductive 
and transformative agency. These agents did not directly challenge the deeper social 
relations and institutions on which the state was premised. However, the informal 
and illegal practices created effects that were not intended by the centre of the formal 
network.
As mentioned already, the thesis argued that while, legally, the state is unified in 
time and space, it exists in multiple spaces and times. These social spaces inform 
differentiated agential potential. The agential potential of states is differentiated 
depending on the social relations and practices that become dominant in social 
transactions. The explanations provided in this thesis intended to avoid the 
reification of a certain type of relation or elements such as sovereignty, territory, and 
population, by focusing on the relations involved in the transactions and contexts in 
which transactions take place. Treating state agency as relational was central to 
strengthening the argument about state agency as non-unitary.
The analysis of regime change in Chapter 6 exposed the contradictory networks of 
social relations and of agents informing the constitution of the Romanian state. The 
analysis showed that agential potential is networked and differentiated depending on 
the type of relations drawn on during the transactions. For instance, after the 1944 
coup, the re-instatement of democratic procedures and a non-fascist leadership, 
which formally made the state a constitutional monarchy, informed positively the 
relationship with the Western Allies. At the same time, the Soviets regarded the 
social relations underpinning the constitution of the Romanian state as the cause for 
the reluctance of the Romanian state to work with the Allied Soviet High 
Commission after 1944. More broadly, the ‘bourgeois’ and anti-revolutionary social
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relations and institutions were considered responsible for informing the actions and 
interests of the Romanian state during the war, and particularly its opposition to the 
USSR. However, the presence of the Romanian communists in coalitions with the 
traditional Liberal and Peasants’ parties constituted the Romanian state as an actor 
with potential internationalist features. The discussion also argued that the presence 
of the Soviet Army on the Romanian territory represented a resource that enhanced 
the agency of the state, from the perspective of the Romanian Communists and of 
the USSR. At the same time, it was limiting the state’s agential potential in 
international and ‘domestic’ matters from the perspective of the traditional political 
parties and from that of the Western states. One of the conclusions of Chapter 6 was 
that the agential power of the Romanian state after 1944 would be difficult to frame 
as uniquely low or high.
Chapter 7 argued for instance that the pursuit of the debt payment goal constituted 
the Romanian state in two opposite ways in relation to the Western governments and 
banks: as a still reliable state, which could pay the debt, as well as an oppressive and 
weak actor. The position depended on the type of social relations and practices that 
became relevant in the transactions with foreign others. The different roles that the 
Romanian state took during the 1960s to mid 1980s, such as ‘socialist’, ‘maverick’, 
‘developing’, ‘dictatorship’, suggested the existence of different and overlapping 
social spaces. These roles informed Romanian state agency internationally. The 
analysis demonstrated that these roles were not the exclusive outcome of a top-down 
process or the outcome of the domestic social space. The chapter, for instance, 
argued that even the claims of ‘maverick’ and independent policy should be 
reframed in order to acknowledge the relational aspects of state action across the 
inside-outside divide. The analysis rejected the accounts that identify one main
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relationship (state-society for instance) as the cause for the agential potential of the 
state internationally. The chapter also strengthened the argument made against 
typologies of states, which identify, for instance, a type of state (e.g. ‘developing’) 
with a specific agential potential (e.g. weakness internationally).
The thesis has been informed by an understanding of social action as nonlinear. Non- 
linearity of the social world more broadly assumes a certain degree of 
unpredictability or openness in terms of the form social life takes, despite the fact 
that there are stable features or patterns defined within the relations. This means that, 
even when patterns of interactions are present within social interaction, the manner 
in which interaction occurs makes it impossible to trace outcomes to one element 
alone. If causes are multiple and interact in a complex manner, it is also difficult to 
separate, for instance, between exclusively material or ideational causes, as material 
and ideational resources become entangled in the outcome. The task of producing 
explanations of the type if ‘a’, then ‘b’ will follow becomes untenable if the 
transformative potential embedded in human reflexivity is taken into account, as 
well as the potential of certain events or humans to act as catalysts for fundamental 
changes. Such a view has important implications for the type of social inquiry that 
the discipline of IR can produce in terms of explanations of past events; and in terms 
of predicting future outcomes, if the intention is to develop policy relevant analysis.
The analysis in Chapter 6, for example, has illustrated the importance of social 
relations, as well as contingent events, leading to the formal change of regime in 
Romania in December 1947. The immediate context was important as a catalyst for 
making some social relations (Marxist-Leninist) and networks of human agents
220 In Chapter 7, a mix of material and ideational factors enabled the emergence of a particular kind of 
nationalism.
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(communists) more important than others (liberal, social democrat, fascist). In 
Chapter 7 ,1 have shown that the natural disasters of 1980 and 1981 amplified the 
economic problems of the Romanian state by disrupting the industrial and food 
production intended for export. Exports were essential for obtaining foreign currency 
that was used to pay for industrialisation. These contingent events made more 
pressing the need to change the foreign policy goal from industrialisation to debt 
repayment. My empirical analysis has been underpinned by an understanding of 
transformation as path dependent on previous social relations and practices, yet not 
determined in any clear way.
From the perspective taken in this thesis, policy relevant social inquiry could only 
identify tendencies and construct scenarios, not predict outcomes. The focus would 
be on developing contingency plans that can only approximate future outcomes. 
Bernstein et al. propose a similar direction for policy-relevant social science. They 
write:
[scenarios] start with the assumption that the future is unpredictable and tell alternative stories of how 
the future may unfold. Scenarios are generally constructed by distinguishing what we believe is 
relatively certain from what we think is uncertain. The most important ‘certainties’ are common to all 
scenarios that address the same problem or trend, while the most important perceived uncertainties 
differentiate one scenario from another (Bernstein, Lebow, Stein, & Weber, 2000, p. 54).
The implications for political action of the assumptions that states are not constituted 
as coherent entities, which possess a coherent inside, are also worth exploring. What 
are the consequences of reporting or claiming that Serbia’s feelings are hurt by the 
Kosovo proclamation of independence -  i.e. projecting upon an entire political 
community feelings of anger or frustration? On the other hand, what would be the 
type of policy approach when the networks of social relations and of human agents 
that constitute the state are taken into account? Important policy consequences could 
also come out of explanations that identify the leader (e.g. Mugabe) with the
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Zimbabwean state -  for instance in terms of the potential and the speed of change of 
the Zimbabwean state if the leader were removed.
Viewing the state as a network with multiple boundaries and spaces that inform its
potential to act also raises questions about the nature of ‘the’ international. It
suggests that ‘the international’ is neither a stable space nor concept, against which
the state and state agency are constituted. In this light, the thesis advances and
subscribes to arguments that intend to reconceptualise ‘the international’. From the
perspective of the approach developed in this thesis, the research endeavour does not
need to be trapped in the dilemmas of whether explanations we provide are
001‘systemic’ or ‘reductionist’. My analysis suggested the need to focus on multiple
social relations, institutions and practices, which constitute social spaces, rather than 
a priori decide which social relationships, and, more generally, which social spaces
are more important in constituting and explaining state action. The ‘micro’ and the
000‘macro’ are implicated in one another because the thesis advocates an ontological 
position that acknowledges the potential of various social networks to be constitutive 
and causative of social action. It is a matter of finding the appropriate methodology
OO'Xthat could be consistent with such a view. My particular analysis used one of the 
methodologies of network analysis, which suggested that social spaces could be 
drawn according to the formal membership criteria of individuals, or according to 
their participation in a specific activity or practice. This allowed me to assess the role
221 For instance, Hollis and Smith put forward theoretical explanations around several system-unit 
dyads such as system-state, state-bureaucracy, and bureaucracy-individual, with the first term of the 
dyad playing the systemic function and the second the unit one (Hollis & Smith, 1991, pp. 7-9). 
Buzan identifies five ‘spatial’ units of analysis or ontological referents -  the individual, the 
bureaucracies, the state, the region and the system, which could be analysed according to three levels, 
which are capacity, structure and process (Buzan, 1995, pp. 204 - 205).
222 Katzenstein, Peter J. et al. differentiate between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ research questions 
(Katzenstein & al, 1996, p. 10).
223 Bernstein et al. develop a seven step methodology for building scenarios, which could be valuable 
also for framing explanations of past events (Bernstein et al., 2000, p. 55).
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of social processes associated with more than one social space, such as the 
‘domestic’ or the formal institutions of the Romanian state.
The argument put forward in the thesis made historical analysis central to developing 
understandings of state action. At the theoretical level, it insisted upon the 
contingency of human action and the role of social practices in the reproduction and 
transformation of states as actors. In this respect, it built upon the insights of 
historical sociologists and postmodernists. My analysis in chapters 6 and 7 has 
argued, however, against the type of ontological assumptions that silently inform the 
political histories of the Romanian state. The thesis showed that the political 
histories work with pluralist or/and statist assumptions, which also serve to organise 
the historical data when detailed or precise information is missing. For instance, state 
policies are attributed to and explained by reference to the leader.
The thesis makes the case for theoretical frameworks that are sensitive to material 
from other disciplines, such as cultural studies, history, anthropology, economics, 
diplomacy, geography, and so forth. The writings of anthropologists and 
international political economists on communist societies provided my argument 
with important insights that demonstrated the network nature of the Romanian state 
and its contradictory and varied agential potential. More generally, the thesis 
subscribes to those appeals for the enlargement of the boundaries of the discipline, 
yet it remains critical of how such analysis is framed.
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